-NRLF 


MODERN  CAVALRY 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON    •    CHICAGO    •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA    •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON    •    BOMBAY    •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OP  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


MODERN    CAVALRY 


STUDIES  ON  ITS  ROLE  IN  THE  WARFARE 
OF  TO-DAY  WITH  NOTES  ON  TRAIN- 
ING FOR  WAR  SERVICE 


BY 

MAJOR  MALCOLM  WHEELER-NICHOLSON 

Cavalry,  United  States  Army 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

AH  rights  reserved 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


COPYRIGHT,  1922, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  January,  1922. 

\VpW\v^    *»1  1 


Press  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Company 
New  York,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

THE  tumult  and  shouting  of  the  world  war  has  had  a 
little  time  to  die  down.  Throughout  its  course  and  for 
some  time  afterward  it  was  impossible  to  clarify  ideas  and 
to  deduce  lessons.  These  require  a  certain  amount  of 
perspective  for  their  better  rendering. 

This  perspective  has  been  a  little  furnished  by  the 
passage  of  time.  Time  is  a  cold  analyst  who  makes 
tangible  the  real  causes  and  effects  and  relegates  the 
merely  subsidiary  to  a  nebulous  background.  Out  of  the 
haze  and  smoke  of  conflict  we  can  begin  to  see  dimly  the 
simple  primitive  forces  that  were  at  war  and  to  see  the 
underlying  causes  that  make  for  victory  or  defeat.  In 
freeing  the  mind  from  the  thralldom  of  the  present,  in 
deliberately  comparing  this  war  with  all  wars,  the  mind 
of  the  military  student  becomes  amazed  at  the  simplicity 
of  the  predominating  factors  in  warfare. 

This  last  war  has  complicated  the  issue  by  the  use  in 
battle  of  a  larger  variety  of  innovations  in  the  way  of 
auxiliaries  and  mechanical  aids,  than  any  war  in  history. 
The  aeroplane  and  the  tank  and  a  host  of  like  aids  have 
a  tendency  to  obsess  the  mind  of  the  unthinking  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  important  factors  in  victory  or  defeat, 
to  the  real  forces  that  battle  for  ascendency. 

Battle  is  decided  by  men.  Mechanical  aids  and  aux- 
iliaries end  by  neutralizing  each  other.  They  do  not 
decide  a  war.  It  is  the  actual  physical  contact  of  men 


904B11 


vi  PREFACE 

or  the  fear  of  physical  contact  that  decides  battles.  In 
the  final  analysis  it  is  the  preponderance  of  man  power 
that  wins. 

To  secure  this  preponderance  of  man  power  at  the 
right  place  and  time  is  the  aim  of  all  military  leaders. 
It  is  the  aim  of  all  strategy  and  the  reason  for  all  the 
cumbersome  mechanics  of  war.  The  Great  Captains, 
from  Hannibal  to  Napoleon,  have  been  great  because 
they,  above  all  others,  realized  the  fundamental  simplicity 
of  war.  The  failures  and  mediocrities  in  military  history 
have  failed  because  they  grasped  at  the  shadow,  were 
obsessed  with  forms,  formulas,  geometrical  figures  and 
thereby  missed  the  substance.  "Getting  there  firstest  with 
the  mostest  men"  has  always  been  and  will  always  be  the 
principle  of  warfare.  All  else  is  accessory. 

The  "getting  there  firstest"  part  of  this  principle  is  the 
part  upon  which  the  argument  for  cavalry  is  based.  In 
using  tfie  word  cavalry  it  is  first  necessary  to  disabuse 
the  mind  of  the  untechnical  civiMan  of  any  ideas  of 
waving  plumes,  whipping  pennons  and  flashing  cuirasses. 
The  horse  has  become  more  of  a  means  of  transportation 
whereby  to  transport  a  soldier,  armed,  equipped  and 
trained  in  all  respects  as  the  footman,  to  the  firing  line. 
Our  cavalrymen  use  the  same  rifle,  and  are  trained  in 
the  same  musketry  course  as  are  the  infantrymen  of  our 
army.  They  expend  the  same  amount  of  ammunition  at 
target  practice  as  do  the  infantrymen.  Why  the  battle 
value  of  our  cavalry  should  be  lessened  by  the  fact  that 
they  approach  the  field  of  battle  on  horse  rather  than  on 
foot  has  yet  to  be  proved. 

Since  the  World  War  there  are  those  who  would  sup- 
plant cavalry  with  infantry  mounted  in  trucks  and  lorries. 
This,  it  is  claimed,  would  make  cavalry  superfluous  by 
rendering  infantry  equally  mobile.  This  was  done  in  the 


PREFACE  vii 

war  on  the  Western  front,  argue  they.  This  argument 
takes  for  granted  that  there  will  be,  in  any  terrain  we 
will  be  called  upon  to  march  over,  similar  roads  to  those 
existing  in  Northern  France.  If  one  will  take  an  atlas 
and  estimate  just  how  much  -of  the  earth's  surface  is 
covered  by  roads  in  any  way  similar  to  those  of  Northern 
France  this  argument  is  at  once  proved  fallacious.  To 
particularize,  in  Europe  one  finds  good  roads  in  France, 
Germany,  and  the  British  Isles.  And  by  good  roads  is 
meant  roads  that  will  stand  up  in  rain  and  shine  against 
the  fearful  racketing  and  tearing  of  heavy  motor  traffic. 
From  the  standard  set  by  these  three  countries  the  roads 
of  the  remainder  of  Europe  grade  down  to  the  cattle 
tracks  on  the  immense  steppes  of  Russia.  The  great 
highlands  of  Asia,  the  enormous  extent  of  Africa,  China, 
Siberia  and  Australia  must  be  taken  into  consideration. 
In  the  two  Americas  we  have  a  few  good  roads  on  our 
Atlantic  seaboard,  a  narrow  strip,  and  a  few  good  ones 
on  the  southern  end  of  our  Pacific  seaboard.  Against 
these  must  be  put  the  enormous  territories  of  South  and 
Central  America,  Mexico,  the  remainder  of  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  To  base  our  transportation  needs 
solely  upon  conditions  existent  in  the  comparatively  tiny 
proportion  of  the  earth's  surface  containing  good  roads 
and  to  disregard  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  square 
miles  not  so  blessed  is  putting  too  many  eggs  in  one 
basket.  The  weakness  of  this  is  further  exemplified  when 
one  takes  into  consideration  the  remote  chances  of  another 
war  between  two  white  civilized  races  on  civilized  terrain, 
as  compared  to  a  war  between  a  white  civilized  race  and  a 
colored  race  of  lesser  civilization  fighting  on  a  primitive 
terrain.  And  the  greater  portion  of  the  earth's  surface 
is  primitive  terrain  inhabited  by  semi-civilized,  barbaric 
or  savage  peoples. 


viii  PREFACE 

In  addition  to  the  great  extent  of  the  earth's  surface 
where  it  is  impossible  to  use  gasoline  transportation,  there 
is  another  phase  of  the  problem  that  few  people  know  or 
reflect  on — the  fact  that  the  gasoline  supply  of  the  world 
has  a  known  limit  and  that  limit  much  closer  than  people 
realize. 

Before  relegating  cavalry  and  the  horse  to  the  limbo 
of  forgotten  things,  it  is  wise  to  reflect  a  little  upon  the 
Palestine  campaign — a  campaign  undertaken  and  pushed 
through  while  the  fighting  on  the  Western  front  was  in 
progress — with  forces  having  access  to  the  innovations 
introduced  in  this  war.  Because  of  the  terrain,  these 
forces  fought,  with  few  modifications,  as  Richard  and 
Saladin  fought  in  days  gone  by.  The  man,  aided  by  the 
horse  (a  proportion  of  something  like  three  divisions  of 
cavalry  to  four  of  infantry)  struggled  as  he  has  always 
struggled  and  always  will  struggle  when  a  little  removed 
from  the  good  roads  of  civilized  countries. 

Civilization  has  been  overrun  by  horsemen  from  time 
immemorial.  At  recurrent  periods  throughout  the  course 
of  history,  hordes  of  horsemen  have  swept  over  Europe 
from  the  highlands  of  Asia.  Our  own  America  was 
discovered  because  o<f  the  closing  of  the  trade  routes 
to  the  East  by  the  Seljukian  Turks,  marauding  horsemen 
who  had,  themselves,  been  pushed  from  their  fastnesses 
by  still  other  roving  horsemen  in  the  interior  of  Asia. 

As  long  as  the  enormous  stretches  of  almost  trackless 
land  surface  on  the  globe  are  so  much  greater  in  extent 
than  the  small  area  of  improved  country,  as  long  as  these 
great  domains  are  inhabited  by  people  inferior  in  civiliza- 
tion, just  so  long  will  there  be  need  of  the  mounted  man. 

This  necessity  for  cavalry  was  impressed  upon  the 
writer  after  having  served  on  the  plains  of  the  Texas- 
Mexican  border,  after  having  served  with  Cossacks  and 


PREFACE  ix 

Japanese  cavalries  in  Siberia  and  after  having  traveled 
over  most  of  Europe,  which  traveling  was  followed  by  an 
exhaustive  study  of  the  World  War.  The  necessity  of 
attempting  to  correct  some  of  the  current  fallacies  in 
regard  to  cavalry  was  impressed  upon  him. 

This  work  is  not  intended  as  an  exhaustive  or  complete 
treatise  upon  cavalry.  It  is  an  attempt  to  put  between 
the  covers  of  one  book  the  best  thought  on  the  subject  as 
represented  in  the  conversation  and  writings  of  English, 
French,  Belgian,  Japanese,  Russian  and  German  cavalry 
officers.  The  writer  has  had  the  privilege  of  studying  at 
first  hand  the  cavalry  services  of  all  of  the  above  named 
cavalries  except  the  German  and  made  up  for  this  latter 
lack  by  studying  the  Swedish  which  is  closely  modeled 
r>n  the  German.  Good  ideas  have  been  freely  pre-empted 
wherever  found.  The  notes  on  training  have  been  for 
the  most  part  hammered  out  from  personal  experience 
extending  over  nearly  ten  years  of  service  as  a  cavalry 
officer. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  young  cavalry  officer  will  be 
enabled  to  find  herein  enough  matter  of  interest  to  lead 
him  to  reflection  on  the  tactical  possibilities  and  responsi- 
bilities of  his  profession. 

The  work  is  offered  with  no  apologies.  It  represents 
a  lot  of  hard  work  honestly  undertaken  in  an  effort  to 
contribute  a  little  to  thought  on  the  subject  of  National 
defense.  It  tries,  as  best  it  can,  to  fill  the  gap  caused 
by  the  fact  that  there  is  no  modern  work  based  on  cavalry 
service  in  the  World  War. 

M.  W.  N. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 


The     following     works     have     been     valuable     in     furnishing 
materials : 

Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace von  Bernhardi 

Cavalry  in  Future  Wars. von  Bernhardi 

Cavalry  on   Service von  Pelet-Narbonne 

The  Nation  in  Arms von  der  Goltz 

The  Conduct  of  War von  der  Goltz 

On   War von  Clausewitz 

Tactics,  Cavalry  and  Artillery Balck 

Entwicklung  der   Taktik   im   Weltkrieg 

(Berlin,  1920)    Balck 

The  March  on  Paris von  Kluck 

Die  Rieter  Patrouille  im  Weltkrieg Rittmeister  K'ronberger 

Die   Militarischen    Lehren   des    Grossen 

Krieges     M.  Schwarte 

Heerfiirhrung  im  Weltkrieg    von  Freytag-Loringhoven 

Our   Cavalry Rimington 

A  History  of  Cavalry Denison 

1914    Field  Marshal  French 

The  Palestine   Campaign British  Official  Account 

Aids  to   Scouting Baden-Powell 

The  Art  of  Reconnaissance Henderson 

Some  Achievements  of  Cavalry Field    Marshal    Sir 

Evelyn  Wood 
British      Campaigns      in      France      and 

Flanders     Conan  Doyle 

The   Tank   Corps Williams-Ellis 

La   Cayallerie    Franchise   de   la   premier 

battaile  de  la  Marne Hethay 

The  Principles  of  War Marshal  Foch 

Cavaliers    de    France    (1914    Etapes    et 

combats) Capitaine  Langevin 

xi 


xii  ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

The  Crowd  Le  Bon 

The  Transformations  of  War Commandant  Colin 

American    Campaigns Steele 

The  Mounted  Rifleman Brig.  Gen.  Parker 

In  addition  to  the  above  many  valuable  ideas  have  been  gleaned 
from  various  articles  in  the  British  Cavalry  Journal,  the  Journal 
of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institute  and  the  American  Cavalry 
Journal.  Thanks  are  hereby  expressed  to  Lieut.  Col.  David 
Biddle,  Cav.  Liaison  Officer  with  the  British  Army  of  Occupation, 
to  Captain  Royden  Williamson,  Cav.  Liaison  Officer  with  the 
Belgian  Army  of  Occupation  and  to  Lieut.  Mark  Devine,  Cav- 
alry attached  to  the  i6th  Cuirassier  Regiment,  French  Army  of 
Occupation,  for  the  assistance  and  information  furnished  by 
them.  Valuable  facts  as  to  the  campaign  in  Palestine  were  found 
in  the  reports  of  Colonel  Davis,  Cavalry. 

M,  W.  N. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY i 

II  TROOP  TRAINING — SOME  BASIC  FACTORS      ....  15 

III  TROOP  TRAINING — MORALE  FACTORS 31 

IV  TROOP  TRAINING — THE  OFFICER 49 

V  TROOP  TRAINING — THE  HORSE 66 

VI  AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY 75 

VII  CAVALRY  TACTICS — MOUNTED  ACTION 88 

VIII  CAVALRY  TACTICS — DISMOUNTED  ACTION      .     .     .     .  106 

IX  CAVALRY  TACTICS — VARIED    REQUIREMENTS       ...  120 

X  CAVALRY  TACTICS— VARIED  REQUIREMENTS   (Cont.)    .  136 

XI  RECONNAISSANCE — AIR  SERVICE  AND  CAVALRY    .     .     .151 

XII  CAVALRY  RECONNAISSANCE,  PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS    .    .  160 

XIII  NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY     ....  182 


MODERN  CAVALRY 


MODERN  CAVALRY 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY 

Far  from  having  had  its  luster  dimmed  by  tj^c  world 
war,  the  cavalry  service  has  guinfeS  ne\v  power  and  value 
by  the  lessons  learned  therein.  n  Cavalry >  has  Always  had 
certain  advantages  and  Virtues  .possessed'  by'1  no'  other 
branch.  It  has  still  those  virtues  and  advantages  but 
has  added  immeasurably  to  the  original  stock.  It  has 
lost  certain  of  its  disadvantages. 

The  great  advantages  possessed  by  cavalry  have  always 
been  its  superior  mobility  and  offensive  power.  The 
great  lack  has  always  been  stability  and  defensive  power. 
It  still  has  its  original  mobility.  It  has,  in  addition,  a 
greatly  enhanced  offensive  power.  It  has  now  a  stability 
and  defensive  power  only  slightly  less  than  that  of  the 
infantry.  It  went  into  the  world  war  an  auxiliary  branch 
—it  has  come  out  with  the  position  that  rightfully  be- 
longs to  it — that  of  a  co-equal  combatant  branch. 

The  future  of  the  cavalry  lies  in  its  ability  as  a  com- 
batant or  fighting  branch.  It  is  in  developing  to  their 
fullest  capacity  these  capabilities  that  the  energy  of  the 


2  MODERN  CAVALRY 

cavalry  must  find  its  fullest  expression.  It  can  and  must 
be  made  the  powerful  arm  in  our  army  that  it  is  fully 
capable  of  being.  It  has  always  been  the  only  arm  in  the 
hands  of  a  general  whereby  to  dominate  movement.  It 
is  the  arm  of  decision.  There  can  not  be  a  decisive 
victory  without  its  aid.  This  has  always  been  true.  This 
truth  has  gained  greater  strength  and  importance  owing 
to  the  increased  fighting  value  of  cavalry  and  its  in- 
creased range  of  capabilities. 

Cavalry  is  an  arm  highly  sensitive  to  leadership.  It  is 
not  only  necessary  to  have  good  cavalry  but  the  higher 
commanders  must  understand  the  proper  handling  of  it. 
Many  faults  laid  at  the  door  of  cavalry  can  be  laid  directly 
at  the  door  of  the  higher  authority  unskilled  in  its  use. 
This  was:  the  chief  -fault  <D£  the  German  leaders  in  1870 
and  of  tfre'Japanesfe  aM-  Russian  leaders  in  1904. 

The  pffipef  ^  ^fto  is  ambitious  to  wear  the  general's 
stars*a*nd^o  Jekd  irirbajttteS'Olt'he  future  must  thoroughly 
understand  the  powers  and  capabilities  of  cavalry.  Any 
officer  who  hopes  to  rise  to  successful  command  must 
understand  how  to  direct  or  cooperate  with  cavalry. 
The  proof  of  this  needs  no  more  than  a  critical  study  of 
the  cavalry  operations  in  the  world  war,  not  only  a  study 
of  the  comparatively  limited  sector  of  the  Western  front, 
as  valuable  as  that  is,  but  a  study  of  all  fronts. 

The  chief  lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  study  is,  that 
upon  the  results  gained  by  the  cavalry  in  the  first  weeks 
of  a  war  will  depend,  to  an  enormous  extent,  the  success 
or  failure  of  the  first  decisive  encounter  of  all  arms. 

The  second  lesson  to  be  learned  is  the  one  stated  above 
—the  increase  in  the  value  of  cavalry  as  the  result  of 
its  action  in  the  world  war.  To  realize  this  it  is  only 
necessary  to  study  the  Allied  cavalry  performances; 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  3 

above  all,  the  British  cavalry.  Such  a  study  will  convince 
one  that  never  has  cavalry  in  the  past  performed  duties 
as  valuable  or  as  varied  as  it  has  in  the  war  just  finished. 

It  is  further  necessary  to  disabuse  the  mind  of  all  ideas 
as  to  the  importance  of  position  warfare  in  the  wars  of 
the  future.  It  is  necessary  to  remember,  especially  for 
American  officers,  that  after  the  first  few  weeks  in  1914 
the  war  on  the  Western  front  was  nothing  but  one  stu- 
pendous battle.  A  battle  has  ordinarily  three  phases,  the 
maneuvering  or  contact  period,  the  encounter  period,  and 
the  withdrawal  period.  Cavalry,  as  cavalry,  is  of  para- 
mount importance  in  the  first  period,  when  the  opposing 
armies  are  finding  each  other,  and  in  the  third  period 
when  one  has  been  defeated  and  retreats  and  the  other  has 
been  victorious  and  pursues.  But  in  the  second  period, 
the  period  of  infantry  and  artillery  action,  cavalry  finds 
its  greatest  sphere  of  influence  upon  the  flanks.  In  this 
great  battle  of  the  Western  front  the  second  period 
lasted  over  four  years  and  there  were  no  flanks. 

On  the  Western  front  the  cavalry  performed  nobly  in 
the  first  period,  acted  as  infantry  and  a  mobile  reserve 
in  the  second  period  and  was  denied  participation  in  the 
third  owing  to  the  moral  collapse  of  the  Germans  while 
they  were  still  practically  intact  physically.  To  say  that 
the  warfare  of  the  future  will  be  similar  to  the  warfare 
on  the  Western  front  is  to  say  that  all  wars  of  the  future 
will  be  fought  by  millions  of  men  facing  each  other  with 
the  sea  on  one  flank  and  a  neutral  country  on  the  other. 

Half-baked  enthusiasm  for  or  half -baked  condemna- 
tion of  cavalry  are  both  valueless  as  being  based  upon 
ignorance.  It  is  necessary  to  give  heed,  however,  to 
the  opinions  of  the  leaders  in  this  stupendous  struggle. 
Such  men  as  Field  Marshal  French,  Field  Marshal  Haig> 


4  MODERN  CAVALRY 

Field  Marshal  Allenby,  General  Pershing,  General  von 
Kluck  and  General  Ludendorff  to  mention  a  few,  whose 
viewpoint  is  necessarily  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  the 
whole  rather  than  restricted  to  any  special  part,  have 
expressed  opinions  upon  cavalry  that  are  well  worth 
quoting. 

Among  a  great  many  other  commendatory  remarks 
upon  the  work  of  the  British  cavalry  Field  Marshal 
French  *  has  this  to  say  referring  especially  to  the  share 
of  his  cavalry  in  battle :  "The  greatest  threat  of  disaster 
with  which  we  were  faced  in  1914  was  staved  off  by  the 
devoted  bravery  and  endurance  displayed  by  the  cavalry 
corps  under  a  commander,  General  Allenby,  who  handled 
them  throughout  with  consummate  skill  ...  it  is  no  dis- 
paragement, however,  to  the  other  troops  engaged  if  I 
lay  stress  upon  the  fact  that  it  was  the  cavalry  alone 
who,  for  more  than  a  fortnight  previously,  had  been  dis- 
puting foot  by  foot  every  yard  of  the  ground  to  the 
river  Lys.  They  had  fought  day  and  night  with  the 
utmost  tenacity  and  the  battles  of  October  31  and  Novem- 
ber i  were  but  the  climax  to  a  long  and  bitter  spell  of 
heroic  effort.  .  .  .  Taking  into  account  the  losses  they 
suffered  they  can  hardly  have  opposed  2,000  rifles  to  the 
onslaught  of  what  has  been  computed  at  more  than  two 
German  army  corps." 

Field  Marshal  Haig,  in  his  careful  report  of  the  war 
to  his  government,  had  the  following  to  say  about  the 
cavalry  service:  "In  the  light  of  the  full  experience  of 
the  war  the  decision  to  preserve  the  cavalry  corps  has 
been  completely  justified.  It  has  been  proved  that  cavalry, 
whether  used  for  shock  effect  under  suitable  conditions, 
or  as  mobile  infantry,  have  still  an  indispensable  part  to 

"•1914,".  P.  266. 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  5 

play  in  modern  war.  Moreover,  it  can  not  safely  be 
assumed  that  in  future  wars  the  flanks  of  the  opposing 
forces  will  rest  on  neutral  states  or  impassable  obstacles. 
Whenever  such  a  condition  does  not  obtain,  opportunities 
for  the  use  of  cavalry  must  arise  frequently." 

"Throughout  the  great  retirement  in  1914  our  cavalry 
covered  the  retirement  and  protected  the  flanks  of  our 
columns  against  the  onrush  of  the  enemy;  and  on  fre- 
quent occasions  prevented  our  infantry  from  being  over- 
run by  the  enemy  cavalry.  Later  in  the  same  year  at 
Ypres  their  mobility  multiplied  their  value  as  a  reserve, 
enabling  them  rapidly  to  reinforce  threatened  portions  of 
our  line." 

General  Pershing  in  his  article  in  our  Cavalry  Journal l 
stated  that  "The  splendid  work  of  the  cavalry  in  the 
first  few  weeks  of  the  war  more  than  justified  its  exist- 
ence and  the  expense  of  its  upkeep  in  the  years  of  peace 
preceding  the  war.  The  American  theory  for  the  em- 
ployment of  cavalry  is  correct  and  the  Allied  cavalry 
would  have  been  of  even  greater  use  in  the  early  months 
of  the  war  if  it  had  been  trained  as  American  cavalry  is 
trained." 

On  the  other  side  von  Kluck,  the  commander  of  the 
First  German  Army  that  made  the  rush  through  Belgium 
and  France  to  be  stopped  at  the  First  Battle  of  the  Marne, 
has  this  to  say  as  to  one  occasion  when  he  lacked  cavalry : 
"On  the  occasion  of  the  pursuit  of  the  British  army  after 
Mons  and  their  successful  and  skilful  retreat  on  the  24th 
and  25th  of  August  1914  .  .  .  the  chief  factor  2  that  en- 
abled the  British  Army  to  escape  was  that  the  German 
First  Army  (von  Kluck's)  lacked  the  effective  means  of 

1  Journal  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association,  April,  1920. 
a<The  March  on  Paris,  1914,"  page  56. 


6  MODERN  CAVALRY 

making  it  stand  and  fight,  namely,  the  three  divisions 
which  composed  Marwitz's  Cavalry  Corps." 

Ludendorf  l  is  quoted  in  the  Cavalry  Journal  as  saying : 
"The  cavalry  was  of  the  greatest  importance  and  service 
to  me  in  all  campaigns  of  movement.  In  the  March,  1918, 
offensive  in  France,  I  felt  seriously  handicapped  by  the 
lack  of  cavalry." 

It  will  be  noted  that  most  of  these  testimonies  as  to  the 
value  of  cavalry  refer  to  it  in  the  movement  phase  of  the 
war.  As  long  as  armies  are  forced  to  maneuver,  as 
long  as  there  are  great  stretches  of  broad  continent  in 
the  world,  in  America,  in  Africa,  in  Europe  and  in  Asia 
just  so  long  will  there  be  need  of  highly  mobile  troops. 
So  far  the  cavalry  is  the  only  successful  mobile  branch 
fit  and  able  to  discharge  all  duties  that  a  war  of  movement 
would  make  necessary. 

Cavalry  has  improved  to  an  enormous  degree.  It  can 
defend  itself  from  surprise  more  fully,  can  deceive, 
threaten  and  hold  in  check  and  is  much  more  capable  of 
vigorous  offensive  action  than  in  former  days.  It  is 
keeping  up  with  the  demands  of  modern  war.  The  very 
innovations  that  were  loudly  proclaimed  as  capable  of 
supplanting  cavalry  are  developing  now  into  aids  that 
have  added  immeasurably  to  the  value  of  cavalry.  It  is 
high  time  we  stopped  speculating  on  the  numerous  and 
varied  substitutes  that  were  to  supplant  cavalry,  such  as 
aeroplanes,  tanks,  etc.,  and  study  as  to  how  we  can  best 
utilize  the  power  of  these  new  weapons  to  aid  cavalry. 

The  history  of  the  art  of  war  has  been  the  history  of 

battle.     Battle  has   always  been   decided  by  men,  men 

armed  with  spear  and  shield  or  men  armed  with  rifle 

and  bayonet.     The  scythe-bearing  chariot,  the  elephant 

journal  U.  S.  Cavalry  Association,  July,  1920, 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  ^ 

tower,  the  tank  and  the  aeroplane  were  and  are  auxil- 
iaries that  aided  or  aid  the  elemental  man  to  fight  his 
enemies,  to  come  to  actual  physical  contact  with  them. 
This  actual  physical  contact,  or  the  fear  of  it,  is  what 
always  has  and  what  always  will,  decide  battles. 

Battles  have  been  won  by  men,  armed  with  this  weapon 
and  that,  aided  by  this  auxiliary  and  that.  In  some 
periods  the  mounted  man  predominated  in  others  the  foot- 
man. The  history  of  the  development  of  tactics  has  been 
the  history  of  the  alternate  rise  and  fall  in  importance  of 
horsemen  and  footmen  as  battle  troops.  Cavalry  occu- 
pied a  high  place  as  offensive  troops  in  battle  down  to  the 
period  of  the  invention  of  the  breech-loading  quick-firing 
rifle.  The  American  Civil  War  blazed  the  way  towards 
a  new  development  of  cavalry  tactics — the  development  of 
the  highly  mobile  cavalryman  armed  also  with  the  quick- 
firing  breech-loading  rifle,  capable  of  fighting  mounted 
against  cavalry  or  dismounted  against  infantry.  This 
was  simply  a  revival  of  the  dragoon  principle  which  is  as 
old  as  the  history  of  cavalry.  In  spite  of  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  American  Civil  War,  European  cavalries 
stood  fast  by  their  out-of-date  tactics,  the  idea  of  the 
arme  blanche  to  the  exclusion  of  aught  else. 

The  English  carried  out  these  ideas  even  as  late  as  the 
Boer  War.  There  they  encountered  a  highly  mobile 
type  of  rifleman  who  ran  rings  around  their  old-fashioned 
cavalry  tactics.  They  learned  in  the  Boer  War  what 
we  learned  in  the  Civil  War.  They  profited  well  by  their 
teaching,  amplified  their  armament  and  carried  things  to 
a  still  further  point  in  their  insistence  upon  cooperation 
of  horse  artillery  with  cavalry  at  all  times,  a  high  degree 
of  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  and  a  general  augmentation 
of  the  offensive  fire  power  of  cavalry.  They  have  not 


8  MODERN  CAVALRY 

forgotten  the  use  of  the  horse  as  a  weapon  but  have  at- 
tached the  proper  weight  to  that  use. 

Our  theory  as  to  the  use  of  cavalry  is  correct  as  has 
often  been  stated.  Our  practice  in  training  does  not  fully 
carry  out  the  tenets  of  our  theory.  It  is  a  serious 
question  whether  the  British  have  not  outstripped  us  in 
their  practice  while  we  have  been  content  with  the  theory. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  they  have  had  two  wars  in 
which  their  cavalry  has  fought  and  learned  since  our 
Civil  War,  which  was  the  last  that  saw  American  cavalry 
used  in  any  numbers  as  cavalry. 

It  is  inspiring  to  read  the  words  of  Field  Marshal 
Allenby  in  the  January,  1921,  number  of  the  American 
Cavalry  Journal  as  representing  the  opinion  of  a  most  suc- 
cessful British  leader  in  the  World  War :  "I  have  been  a 
cavalry  officer  ever  since  I  joined  the  army  in  1882  and  I 
have  never  felt  more  confidence  in  the  future  of  the  arm 
than  I  do  today.  .  .  .  Recent  inventions  and  appliances 
affecting  the  conditions  of  war,  so  far  from  lessening  the 
power  and  scope  of  cavalry  have  added  thereto/' 

The  chief  value  of  cavalry  is  its  value  as  a  highly  mobile 
battle  arm.  It  is  a  fighting  branch.  That  it  can,  in  ad- 
dition, perform  valuable  screening  and  reconnaissance 
duties,  can  threaten  flanks  and  rear,  can  act  as  a  highly 
mobile  reserve,  can  on  occasion  use  its  horses  as  weapons, 
can  pursue  and  can  cover  a  retreat  does  not  detract  from 
the  fundamental  reason  for  its  being — that  its  men  can 
fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  infantryman.  It  can 
do  it  because  it  has  done  it  and  accomplished  glorious 
results  in  modern  war. 

It  is  only  in  the  minds  of  that  type  who  read  as  they 
run  that  cavalry  has  suffered  in  estimation.  This  type 
of  mind  has  concentrated  itself  upon  the  special  opera- 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  9 

tions  covering  a  comparatively  limited  period  upon  the 
Western  front.  It  is  the  only  front  with  which  the 
American  public  is  at  all  acquainted  as  a  whole.  The 
splendid  operations  of  Allenby's  cavalry  in  Palestine  are 
now  known  to  the  army  as  well  as  the  operations  in 
Mesopotamia  and  Syria.  The  cavalry  operations  of  the 
early  days  of  1914  on  the  Western  front  are  available 
for  study.  Little  light  has  as  yet  been  thrown  on  the 
operations  of  the  German  and  Russian  cavalries  on  the 
Eastern  front  though  fragmentary  references  to  these 
are  contained  in  the  Militdr  Wochenblatt  that  point  to  the 
existence  of  great  decisions  gained  by  the  arm  in  that 
sector.  The  operations  in  Rumania  are  not  available  for 
study  at  the  time  of  writing.  There  is  however  a  wealth 
of  material  available  for  study  without  these. 

Had  any  one  of  these  fronts,  in  which  open  warfare 
was  the  rule,  been  in  the  limelight  by  being  the  sole 
theatre  of  operations,  with  the  world's  attention  focussed 
upon  it  to  the  exclusion  of  aught  else,  it  is  believed  that 
the  value  of  open  warfare  and  the  correspondingly 
greater  value  of  that  essential  open  fighting  arm,  cavalry, 
would  not  have  suffered  to  the  extent  that  it  has  in  hasty 
civilian  estimation. 

The  civilian  mind  forms  its  notion  of  military  happen- 
ings from  press  despatches.  The  military  mind  must  not 
content  itself  with  the  same  information.  This  condition 
has  worked  a  species  of  injustice  on  the  cavalry  service. 
One  does  not  stop  to  think  that  it  is  an  unusually  active 
newspaper  correspondent  who  can  accompany  cavalry  on 
campaign,  and  to  reflect  that  the  rare  press  correspondent 
who  did  must  be  a  species  of  military  genius  to  evolve 
news  items  out  of  his  restricted  view  of  any  cavalry 
operations  with  their  enormous  extension  and  extreme 


io  MODERN  'CAVALRY 

rapidity.  His  viewpoint  would  necessarily  be  restricted 
to  the  minor  sHare  played  by  the  squadron  or  other  small 
unit  that  he  accompanied.  Small  blame  to  him  if  he 
turned  to  the  spectacular  innovations  that  were  more 
nearly  under  his  eye  and  whose  "news  value"  from  his 
viewpoint  and  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  people  he 
served — the  reading  public — was  immeasurably  greater. 
The  work  of  cavalry  on  campaign  extends  over  a  greater 
area  and  is  exceedingly  difficult  for  the  layman,  with  his 
hazy  notions  of  tactics  and  strategy,  to  understand. 
For  these  reasons  the  work  of  the  Allied  and  German 
cavalries  during  the  first  phase  of  the  war,  in  the  early 
days  of  1914,  has  never  been  assessed  at  its  full  value  by 
the  public  as  a  whole. 

There  is  no  excuse  for  the  military  mind  following  this 
model.  Sufficient  study  and  reflection  on  the  part  of  the 
most  skeptical  will  convince  them  of  the  value  of  cavalry. 
It  is  a  waste  of  time  to  argue  upon  a  question  so  easily 
proved.  This  time  should  be  devoted  to  a  study  of  the 
tactics  and  training  of  cavalry. 

A  study  of  armament,  training  and  tactics  for  cavalry 
would  lead  to  a  study  of  the  probable  theatres  of  war  for 
that  branch.  Any  place  on  the  earth's  surface  is  a 
possible  theatre  of  operations.  What  would  have  been 
the  reply  of  an  American  cavalry  officer  cheerlessly  doing 
"fours  right"  in  the  sun  and  sand  of  the  Mexican  border 
in  the  year  1912  if  he  had  been  told  that  in  seven  short 
years  he  would  be  struggling  against  the  German  in  the 
fields  of  France?  He  would  most  likely  be  as  uncon- 
vinced today  if  told  that  he  might  in  a  few  short  years 
be  struggling  on  the  rich  and  productive  spaces  in  Siberia 
against  a  powerful  military  autocracy  to  ease  its  strangle- 
hold on  a  virgin  continent.  There  is  scarcely  any  place 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  n 

on  the  earth's  surface  that  is  improbable  as  a  theatre  of 
future  operations  and  still  fewer  that  are  impossible. 
Modern  means  of  transportation  make  of  the  sea  a  high- 
way rather  than  a  barrier.  As  to  causes,  no  man  knows 
what  the  morrow  will  bring  forth ;  this  however  is 
certain — every  point  of  contact  with  a  foreign  nation  is  a 
possible  point  of  irritation.  Our  points  of  contact  have 
increased  a  thousand  fold  in  the  last  few  years  and  are 
still  increasing  by  leaps  and  bounds.  The  cavalryman 
has  no  means  of  foretelling  upon  what  broad  continent 
his  training  and  skill  may  be  called  in  as  a  bulwark  to  his 
country ;  it  behooves  him  prepare  for  any  eventuality. 
He  must  not  be  narrow.  He  must  above  all  refrain  from 
adopting  as  his  model  the  type  of  warfare  on  the  Western 
Front. 

Sir  John  French  *  says :  "It  is  always  a  danger  when 
some  particular  campaign  is  picked  out  at  the  fancy  of 
some  pedagogue,  and  its  lessons  recommended  as  a 
panacea.  It  is  by  study  and  meditation  of  the  whole  of 
the  long  history  of  war  and  not  by  concentration  upon 
single  and  special  phases  of  it,  that  we  obtain  safe  guid- 
ance to  the  principles  and  practice  of  an  art  which  is  as 
old  as  the  world  itself." 

For  all  these  reasons  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  type  of 
mind  that  bases  all  its  conclusions  upon  the  American 
phase  of  the  warfare  on  the  Western  Front  will  not  be 
the  deciding  voice  in  our  legislative  chambers  and  military 
councils,  so  that  cavalry  shall  not  undergo  the  danger  of 
being  assessed  at  less  than  its  true  value  and  that  its 
strength  shall  not  be  cut  down  to  a  point  where  it  can 
seriously  affect  the  strength  of  the  army  as  a  whole. 

1  Preface  to  translation,  "Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace,"  von 
Bernhardi. 


12  MODERN  CAVALRY 

The  public  as  a  whole  should  be  educated  to  the  value 
of  cavalry.  Propaganda  is  only  the  official  word  for 
advertising  and  there  should  be-  few  Americans  unaware 
of  the  value  of  advertising.  The  necessity  for  it  is  this — 
that  the  army  originates  and  is  supported  by  the  people 
and  it  is  due  them  that  they  be  informed  of  it  in  spite 
of  themselves.  Without  the  popular  support  thus  stimu- 
lated the  cavalry  will  not  be  the  strength  to  the  army  and 
the  country  in  the  hour  of  need  that  it  should  be. 

Every  cavalry  officer  should  consider  himself  duty 
bound  to  educate  all  with  whom  he  comes  in  contact. 
The  Cavalry  Association  and  the  Cavalry  Journal  should 
be  supported  enthusiastically.  Close  touch  should  be 
maintained  with  National  Guard  and  Reserve  Cavalry 
Officers.  Effort  should  not  only  be  made  to  give  them 
all  the  assistance  and  encouragement  possible  and  to  make 
them  feel  that  they  are  brothers  in  arms  but  their  assist- 
ance must  be  secured  in  furthering  the  advance  of  the 
mounted  service  as  a  whole,  which  as  civilians,  they  can 
do  in  mai\y  ways  not  open  to  the  Regular  officer,  the  en- 
couragement of  horse  breeding  and  horse  interests 
generally,  being  one. 

Effort  should  be  made  to  secure  as  reserve  officers  that 
class  of  young  men  whose  interests  are  allied  with  cavalry 
interests — horse  breeders,  polo  players,  gentlemen 
jockeys,  and  horse  enthusiasts  generally.  Their  co- 
operation would  succeed  in  keeping  the  cavalry  more  in 
touch  with  the  public,  and  would  have  its  effect  in  raising 
the  value  of  cavalry  in  civilian  estimation.  The  educa- 
tion of  the  public  to  the  value  of  cavalry  will  lead  to  an 
increased  appreciation  of  it  and  this  will  be  valuable  in 
that  it  will  react  quickly  and  favorably  upon  the  morale 
of  the  service. 

The  morale  of  our  cavalry  service  suffered  somewhat, 


THE  VALUE  OF  CAVALRY  13 

both  from  the  fact  that  so  many  of  the  younger  cavalry 
officers  were  not  enabled  to  share  in  the  fighting  on  the 
Western  front,  and  from  the  temporary  eclipse  of  the 
value  of  cavalry  owing  to  the  non-use  of  our  mounted 
men  in  France.  It  is  necessary  to  raise  this  morale. 
One  of  the  best  means  is  the  educating  of  the  cavalry 
officer  to  the  value  of  his  branch.  He  must  not  only  be 
informed  of  what  it  has  done  in  modern  war  of  the  past 
but  what  it  is  capable  of  doing  in  war  of  the  future. 

He  must  remember  that  cavalry,  while  less  numeri- 
cally, is  more  important  strategically,  owing  to  the  ex- 
tension of  modern  battle  fronts,  and  to  the  increased  sen- 
sitiveness of  the  enemy's  lines  of  communications  caused 
by  the  demands  of  modern  war.  The  modern  army  is 
comparatively  much  more  dependent  upon  its  line  of 
communications  than  formerly.  This  renders  move- 
ments against  such  lines  of  greater  value  than  in  the  days 
when  an  army  could  live  off  the  country.  Any  interrup- 
tion of  the  enemy  lines  of  communication  has  a  much 
more  telling  effect  than  formerly. 

He  must  remember  that  while  cavalry  has  to  a  certain 
extent  been  supplanted  as  the  organ  of  strategical  recon- 
naissance by  the  air  service,  that  such  supplanting  operates 
to  aid  the  cavalry  and  to  allow  it  to  develop  to  the  fullest 
its  capabilities  in  tactical  reconnaissance,  which  the  aero- 
plane cannot  replace.  That  side  which  through  any 
cause  is  denied  the  assistance  of  its  air  force — whose  air 
force  meets  with  defeat — will  be  deprived  of  all  means  of 
reconnaissance  unless  it  can  rely  upon  cavalry. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  cavalry  is  the  arm  of  de- 
cision. It  is  the  strategic  and  tactical  weapon  capable  of 
swift  and  extended  movement.  Cherfils  *  says  that 
"three-quarters  of. the  strategy  of  war  lies  in  the  method 

1  Quoted  in  "Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington,  page  98. 


14  MODERN  CAVALRY 

of  the  employment  of  cavalry."  This  is  true  because 
cavalry,  if  properly  handled,  ensures  to  the  higher  com- 
mand freedom  of  action  and  correspondingly  denies  that 
privilege  to  the  enemy. 

As  long  as  the  individual  soldier  with  his  weapon  re- 
mains the  ultimate  factor  in  warfare  so  long  will  cavalry 
retain  its  importance  as  a  combatant  arm;  the  world  as 
yet  has  too  many  broad  spaces  wherein  armies  of  the 
future  can  be  moved.  That  army  that  retains  the  largest 
force  of  highly  mobile  battle  troops  will  hold  the  winning 
cards  in  the  future  as  in  the  past. 

The  value  of  cavalry  will  be  nothing  unless  we  have 
leaders  trained  in  its  use — -not  only  leaders  in  the  arm 
itself  but  leaders  of  all  branches.  A  combination  of  fine 
horses,  excellent  riders  and  excellent  shots  will  not  make 
cavalry.  All  these  are  worthless  unless  they  are  led,  led 
by  leaders  who  understand  the  tactical  and  strategical 
value  of  that  most  sensitive  and  responsive  of  all  arms  to 
leadership.  Leaders  are  needed  who  can  cooperate  in- 
telligently with  higher  command,  who  can  cooperate  with 
infantry  and  artillery  and  who  can  in  addition  fulfill  all 
the  manifold  duties  demanded  of  a  cavalry  officer. 

To  have  cavalry  of  the  highest  value  it  must  be  led  and 
well  led — to  be  able  to  lead  it  properly  should  be  the  am- 
bition of  every  cavalry  officer.  To  achieve  leadership  re- 
quires a  careful  balance  of  study  and  action,  requires 
moreover,  a  sticking  to  the  main  issue,  a  constant  objective 
in  view,  a  daily  analysis  of  one's  activities,  a  daily  asking 
of  the  question  "Am  I  following  the  road  that  is  leading 
to  improved  readiness  for  war  or  am  I  plucking  daisies 
by  the  road  side  ?" 


CHAPTER  II 

TROOP  TRAINING SOME  BASIC  FACTORS 

In  the  cavalry  service  we  must  realize  that  the  Ameri- 
can cavalry  has  not  had  the  advantages  of  service  as 
cavalry  in  campaign  in  the  World  War.  We  have  not 
had  the  opportunity  of  learning  lessons,  of  correcting 
errors,  of  formulating  doctrines,  that  has  been  granted  the 
other  branches.  In  other  words,  we  are  behind  the  other 
branches.  They  have  had  their  trial  by  fire,  we  have  not. 

The  only  alternative  is  the  alternative  of  learning  by 
the  experience  of  others.  How  can  we  best  do  that? 
What  do  we  want  to  learn? 

At  the  present  time  we  are  formulating  a  cavalry 
doctrine.  A  cavalry  doctrine  is  necessary  before  we  will 
ever  make  a  united  and  efficient  working  force  of  the 
cavalry.  This  will  first  require  the  development  of  a 
clear  and  uniform  combat  policy  for  the  cavalry.  This 
policy  should  be  enunciated  definitely  and  unmistakably 
and  should  be  the  basis  for  peace  time  training  and  war 
time  service. 

The  next  step  is  the  concentration  of  the  best  brains 
in  the  cavalry  on  the  training  problem,  to  determine  the 
limit  and  scope  of  the  training  necessary  to  realize  the 
tactical  ideals  announced  in  the  doctrine.  This  then  would 
be  the  basis  for  determining  the  standards  of  training  of 
all  units  of  the  cavalry  from  the  private  on  up  through 

15 


16  MODERN  CAVALRY 

the  squad  and  platoon  to  the  division.  Lastly,  there 
should  be  a  strict  and  uniform  test  for  every  unit. 

Scharnhorst *  is  quoted  as  saying  that  in  war  it  did  not 
matter  so  much  what  was  done  as  that  it  should  be  done 
with  vigor  and  singularity  of  purpose.  Vigor  and  singu- 
larity of  purpose  are  the  necessary  forces  to  put  into  effect 
if  we  are  to  have  a  cavalry  fit  to  hold  its  own. 

The  adoption  and  strict  carrying  out  of  any  system, 
based  on  good  sense,  would  obviate  the  very  common 
practice  of  devoting  time  and  energy  to  subjects  that  have 
no  bearing  upon  battle  efficiency.  It  would  stop  the 
branching  off  of  the  main  road  that  leads  to  preparation 
for  war  and  the  following  of  innumerable  small  by-paths 
that  lead  nowhere. 

The  ideal  for  which  the  cavalry  should  strive  should 
be  a  thorough  training  for  fighting.  Every  activity 
should  be  analyzed  from  that  -viewpoint.  Individual 
hobbies  should  be  banned  with  bell  and  book.  All 
hobbies  contain  in  them  some  element  of  good  to  the 
service.  It  is  when  one  hobby  is  followed  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  other  training  that  the  harm  results. 

It  used  to  be  possible  very  often  to  find  regiments  that 
were  simply  aggregations  of  lettered  troops.  In  this  type 
of  regiment  it  was  not  seen  that  the  regiment  was  failing 
to  justify  its  existence  by  being  a  tactical  organization, 
but  was  simply  content  with  being  called  a  regiment,  in 
other  words,  this  term  had  degenerated  into  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  a  drill  designation  and  an  administrative  con- 
venience. In  the  regiment  of  this  type,  one  troop  was 
composed  of  excellent  horsemen  and  well-trained  horses, 

*At  the  council  of  war  held  on  Oct.  5,  1806,  in  the  Prussian 
Headquarters  at  Erfurt.  Quoted  in  "The  Nation  in  Arms,"  von 
der  Goltz,  page  63. 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS     17 

another  was  proficient  with  the  sabre,  another  was  a 
shooting  troop  and  a  lot  were  simply  mediocre  at  every- 
thing. 

The  commander  of  that  regiment  labored  under  the 
delusion  that  he  was  commanding  a  tactical  unit ;  he  was 
not.  He  was  commanding  twelve  troops,  each  troop 
more  or  less  of  a  specialist  at  some  one  phase  of  work, 
all  of  them  varying  in  efficiency  in  any  number  of  classes 
of  work  that  they  were  liable  to  be  called  upon  to  perform 
in  the  field.  To  achieve  any  results  in  campaign  with  that 
type  of  command,  it  was  necessary  that  the  regimental 
commander  have  a  highly  developed  knowledge  of  all  the 
peculiarities  and  specialties  of  his  subordinate  command- 
ers. The  problem  was  further  complicated  when  it  reached 
the  brigade  because  the  brigade  commander  had  to  know 
all  the  personal  quirks  of  all  the  subordinate  commanders 
with  the  addition  of  the  personalities  of  his  regimental 
commanders.  In  other  words,  to  be  a  successful  higher 
commander  of  cavalry  under  such  conditions  would  re- 
quire an  intimate  and  detailed  knowledge  of  all  the  idiosyn- 
crasies of  all  the  subordinate  commanders  who  had  any- 
thing to  do  with  training.  Such  a  lack  of  system  is 
dangerous.  Some  day  in  the  field  men  will  be  sent  on 
missions  that  they  are  not  trained  for,  men  will  be  put 
into  the  firing  line  and  waste  ammunition,  they  will  be 
sent  on  patrols  and  hurt  their  unit  by  being  captured  in- 
stead of  aiding  it  by  bringing  back  information.  Men  in 
every  unit  will  vary  in  the  nature  and  degree  of  their 
training  in  all  phases  of  cavalry  work. 

It  is  absolutely  necessary  that  every  regiment,  every 
squadron  and  every  troop  be  trained  in  the  same  subjects 
and  be  equally  well  trained.  This  can  only  be  achieved 
by  standardization  of  training. 


i8  MODERN  CAVALRY 

When  training  is  standardized  there  will  be  the  in- 
evitable cry  from  the  unthinking  regarding  "initiative." 
Initiative  is  a  term  that  has  been  abused  a  great  deal.  It 
is  wise  to  consider  initiative  and  its  relation  to  training. 
The  development  of  the  highest  degree  of  initiative  com- 
patible with  the  military  machine  should  be  the  ideal — 
especially  in  the  cavalry.  But  the  difference  between 
the  initiative  that  leaves  the  choice  of  results  in  the  hands 
of  many  and  diverse  personalities  and  the  initiative  that 
finds  expression  in  choice  of  means  to  fulfil  certain  pre- 
scribed requirements  should  be  clearly  understood.  In 
the  one  case  there  are  some  ten  or  twelve  requirements 
for  a  trained  force  of  cavalry;  the  initiative  finds  ex- 
pression in  choosing  the  number  and  type,  in  selecting 
which  of  these  subjects  shall  be  worked  upon.  In  the 
other  case  the  initiative  finds  expression  in  choice  of  means 
to  comply  with  certain  standards  prescribed  for  the  whole 
service.  This  is  the  proper  outlet  for  initiative. 

To  develop  the  highest  degree  of  initiative  possible  in  all 
subordinates  is  a  laudable  objective  for  the  cavalry  service. 
To  do  it  implies  that  every  subordinate  leader  should 
actually  lead.  He  must  have  command  of  his  unit,  and 
this  must  hold  true  from  the  squad  on  up  to  the  division. 
The  corporal  and  the  sergeant  must  be  given  the  highest 
degree  of  responsibility  possible.  They,  like  all  others, 
should  be  required  to  render  an  accounting  of  their 
stewardship  at  stated  intervals  by  means  of  prescribed 
tests.  The  lieutenant,  who  in  many  troops  of  the  old 
army,  was  detailed  hither  and  yon  on  a  variety  of  odd 
jobs,  must  be  developed  by  responsibility.  And  one  of 
the  best  methods  of  developing  responsibility  in  a  combat 
officer  is  to  allow  him  to  command.  Give  the  lieutenant 
a  platoon  and  make  him  responsible  for  it ;  he  has  to  lead 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS     19 

it  in  war,  he  should  learn  in  peace.  In  practice  such  a 
system  is  found  to  develop  the  enthusiasm  and  energy  of 
the  lieutenant  to  a  remarkable  degree. 

The  troop  commander,  an  individual  upon  whom  the 
responsibility  should  rest,  should  be  judged  by  his  results. 
It  is  believed  that  the  comparative  youth  of  present  field 
officers  has  a  tendency  to  work  a  hardship  on  many  troop 
commanders  who  find  that  they  have  too  many  means 
prescribed  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  choice  of  means 
should  be  left  to  their  judgement.  The  squadron  com- 
mander should  look  upon  his  duties  more  in  an  advisory 
light  and  should  consider  himself,  as  far  as  training  goes, 
more  as  a  guide  and  a  counsellor.  When  the  time  comes 
for  testing  the  state  of  training  of  his  unit  then  he  should 
be  very  exacting.  Up  to  that  time  he  should  consider 
that  his  main  duty  is  the  training  of  officers.  If  he  wants 
highly  efficient,  dependable  and  responsible  troop  officers 
under  him  then  he  should  work  to  develop  these  qualities 
in  his  subordinates,  remembering  that  the  ideal  is  to  give 
a  man  a  job  and  then  let  him  develop  it  (and  incidentally 
himself)  to  the  highest  degree.  If  he  is  incapable  of  de- 
velopment and  is  unworthy  of  being  trusted  take  measures  ' 
to  get  rid  of  him. 

The  troop  commander  must  carry  out  the  same  principle 
with  his  subordinates.  His  lieutenants  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers  are  entitled  to  the  same  amount  of  re- 
sponsibility and  trust  that  he  desires. 

The  non-commissioned  officer  is  an  important  person 
in  any  branch.  Owing  to  the  dispersed  work  of  cavalry 
he  is  exceptionally  important  in  this  branch.  His 
capabilities  as  a  trainer  are  very  often  not  sufficiently  de- 
veloped. He  should  in  the  first  place  be  selected  more 
carefully  than  he  is  in  many  organizations.  Simply  being 


20  MODERN  CAVALRY 

an  old  soldier  is  not  sufficient.  There  are  old  soldiers 
and  old  soldiers.  The  non-commissioned  officer  should 
be  a  professional  soldier  of  a  high  type  of  efficiency  and 
capability.  As  to  selection,  let  the  troop  commander 
select  him  as  heretofore,  but  let  the  higher  authority  pre- 
scribe a  test  before  he  is  appointed.  This  test  should  be 
a  thorough  examination  of  him  as  a  horseman,  as  a  shot, 
as  a  leader,  and  as  a  scout.  Let  this  test  be  held  fre- 
quently in  the  organization  so  as  to  make  it  an  incentive 
for  the  private  to  better  his  condition.  Some  means  of 
advancement  should  be  made  open  to  the  private  in  addi- 
tion to  the  whim  of  his  troop  commander.  The  non-com- 
missioned officer  once  made  should  have  as  much  honor, 
responsibility  and  initiative  allowed  him  as  is  possible.  It 
would  be  the  better  part  to  attempt  the  formation  of  a 
class  of  professional  soldiers  amongst  the  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  to  make  this  more  of  a  career  for  a  young 
man  than  it  now  is.  There  should  be  a  greater  difference 
in  the  pay  of  the  non-commissioned  officer  and  the  private 
than  there  is  now.  The  non-commissioned  officer  should 
not  be  treated  as  simply  a  private  with  some  marks  on  his 
arm.  His  initiative  and  responsibility  should  be  de- 
veloped by  throwing  upon  his  shoulders  the  direct  re- 
sponsibility for  the  training  of  the  individual.  The  officer 
should  visualize  his  duties  more  as  a  trainer  of  groups. 
The  task  of  the  officer  does  not  end  with  developing  his 
own -energy  to  the  highest  point.  He  will  fail  signally 
as  a  leader  if  he  does  not  develop  the  capabilities  of  his 
subordinates.  This  after  all  is  the  test  of  leadership.  A 
study  of  means  to  encompass  these  ends  will  repay  an 
officer  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  labor  involved.  Every 
part  of  the  machine  should  function  under  its  own  power. 
It  should  function  automatically,  the  energy  coming  from 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS    21 

within,  the  sum  of  the  energies  of  the  subordinate  leaders. 
The  difference  is  like  the  difference  between  one  man 
who  laboriously  pushes  an  automobile  with  a  dead  engine 
and  another  who  rides  in  a  machine  moving  along  under 
the  power  of  its  own  engine. 

To  achieve  such  results  it  is  necessary  to  crowd  sub- 
ordinates with  responsibility,  to  avoid  worrying  them,  to 
demand  results,  to  rate  them  competitively,  to  praise  and 
reward  the  successful  and  energetic  ones  and  rid  oneself 
of  the  failures.  Every  subordinate  should  be  tested  and 
his  capabilities  measured. 

The  troop  commander's  success  or  failure  depends  upon 
the  performance  of  his  organization.  This  depends  in 
great  measure  upon  the  amount  of  energy  developed  from 
his  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  How  many 
troop  commanders  really  have  anything  but  a  rather  hazy 
idea  of  the  comparative  virtues  and  failings  of  their  sub- 
ordinate leaders  ?  The  only  successful  means  of  arriving 
at  this  ability  to  judge  is  to  test  them  in  command  of  a 
unit  appropriate  to  their  grade. 

Owing  to  the  nature  of  cavalry  requirements,  the 
cavalry  soldier  is  required  to  absorb  a  knowledge  of  many 
things.  The  horse,  the  rifle,  the  automatic  rifle,  the 
automatic  pistol,  the  sabre,  scouting,  care  of  self  and 
equipment  are  a  few  of  the  most  important.  To  train 
properly  a  man  in  all  these  subjects  in  addition  to  the 
other  many  demands  upon  his  time,  presupposes  a  very 
exact  and  scientific  system  of  training  the  individual  if 
results  are  to  be  gained.  There  cannot  be  any  duplica- 
tion, any  lost  motion  or  any  slighting  of  any  of  the  sub- 
jects. To  neglect  any  link  in  this  chain  of  instruction 
will  weaken  the  whole. 

It  is  a  serious  question  whether  we  even  approximate  a 


22  MODERN   CAVALRY 

thorough  covering  of  all  the  subjects  of  training  with  the 
individual  soldier.  All  these  things  have  to  be  crowded 
in  the  short  space  of  time  left  in  a  soldier's  enlistment 
from  guard  duty,  from  the  hospital,  from  schools,  from 
the  guard  house  and  from  fatigue  duties,  all  of  which 
take  time  from  the  important  duty  of  training  the  in- 
dividual for  war.  To  achieve  this  means  a  great  deal 
of  thinking  must  be  applied  to  the  problem. 

There  is  not  enough  thought  expended  upon  the  in- 
dividual as  an  individual.  The  average  troop  officer  is 
prone  to  look  upon  him  in  the  aggregate.  He  is  prone  to 
concentrate  his  energy  upon  the  proportion  of  men  he 
turns  out  each  day  for  drill  but  he  does  not  think  of  the 
men  who  are  not  at  drill.  He  does  not  visualize  his 
problem  with  the  idea  of  seeking  to  turn  out  an  organiza- 
tion in  which  every  man  has  a  thorough,  equal  and  uni- 
form training  for  war.  The  present  method  is  too  much 
of  a  hit  and  miss  affair.  If  the  cavalry  is  going  to  meet 
the  many  and  varied  demands  that  will  be  made  of  it  in 
modern  war  we  must  make  the  training  of  the  individual 
more  of  a  scientific  business. 

The  methods  now  in  use  with  some  officers  are  open  to 
serious  objections,  first  because  there  is  no  uniformity  in 
the  organization,  men  varying  in  the  same  troop  to  a  great 
extent  in  various  qualifications,  some  being  good  horse- 
men, some  poor,  some  being  good  scouts,  others  hopeless, 
some  being  good  shots,  while  with  others  ammunition 
would  be  saved  and  better  results  gained  by  supplying 
them  with  a  handful  of  rocks.  Secondly,  such  methods 
tend  to  deaden  the  initiative  and  interest  of  the  individual 
soldier.  He  is  drilled  as  hard  and  painstakingly  at  the 
subjects  in  which  he  is  proficient  as  the  most  newly  joined 
recruit  who  has,  as  yet,  gained  proficiency  in  nothing. 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS    23 

There  is  no  incentive  for  him  to  apply  his  abilities  and 
his  energy  in  learning  a  subject;  he  is  given  no  considera- 
tion for  having  learned  it. 

The  time  saving  system,  where  results  would  be  more 
certain  of  accomplishment,  would  be  a  system  of  rating 
cards  for  each  man.  When  he  has  become  a  satisfactory 
horseman  let  him  devote  his  time  to  the  pistol  or  to  some 
subject  in  which  he  is  deficient.  He  would  be  a  much 
more  satisfactory  soldier  and  much  more  interested  in  the 
game  if  he  were  given  some  credit  for  having  learned  a 
subject  quickly  and  permitted  to  devote  his  time  to  other 
necessary  things.  It  would  conserve  the  energies  of  both 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  and  save  dupli- 
cation of  effort  if  they  could  be  permitted  to  concentrate 
energy  upon  the  backward  men  of  the  organization. 

Individual  proficiency  should  be  made  a  goal  for  the 
soldier  to  strive  for.  Upon  his  attainment  of  the  neces- 
sary degree  of  proficiency  let  him  even  have  a  slight  let 
up  in  his  labors  as  a  reward,  while  the  energies  of  the 
instruction  personnel  were  being  devoted  to  making  the 
backward  men  proficient  and  the  standard  of  instruction 
thereby  more  uniform  in  the  unit. 

The  troop  unit  is  the  important  training  and  administra- 
tive organization,  as  well  as  a  tactical  element.  The 
squadron  unit  is  a  highly  important  tactical  unit.  The 
principle  of  command  and  organization,  the  giving  of  a 
unit  to  every  leader  and  allowing  him  to  command  it, 
should  be  adopted  throughout  the  regiment  and  especially 
with  the  squadron.  The  tendency  upon  the  part  of  some 
regimental  commanders  is  to  deal  too  directly  with  the 
troop  commanders  and  to  disregard  the  intermediate 
leader,  the  squadron  commander.  The  squadron  unit  is 
so  essentially  important  as  the  cavalry  tactical  unit  that 


24  MODERN   CAVALRY 

every  effort  should  be  made  to  lay  stress  upon  it  in  peace 
time.  The  regimental  commander,  who  commands  only 
a  group  of  troops  in  peace  time,  in  war  will  be  forced  to 
command  through  the  squadron  unit.  The  logical  thing 
to  accomplish  is  to  make  the  transition  from  peace  to  war 
with  as  little  disturbance  as  possible  and  with  as  little 
necessity  for  change.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the 
squadron  commander  of  our  cavalry  will  have  as  much 
responsibility  in  war  as  the  regimental  commander  of  a 
foreign  cavalry.  He  must  be  permitted  in  peace  to  train 
for  this  responsibility. 

All  matters  affecting  training  and  combat  efficiency 
should  come  through  the  squadron  commander  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course.  The  major's  opportunities  of  actually 
commanding  his  squadron  should  not  be  limited  simply  to 
the  occasions  when  the  squadron  is  detached  from  the 
regiment  for  a  peace  time  practice  march.  The  highest 
type  of  regimental  commander  will  command  through  his 
squadron  commanders  to  the  greatest  extent  possible.  He 
cannot  hope  to  maneuver  an  aggregation  of  troops  in  war, 
he  must  work  for  preparation  for  war  in  this  as  in  other 
matters. 

The  question  of  readiness  for  war  service,  of  a  regi- 
ment, requires  some  thought.  Take  for  an  example  any 
regiment  at  any  time  of  the  year ;  our  possible  enemy  or 
enemies  will  not  let  us  pick  and  choose  the  time  when  our 
units  will  be  at  the  highest  percentage  of  efficiency.  A 
case  in  point  would  be  a  regiment  suddenly  ordered. to 
take  the  field  in  a  winter  month  before  target  season  had 
taken  place  for  the  year.  That  regiment  since  last  target 
season,  would  have  lost  a  great  number  of  time-expired 
men  and  gained  a  great  number  of  recruits.  It  would 
amount,  in  some  cases,  to  as  much  as  a  third  of  the  men 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS    25 

who  had  had  no  previous  rifle  or  pistol  practice.  Yet  they 
would  have  to  take  the  field  and  be  put  in  the  firing  line 
as  well  as  any  of  the  other  men. 

Our  regiments  are  not  ready  under  the  present  system 
to  take  the  field  at  any  time.  We  have  no  reservists  to 
complete  cadres  (it  must  be  remembered  that  filling  cadres 
in  the  cavalry  means  also  filling  out  the  horse  strength 
with  green  horses).  The  regiment  under  the  present 
methods  will  never  be  a  uniformly  trained  first  line  unit 
thoroughly  dependable  in  any  phase  of  work  that  it  is 
called  upon  to  perform.  There  will  always  be  a  large 
proportion  of  men  deficient  in  some  necessary  instruction, 
the  rifle,  the  pistol,  the  automatic  rifle,  horsemanship, 
scouting  or  something  equally  important. 

The  fault  lies  in  the  fact  that  we  are  prone  to  carry 
out  the  "season"  habit  to  too  great  an  extent.  This  is 
perfectly  feasible  in  an  army  with  men  required  to  join 
at  stated  periods  for  stated  training  upon  the  receipt  of 
which  they  pass  to  the  reserves.  But  it  is  not  practicable 
for  us  with  our  recruits  received  at  any  time  and  in  any 
quantity  and  our  trained  men  leaving  whenever  their  en- 
listments expire. 

These  conditions  are  important.  They  strike  directly 
at  war  efficiency.  The  evil  effects  inherent  in  the  happy- 
go-lucky  military  system  that  any  volunteer  army  has  to 
work  under,  must  be  nullified  by  training  methods  formu- 
lated with  the  object  of  correcting  the  conditions  to  as 
great  an  extent  as  possible. 

The  training  scheme  in  the  regiment  should  have  in  view 
as  high  a  condition  of  immediate  readiness  for  war  as  is 
possible.  To  accomplish  this  end  it  will  be  necessary  to 
have  a  little  training  in  all  the  subjects  all  the  time.  We 
cannot  have  a  target  "season."  Our  men,  irrespective  of 


26  MODERN  CAVALRY 

their  length  of  service,  must  be  constantly  practiced  with 
their  rifles.  This  has  advantages  outside  of  the  subject 
under  discussion.  We  cannot  devote  a  certain  season  to 
scouting  and  patrolling  without  always  being  in  danger 
of  war  finding  us  with  great  numbers  of  our  men  unpre- 
pared. The  men  untrained  in  horsemanship  and  the  care 
of  the  horse  may  look  very  well  in  ranks  but  the  first 
minute  of  detached  work  and  the  exigencies  of  campaign 
will  show  them  up  as  broken  reeds  and  they  will  have 
lowered  the  strength  of  the  command  by  losing  horses  on 
the  first  march. 

The  thing  to  strive  for  is  a  certain  uniform  advance  in 
preparation  for  war.  This  will  require  a  closer  searching 
and  knowledge  of  the  individual  qualifications  and  in- 
struction of  each  man,  and  a  change  of  our  seasonal  train- 
ing habits  to  varied  training  in  every  subject  every  week. 

The  regiment  taking  the  field  after  months  spent  on 
training  of  this  nature  will  be  in  better  shape  than  one 
under  the  old  system.  It  will  still  suffer  from  some  of 
the  disadvantages  inherent  in  our  American  habit  of  ex- 
temporizing armies  after  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  last 
war  saw  many  Regular  regiments  entirely  denuded,  not 
only  of  officers  but  of  a  great  proportion  of  non-commis- 
sioned officers.  We  must  guard  against  this  contingency. 
If  our  officers  are  promoted  to  higher  rank  and  transferred 
and  our  non-commissioned  officers  commissioned  and  sent 
to  different  regiments,  what  will  be  left? 

We  will  have  junior  officers  promoted  to  higher  rank. 
They  should  have  the  training  necessary  to  handle  their 
new  responsibilities.  We  will  have  many  reserve  officers 
and  many  enlisted  men  assigned  to  command  units.  We 
must  get  hold  of  the  reserve  officer  and  keep  in  touch  with 
him.  We  must  have  a  high  degree  of  training  for  our 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS    27 

non-commissioned  officers  and  they  must  all  be  tested  in 
peace  time  and  their  fitness  for  commissions  noted  on 
their  records.  Every  effort  must  be  made  in  peace  time  to 
make  the  transition  stage  from  peace  to  war  as  orderly 
and  as  smooth  an  affair  as  possible. 

In  the  cavalry  especially  we  must  train  and  habituate 
all  juniors  to  higher  command.  This  should  include  as 
many  selected  privates  as  possible.  For  more  reasons 
than  one  it  is  advisable  to  hold  exercises  and  drills  in 
which  all  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  drop  out 
and  privates  take  charge.  This  not  only  arouses  the  in- 
terest of  the  privates  but  it  grounds  them  more  thoroughly 
in  their  duties.  The  advantages  of  such  a  training  for  an 
organization  in  the  event  of  casualties  in  which  all  the 
officers  or  non-commissioned  officers  are  lost  needs  no 
argument.  It  should  be  a  settled  policy  of  the  cavalry  to 
train  all  juniors  to  higher  command  and  this  should  be  a 
regular  part  of  the  training  prescribed. 

The  necessity  of  developing  the  self-reliance  and  in- 
itiative of  the  cavalry  soldier  should  never  be  lost  sight 
of.  To  enable  him  to  have  these  qualities  in  the  field  they 
should  be  developed  in  the  post.  Application  of  imagina- 
tion and  energy  on  the  part  of  officers  to  stimulate  interest 
and  enthusiasm  in  the  men — this  is  the  key  to  the  situa- 
tion. The  spirit  of  competition  is  an  important  aid ;  give 
rewards  for  individual  and  unit  proficiency.  This  is  an 
old  method.  "Xenophon  has *  described  the  steps  taken 
by  Agesilaus  to  train  a  body  of  cavalry  in  Phrygia.  .  .  . 
When  he  had  collected  his  forces  at  Ephesus,  he  drilled 
them  continually  and  to  incite  them  to  take  pains  he  of- 
fered prizes  to  the  troops  of  horse  to  such  as  shoul3  ride 
best.  The  places  of  exercise  were  consequently  crowded 

1  "History  of  Cavalry,"  Denison,  page  34. 


28  MODERN  CAVALRY 

with  men  practicing,  the  horse  course  full  of  horsemen 
riding  about  and  javelin  men  and  archers  aiming  at  marks. 
This  cavalry,  so  carefully  drilled,  aided  materially  in  gain- 
ing the  successes  which  followed  in  the  campaign."  Age- 
silaus  evidently  understood  the  principle  of  touching  up 
the  enthusiasm  and  energy  of  his  subordinates. 

Competitions  and  prizes  are  one  means  of  achieving  this. 
There  are  many  others ;  judicious  commendation  is  a  good 
one.  Above  all,  an  officer  must  be  observant  and  quickly 
note  exceptional  energy  and  ability.  Stimulate  the 
sporting  qualities  of  the  men  by  contests  for  performance 
in  various  training  subjects.  Carry  a  stop  watch  and 
make  speed  an  essential  in  training  as  it  is  an  essential 
in  cavalry  work.  The  difference  between  ten  seconds 
gained  and  ten  seconds  lost  in  dismounting  to  fight  on 
foot  may  mean  the  difference  between  several  men  and 
horses  added  to  the  casualty  list  or  saved. 

An  officer  must  be  familiar  with  the  time  element  in  his 
work.  He  should  know,  for  example,  how  long  it  takes 
him  to  open  fire  from  different  formations,  how  long  to 
mount  and  charge,  which  are  the  best  formations  of  led 
horses  to  facilitate  quick  mounting,  etc.  He  can  lend 
much  interest  to  his  work,  stimulate  the  abilities  of  his 
men  and  speed  up  on  many  of  his  combat  formations  by 
competitions  between  units.  He  must  always  deduct 
points  for  any  neglects.  He  should  strive  to  have  his 
men  at  all  times  capable  of  accomplishing  results  swiftly 
and  correctly. 

The  one  idea  of  striving  for  war  efficiency  should  be 
kept  in  mind.  Anything  that  does  not  lead  directly  to 
this  should  be  examined  with  suspicion.  Examine  every 
phase  of  training  work  with  this  in  mind. 

An  examination,  for  example,  of  the  question  of  fire 


TROOP  TRAINING— SOME  BASIC  FACTORS    29 

action  shows  that  we  are  undoubtedly  following  good 
infantry  standards  but  shows  also  that  we  are  forgetting 
cavalry  requirements.  One  of  these  is  the  led  horse 
question.  Many  cavalry  units  go  dismounted  to  their 
combat  firing.  No  lesson  is  learned  in  regard  to  their 
care  in  combat.  Combat  firing  practice  should  be  com- 
bined, wherever  suitable  terrain  exists,  with  cavalry  tactical 
work.  Every  lesson  in  fire  action  should  be  learned  as 
the  culmination  of  a  tactical  lesson — which  it  would  be 
in  war. 

There  are  many  things  that  interfere  with  this  striving 
for  war  efficiency.  One  is  our  system  of  guard  duty— 
a  relic  of  the  turreted  castle,  the  moat,  the  wall  and  the 
drawbridge.  It  has  no  value  in  war.  It  absorbs  too 
much  time  from  training  and  is  too  great  an  interference 
with  consecutive  and  uniform  progress.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  we  discard  it  in  the  near  future.  Excessive  amounts 
of  fatigue  duty  constitute  another  interference  with  train- 
ing. A  regimental  commander  must  watch  this  very 
closely  and  cut  it  down  to  the  minimum  absolutely  neces- 
sary. 

The  combination  of  the  two  factors  above,  guard  and 
fatigue,  make  it  extremely  difficult  for  a  troop  com- 
mander ever  to  turn  out  enough  men  to  form  his  small 
but  important  unit,  the  squad.  This  is  the  basis  of  the 
troop  organization.  It  is  also  the  basis  of  combat  forma- 
tions; the  squad  leader  on  the  firing  line,  on  the  march, 
on  patrol  and  elsewhere  in  the  service  of  cavalry  on  cam- 
paign is  a  very  important  subordinate  commander.  If  he 
is  made  into  a  fifth  wheel  by  seldom,  if  ever,  having  men 
to  handle,  he  will  not  be  the  mainstay  and  backbone  of 
the  troop  that  he  should  be. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  system  of  receiving  recruits  and 


30  MODERN   CAVALRY 

remounts  will  be  modified  by  the  enlargement  and  use  of 
cavalry  recruit  depots  and  by  the  augmentation  of  our  re- 
mount service  so  that  it  can  provide  us  replacements  of 
trained  horses  in  war  time.  This,  or  some  other  system 
that  will  accomplish  the  same  results,  will  have  to  be 
adopted  in  peace  time  if  we  are  ever  to  be  worth  anything 
after  the  first  month  or  two  of  campaigning. 

We  must  not  be  so  obsessed  with  training  matters  and 
methods  as  to  lose  our  perspective.  We  must  occasionally 
ask  ourselves  "What  are  we  training  for  ?"  We  are  train- 
ing for  war,  for  battle.  We  are  in  danger  of  spending 
so  much  thought  on  the  forging  of  the  weapon  that  we 
are  liable  to  forget  learning  how  to  use  it.  Our  need  is 
tactical  training  to  learn  to  use  that  exceedingly  sensitive, 
finely  tempered  and  powerful  weapon,  the  cavalry.  This 
training  should  extend  through  all  ranks.  It  should  start 
with  a  cavalry  doctrine  upon  the  tenets  of  which  all  train- 
ing and  all  work  should  be  based  and  to  which  all  should 
subscribe  loyally  and  energetically  regardless  of  personal 
viewpoint. 


CHAPTER  III 

TROOP  TRAINING MORALE  FACTORS 

In  a  truly  scientific  training  for  combat  we  must  work 
in  peace  for  what  is  required  in  war.  We  know,  for 
example,  that  some  of  our  divisions  in  France  covered 
themselves  with  glory.  We  know  that  other  divisions 
barely  "got  away  with  it"  to  put  it  mildly.  What  was 
the  underlying  cause  that  made  this  difference  between 
two  groups  of  men  of  the  same  nation,  in  the  same  uni- 
form, armed  with  the  same  weapons,  and  fighting  against 
the  same  enemy?  The  whole  difference  lies  in  the  word 
"morale."  One  division  had  a  high  degree  of  morale, 
the  other  lacked  it.  When  the  German  morale  broke  they 
retreated.  In  war  the  moral  is  to  the  physical  as  three 
is  to  one,  or  so  Napoleon  states ;  and  it  is  easily  proved. 

We  all  vaguely  realize  the  importance  of  morale  in  war. 
What  we  do  not  all  realize  is  the  necessity  of  morale  in 
peace,  the  necessity  of  training  for  morale.  It  is  simply 
another  phase  of  the  requirement  that  the  transition  from 
peace  to  war  is  to  be  made  as  smoothly  as  possible.  To  do 
this  we  must  make  peace-time  training  fit  war-time  needs. 
And  the  great  need  in  war  is  high  morale. 

What  is  morale?  It  is  made  up  of  many  factors. 
Chief  among  these  are,  loyalty  to,  and  confidence  in,  the 
officers,  self-confidence  upon  the  part  of  the  men,  confi- 


32  MODERN  CAVALRY 

dence  in  their  weapons,  esprit  de  corps,  and  a  high  degree 
of  physical  well  being. 

These  are  all  dependent  upon  and  superinduced  by  the 
following:  loyalty  to  the  officer,  consideration,  justice> 
understanding  and  exertion  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the 
officer  for  his  men.  Confidence  in  the  officer  by  his  ac- 
quiring a  happy  faculty  "of  delivering  the  goods" ;  men 
will  stand  any  degree  of  hardship  and  effort  if  they  know 
that  they  are  being  well  led,  witness  the  soldiers  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson.  Confidence  in  their  weapons,  by  a  high 
degree  of  individual  training.  Esprit  de  corps,  by  a  de- 
liberate fostering  of  this  quality,  means  for  which  will  be 
hereinafter  suggested.  Physical  well-being,  fitness  for 
field  service  upon  the  part  of  the  individual  before  taking 
the  field,  a  knowledge  of  how  to  care  for  himself  after 
arrival  in  the  field  and  solicitude  for  his  comfort  and 
welfare  upon  the  part  of  his  officers. 

The  use  of  these  expressions  creates  an  impression  in 
the  minds  of  many  that  we  are  floating  into  a  sea  of  ab- 
stractions. They  sound  like  copy-book  maxims.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  copy-book  maxims  contain  many  of 
the  "eternal  verities."  A  neglect  to  follow  the  copy-book 
maxims  brings  down  its  own  punishment.  A  neglect  to 
realize  the  foundations  of  martial  achievement  leads  to 
mediocrity.  What  we  are  striving  for  is  the  highest  de- 
gree of  efficiency.  In  striving  for  that  let  us  take  these 
seeming  abstractions  and  reduce  them  to  concrete  appli- 
cation on  the  problem  before  us,  the  training  of  the  cavalry 
soldier  for  war. 

One  of  the  most  striking  things  about  war  is  the  great 
degree  in  which  a  national  army  expresses  the  national 
characteristics.  One  of  the  greatest  causes  of  victory  is 
the  superiority  of  one  set  of  national  characteristics  over 


TROOP  TRAININGS-MORALE  FACTORS     33 

that  of  another.  If,  as  we  believe,  our  national  character- 
istics are  superior  to  those  of  most  other  nations,  then  it 
logically  follows  that  we  must  take  full  advantage  of  them 
for  training  our  armies  so  as  to  utilize  this  power  to  the 
greatest  degree  in  war.  The  consideration  now  is  how  to 
use  these  inbred  characteristics  of  the  American  so  as  to 
make  a  better  cavalry  soldier  of  him. 

The  American  of  a  few  generations  is  the  descendant  of 
pioneers.  The  American  of  recent  assimilation  is  himself, 
or  comes  from,  pioneering  blood.  This  because  it  takes 
the  pioneering  virtues  to  force  a  European  peasant  from 
his  village,  in  which  his  people  have  lived  for  generations, 
and  start  a  new  life  in  a  new  country.  The  latter  class 
very  quickly  assimilate  American  customs  and  habits  of 
thought.  To  all  intents  and  purposes  they  are  the  same 
as  the  native  American  stock. 

The  classes  of  Americans  from  which  our  soldiers  come 
have  a  higher  standard  of  education,  a  higher  standard  of 
living,  and  have  inherited  and  acquired  a  greater  degree  of 
energy,  initiative  and  intelligence  than  those  of  foreign 
countries,  with  the  exception  of  British  Colonials. 

If  we  disregard  all  this,  and  simply  drill  until  we  have 
drilled  all  of  this  out  of  the  man,  we  are  blunting  the  in- 
herited instincts  of  the  man,  are  making  an  automaton  of 
him  instead  of  cultivating  the  degree  of  initiative  and  in- 
telligence necessary  for  the  cavalry  soldier  above  all,  and 
we  are  disregarding  and  throwing  away  means  whereby  to 
achieve  our  objects  more  quickly  and  more  efficiently. 

The  solution  is  to  develop  a  type  of  discipline  and  train- 
ing suited  to  the  nature  of  the  American  soldier.  The 
difference  between  the  types  necessary  to  the  European 
peasant,  for  example,  and  to  the  American,  is  the  differ- 
ence between  the  discipline  of  intelligence  and  the  disci- 


34  MODERN  CAVALRY 

pline  of  habit.  It  is  necessary,  with  the  slow-witted 
peasant,  to  handle  him  in  masses,  to  depend  upon  him 
alone  as  little  as  possible,  to  reduce  the  number  of  things 
that  he  has  to  perform  to  the  minimum  that  can  be  learned 
automatically.  These  things  are  then  drilled  into  him 
with  unceasing  repetition  until  his  mind  and  muscles  co- 
ordinate automatically,  until  his  subconscious  personality 
reacts  for  him  and  he  does  not  have  to  think. 

Like  all  other  things,  this  contains  an  element  of  good. 
Every  soldier  is  the  better  for  some  of  this  type  of  work, 
especially  relating  to  those  things  that  have  to  do  with  the 
handling  of  his  weapons.  The  fault  is  not  in  the  use  of 
the  correct  proportion  of  this  type  of  training.  The  fault 
lies  in  blindly  considering  this  as  the  sum  and  substance 
of  training.  The  danger  of  it  for  the  cavalry  service 
especially,  is  that  too  much  of  it  deadens  individual  in- 
itiative. That  there  is  too  much  of  it  is  due  to  several 
factors:  lack  of  thought  on  the  part  of  officers,  the  fact 
that  it  is  the  following  of  the  line  of  least  resistance,  since 
it  is  much  easier  to  get  out  and  command  a  unit  through 
a  morning's  drill  than  to  sit  up  half  the  night  thinking  of 
new  methods  of  teaching;  and  that  it  presents  something 
material  for  the  eyes  of  the  inspecting  officer  who  does  not 
always  realize  that  an  outfit  capable  of  a  high  performance 
in  close  order  drill  might  fall  down  badly  in  actual  cam- 
paign. The  chief  fault  lies  in  making  it  the  end  rather 
than  only  one  of  the  means. 

To  hark  back,  we  are  training  for  war.  In  peace  we 
must  cultivate  the  qualities  that  will  be  essential  in  war. 
If  we  can  combine  the  cultivation  of  those  qualities  with 
the  instruction  of  the  soldier  in  all  things  pertaining  to 
his  war  requirements,  then  we  are  cutting  down  our  labors 
and  taking  fuller  advantage  of  our  time.  As  it  is  now, 


TROOP  TRAINING— MORALE  FACTORS     35 

many  officers  waste  valuable  hours  in  disciplinary  drills 
when  they  might  secure  the  same  amount  of  discipline 
while  at  the  same  time  teaching  a  soldier  practical  fighting 
methods.  This  will  have  the  effect  of  raising  morale,  be 
cause  the  American  is  by  nature  essentially  practical  and 
much  more  interested  in  the  practical  side  of  his  profes- 
sion or  work. 

The  Value  of  Interest  in  Training  and  Morale: 

In  the  word  "interest"  lies  the  key  to  the  development 
of  more  scientific,  thorough  and  rapid  training.  Psy- 
chology teaches  us  that  interest  and  memory  are  intimately 
connected.  Interest  makes  a  strong  impression  which  re- 
collection revives  in  the  form  of  memory.  Interesting 
things  make  a  deeper  groove  in  the  brain  tissue.  Cast 
your  mind  back  and  try  to  remember  all  that  you  did  in 
the  last  week.  Analyze  the  incidents  you  remember  and 
you  will  find  that  they  are  the  things  in  which  you  were 
interested. 

Our  work  is  principally  with  the  soldier's  memory. 
We  teach  him  to-day  so  that  he  will  remember  to-morrow 
to  carry  out  our  teachings.  We  teach  him  in  peace  and 
depend  upon  his  memory  in  war  for  carrying  him  through 
and  adding  to  the  defence  of  his  nation.  If  our  work  is 
principally  with  the  soldier's  memory,  then  we  must  use 
all  the  aids  that  will  properly  stimulate  that  memory.  Of 
these  the  greatest  is  interest. 

It  is  especially  valuable  in  the  cavalry,  owing  to  the  high 
degree  of  intelligence  the  individual  trooper  will  be  called 
upon  to  display.  General  von  Schmidt,1  who  is  said  to 

1  "Instructions  for  Cavalry,"  von  Schmidt,  page  7.  Quoted  in 
"Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington,  page  177. 


36  MODERN  CAVALRY 

have  exercised  a  greater  influence  for  good  upon  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  than  any  leader  since  Frederick  the  Great,  has 
this  to  say,  "Everything  that  is  dull,  cannot  be  easily  un- 
derstood, or  is  uninteresting,  must  disappear ;  the  cavalry 
soldier  has  less  need  of  this  than  anyone.  With  such  in- 
struction he  is  quite  useless,  for  to  him  more  than  to  any- 
one else  are  freshness,  life,  activity,  mental  quickness  and 
vivacity  necessary." 

Many  of  our  men,  who  could  not  give  a  simple  sum- 
mary of  the  duties  of  the  private  on  the  firing  line,  could 
reel  off  without  thought  the  batting  averages  of  every 
player  of  note  in  the  big  leagues.  The  first  does  not  ap- 
peal to  his  interest,  the  second  does.  With  a  proper  degree 
of  imagination  on  the  part  of  the  officer  there  is  no  reason 
why  all  the  interest-producing  means  in  the  cavalry  can 
not  be  used  properly.  The  horse,  the  rifle,  the  sabre  and 
the  pistol  alone  are  romantic  enough  in  their  appeal  to  a 
red-blooded  young  man. 

Skill  at  imparting  knowledge  must  be  the  ambition  of 
every  officer  who  hopes  to  be  successful.  Few  of  us 
realize  this.  We  go  to  drill  daily,  unprepared,  bore  our 
men  excessively  through  a  long  period  and  are  somewhat 
pleased  at  ourselves  because  they  did  not  fail  to  react  to 
most  of  the  commands !  We  do  not  realize  that  we  are 
breaking  down  morale  by  slighting  the  capabilities  of  the 
individual,  by  under-estimating  his  intelligence  and  by 
treating  him  as  a  block  of  wood. 

A  great  deal  of  the  superiority  of  the  American  soldier 
arises  through  the  fact  that  he  is  a  person  given  excessively 
to  thinking  for  himself.  He  is  very  apt  to  discover  what 
is  essential  and  what  is  non-essential  after  a  few  weeks  in 
the  ranks.  Unless  properly  instructed  he  is  very  prone  to 
classify  even  essential  things  as  non-essentials.  As  a 


TROOP  TRAINING—MORALE  FACTORS     37 

consequence  when  you  hold  him  for  long  and  straining 
periods  upon  what  he  rightly  or  wrongly  conceives  to  be 
non-essential  and  trivial,  his  intelligence  rebels,  his  interest 
flags  and  you  have  succeeded  in  inculcating  bad  habits  of 
body  and  mind  that  it  will  be  exceedingly  difficult  to  eradi- 
cate. 

He  is  easily  interested  in  practical  things.  A  little  time 
spent  with  him  in  the  explanation  of  the  practicability  of 
certain  things  that  have  only  an  indirect  influence  upon 
war  is  time  well  spent.  The  safest  plan  is  to  assess  the 
value  of  any  subject  by  the  measure  of  its  direct  ap- 
plicability to  war. 

The  value  and  power  of  interest  in  instruction  needs 
no  proof.  A  short  study  of  any  manual  of  psychology 
will  demonstrate  the  basic  necessity  for  it.  Interest  is  a 
necessary  thing  in  any  successful  scheme  of  instruction ; 
look  back  for  instance  upon  your  own  instructors  and 
analyze  the  amount  you  have  remembered  from  those  that 
bored  you  and  those  that  interested  you.  It  is  necessary 
that  we  look  upon  our  role  of  teaching  seriously  and  study 
teaching  methods.  It  is  necessary  that  we  concentrate 
our  faculties  upon  adding  interest  to  our  work  and  in 
minimizing  the  things  that  result  in  lack  of  interest. 

Chief  among  these  are  long  periods  of  mounted  drill. 
They  are  useful  so  long  as  they  contribute  to  the  ease  of 
handling  masses  of  mounted  men.  The  time  spent  upon 
mounted  drill  should  be  analyzed  carefully.  It  should 
not  be  allowed  to  take  up  hours  that  could  be  spent  upon 
subjects  that  have  a  proved  and  high  ratio  to  battle  effi- 
ciency. This,  as  all  other  things  should  be  examined 
closely  with  one  thought  in  mind,  "Is  this  leading  to 
readiness  for  war?" 

The  proper  application  of  the  principle  of  cultivating 


38  MODERN  CAVALRY 

the  interest  power  reacts  directly  in  favor  of  higher 
morale.  It  increases  the  trooper's  knowledge,  his  self- 
respect  and  his  self-confidence.  It  puts  a  greater  value 
upon  his  officer  in  his  estimation,  it  teaches  him  to  handle 
himself  and  his  weapons  in  far  more  thorough  manner. 

One  of  the  means  of  cultivating  interest  and  improving 
instruction  is  the  application  to  training  of  the  principles 
of  team-work,  in  other  words  to  make  use  of  the  spirit 
of  the  team  at  sports.  Team-work  is  a  word  used  very 
much  and  very  wrongly.  The  guiding  influence  of  the 
spirit  of  team-work,  and  its  stimulus,  is  the  spirit  of  com- 
petition, the  spirit  that  makes  men  risk  life  and  limb  for 
the  gaining  of  a  slight  advantage  over  another  group  of 
men.  See  men  training  for  long  and  inconvenient  hours 
upon  the  football  field,  see  them  keenly  alert  on  the  base- 
ball diamond  and  then  contrast  this  with  their  normal  atti- 
tude while  at  work.  The  good  officer  should  have  his  men 
just  as  keen  at  work  as  they  are  at  play.  He  can  do  it  by 
using  his  imagination.  Remember  that  you  are  striving  for 
interest.  And  there  is  nothing  more  interesting  to  the 
average  American  than  to  beat  another  man  or  group  of 
men  at  the  same  game. 

The  neglect  to  use  the  spirit  of  competition,  which  is 
so  strong  in  the  breast  of  the  average  American,  is  only 
comparable  to  the  neglect  of  a  man  owning  an  eight- 
cylinder  car  who  through  choice  or  ignorance,  should  be 
content  with  running  only  upon  four  cylinders  habitually. 
There  is  power  latent  in  every  man  and  every  organiza- 
tion which  only  a  development  of  the  competitive  spirit 
can  bring  out. 

Make  every  squad  and  every  platoon  in  the  troop  a 
small  team.  Let  them  compete,  mark  them,  rate  them 
and  reward  the  winners  by  some  means  of  your  own  de- 


TROOP  TRAINING— MORALE  FACTORS     39 

vising.  Properly  carried  out  it  will  mean  a  new  lease  of 
life  and  a  new  influx  of  power  for  the  organization.  It 
will  interest  the  men  in  their  work.  You  will  find  them 
after  hours  practicing  behind  the  stables  or  in  the  bar- 
racks. You  will  have  non-commissioned  officers  asking 
to  take  their  sections  out  on  holidays  and  after  working 
hours.  You  will  have  power  developed  and  coming  from 
below  as  it  should  come.  It  will  increase  the  energies  and 
capabilities  of  your  organization  to  an  undreamed  of  ex- 
tent. It  will  make  for  contentment.  It  will  raise  morale 
by  leaps  and  bounds. 

There  are  officers  who  will  say  that  it  will  hurt  the  or- 
ganization spirit  as  a  whole.  It  does  not,  as  proved  by 
experience,  but  rather  increases  the  amount  and  makes 
more  spirit  available  when  the  time  comes  for  combined 
action.  It  will  develop  esprit  de  corps  as  nothing  else  can. 

The  Cultivation  of  Loyalty: 

To  discount  the  loyalty  and  esteem  of  your  men  is  to 
betray  a  serious  lack  of  judgment.  We  are  preparing  for 
war.  In  war  there  arise  situations  in  which  the  force 
of  orders  and  regulations,  the  fear  of  courts-martial  and 
the  mechanics  of  military  control  will  fail  or  waver. 
Nothing  but  men  are  left,  the  leader  and  the  led.  If  the 
leader  has  been  tried  and  found  wanting  in  peace  time, 
in  time  of  extreme  danger  in  war  his  unit  will  break  under 
him.  It  is  always  possible  that  a  time  will  come  when 
the  personal  feelings  of  the  men  for  the  officer  decide  the 
day.  This  possibility  alone  is  worth  preparing  for  in  ad- 
dition to  the  many  other  advantages  of  loyalty. 

Remember  that  the  confidence  of  men  in  their  leader 
and  esteem  for  him  grow  if  they  realize  that  he  is  doing 


40  MODERN  CAVALRY 

all  within  his  power  to  ameliorate  any  harsh  conditions 
that  might  arise.  This  is  true  even  if  the  results  are 
almost  negligible.  The  men  impute  the  blame  to  Provi- 
dence for  the  unpleasant  conditions  and  their  esteem  for 
their  officer  grows  for  his  efforts.  There  is  no  quicker 
or  more  certain  method  of  losing  the  confidence  of  men 
than  to  let  bodily  fatigue  or  desire  for  comfort  keep  the 
officer  from  laboring  until  all  his  men  and  animals  have 
been  granted  the  highest  degree  of  comfort  possible. 

One  of  the  many  virtues  of  the  army  before  the  war 
was  the  paternal  solicitude  displayed  by  the  troop  com- 
manders for  their  men.  These  older  captains  were  more 
abrupt  and  distant  in  outward  seeming  than  the  present 
generation.  But  they  succeeded  in  gaining  and  holding 
the  respect  and  affection  of  their  men  to  a  greater  extent, 
principally  because  they  devoted  so  much  time  and  energy 
to  the  well  being  of  every  man  and  animal.  Each  trooper 
realized  that  the  "old  man"  had  done  everything  in  his 
power  and  was  looking  after  him. 

A  thoughtless  and  careless  misuse  of  the  punishing 
power  leads  to  bad  conditions  of  discipline.  An  ounce 
of  prevention  is  worth  a  pound  of  cure.  An  organiza- 
tion which  has  the  proper  spirit  will  refrain  from  evil 
doing  if  they  are  convinced  that  it  not  only  hurts  them 
but  hurts  the  organization  as  a  whole.  There  is  a  whole 
lot  to  be  done  in  appealing  to  the  better  side  of  the  men's 
nature.  This  savors  of  "coddling"  to  some.  But  it  is 
sound  doctrine  nevertheless.  Soldiers  are  ordinary  human 
beings,  nothing  more  nor  less.  A  whole  lot  of  the  youth- 
ful spirit  that  finds  outlet  in  the  soldiers  in  the  form  of 
minor  misdemeanors,  is  punished  as  a  crime.  The  read- 
ing of  the  Articles  of  War  once  every  six  months  is  not 
sufficient  to  obviate  this,  any  more  than  the  perusal  of 


TROOP  TRAINING-MORALE  FACTORS     41 

the  college  regulations  deters  a  student  from  breaking 
them.  An  organization  in  which  the  issue  is  put  squarely 
up  to  the  reasoning  power  and  intelligence  of  its  men  will 
seldom  offend.  An  example  in  point  was  an  American 
battalion  of  infantry  once  marching  through  an  allied 
country.  Great  trouble  and  many  complaints  arose 
through  pillaging  orchards  and  gardens.  Men  had  been 
warned  and  some  punished.  Nevertheless  it  still  con- 
tinued. An  old  woman  came  into  camp  weeping  one 
evening.  The  soldiers  had  pillaged  her  garden  and  taken 
her  winter  supply  of  food.  Her  sons  were  at  the  front. 
The  whole  battalion  was  lined  up,  the  results  of  their 
actions  forcibly  pointed  out  to  them  and  a  parallel  drawn 
in  which  foreign  troops  were  imagined  tramping  over 
the  United  States  and  the  result  of  their  acting  in  the 
same  manner.  About  ten  minutes  after  the  battalion 
was  dismissed  a  sergeant  brought  in  a  hatful  of  money, 
the  result  of  a  voluntary  collection  taken  up  from  every 
man  in  the  battalion.  It  was  given  to  the  old  woman  and 
proved  to  be  enough  to  see  her  through  many  winters. 
That  was  the  end  of  pillaging  for  that  battalion. 

It  is  believed  that  the  American  soldier  has  a  higher 
standard  than  we  sometimes  give  him  credit  for.  The 
officer  who  treats  him  like  a  convict  will  have  to  watch 
him  like  a  convict  as  he  certainly  will  act  like  one.  The 
officer,  on  the  other  hand  who  adopts  as  his  policy  a  firm, 
just  but  considerate  attitude  will  find  that  he  has  a  far 
higher  standard  of  discipline,  real  discipline,  discipline 
that  will  not  break  down  when  his  back  is  turned.  Culti- 
vate the  self-respect  of  your  men.  A  fighting  man  can- 
not fight  without  self-respect,  it  is  one  of  the  constituents 
of  courage. 

It  is  a  good  thing  for  an  officer  to  feel  a  heavy  load  of 


42  MODERN  CAVALRY 

responsibility  for  the  actions  and  behavior  of  his  men. 
He  must  cultivate  the  feeling  that  perhaps  every  man  of 
his  unit  in  the  guard  house  is  a  direct  and  tangible  sign 
of  his  failure  as  a  leader.  An  army  is  an  autocracy.  It 
cannot  be  run  by  kindness.  It  will  run  a  lot  more 
smoothly  and  with  a  minimum  of  lost  motion  if  the  quali- 
ties of  consideration  and  understanding  are  shown. 

No  troop  officer  can  feel  satisfied  until  he  can  visualize 
the  character  and  personal  characteristics  of  every  man 
in  his  organization.  It  will  repay  him  to  take  up  the  in- 
tensive study  of  his  constant  offenders  and  really  de- 
termine whether  they  are  criminal  types  that  should  be 
eliminated  or  whether  they  are  not  just  youngsters  with 
an  excess  of  animal  spirits  which  could  be  diverted  into 
more  useful  channels  to  the  credit  of  the  organization. 
He  should  feel  that  every  man  of  his  in  the  guard  house 
is  the  direct  result  of  mishandling  somewhere  along  the 
line.  He  must  remember  that  his  value  to  the  govern- 
ment is  lowered  by  every  failure  upon  his  part  to  under- 
stand and  secure  results  from  the  men  entrusted  to  his 
charge.  If  they  add  to  the  expense  of  administration,  the 
work  of  courts  and  all  the  legal  machinery,  and  in  addition 
are  failing  to  be  trained  as  soldiers,  it  amounts  to  a 
distinct  loss  to  the  Government.  It  is  a  distinct  loss  in 
fighting  efficiency  as  far  as  the  organization  is  concerned. 
He  must  remember  that  he  is  supposed  to  make  soldiers 
and  better  citizens  out  of  the  men  entrusted  to  him.  He 
must  not  throw  them  impatiently  into  the  guard  house 
without  analyzing  carefully  his  own  responsibility  in  the 
matter. 

Every  troop  commander  should  have  his  desk  some- 
where separate  from  the  First  Sergeant  and  troop  clerk, 
where  any  man  in  the  organization  can  come  and  talk  to 


TROOP  TRAINING— MORALE  FACTORS     43 

him  personally  and  alone.  Men  do  not  mind  punishment, 
and  punishment  will  have  a  corrective  influence  rather 
than  the  reverse,  if  they  feel  that  their  officer  is  "square" 
that  he  has  carefully  weighed  the  case,  heard  the  soldier's 
side  and  explained  the  necessity  for  the  disciplinary  action 
taken.  They  do  become  sullen,  resentful  and  discouraged 
if  they  feel  that  they  have  not  had  a  hearing  and  been 
denied  justice  accordingly.  The  officer  has  great  power 
over  his  men.  Power  implies  responsibility.  He  must 
not  exercise  his  power  without  a  due  sense  of  the  re- 
sponsibility. 

That  organization  in  which  there  is  not  a  strong  bond 
of  sympathy,  even  though  it  be  unspoken,  of  under- 
standing and  mutual  consideration  between  officers  and 
men  is  as  "sounding  brass  and  tinkling  cymbal."  It  is 
not  solidly  founded,  the  first  real  test  will  knock  it  down 
like  a  card  house. 

Remember  that  after  all  you  are  not  judged  so  much 
by  the  words  that  you  utter  as  by  the  actions  you  perform 
and  leave  unperformed.  The  American  soldier  really  has 
more  confidence  in  the  officer  who  is  not  "easy,"  the  exact- 
ing, strict  and  impartial  type  of  officer.  All  he  wants  is  a 
"square  deal,"  he  does  not  want  someone  to  weep  on  his 
shoulder  and  "hand  him  a  line  of  bull."  You  cannot 
pose  before  your  men  and  get  away  with  it.  They  will 
see  through  your  pretence.  There  are  a  hundred  pairs  of 
eyes  more  or  less  watching  you  daily.  You  are  discussed, 
in  the  barracks,  in  the  field,  and  at  the  stables.  Your  im- 
perfections are  noted  quickly,  and  as  quickly  forgiven  if 
you  counterbalance  them  by  virtues  that  transcend  them. 
Men  have  more  confidence  in  a  strict  officer,  they  feel  that 
he  is  "on  the  job."  If  he  can  carry  that  impression  into 
the  field  with  him  he  need  never  to  look  behind  him,  he 


44  MODERN  CAVALRY 

will  know  that  his  outfit  is  with  him.  Men  are  so  con- 
stituted that  they  want  a  leader,  a  real  "he  man" ;  bars  on 
your  shoulder  are  nothing  if  there  is  nothing  to  back  them, 
distinctions  between  officer  and  men  are  broken  down 
in  the  ordeal  of  battle.  After  all  is  said  and  done  you 
will  get  loyalty  if  you  are  deserving  of  loyalty.  And  to 
deserve  loyalty  you  will  have  to  develop  a  knightly  sense 
of  "noblesse  oblige/'  a  feeling  of  responsibility  towards 
the  subordinates  entrusted  to  your  care.  The  time  to  de- 
velop that  is  in  the  post,  on  the  march  and  in  the  camp  in 
peace  time, 

Esprit  de  Corps: 

Esprit  de  corps  will  often  carry  an  outfit  through  when 
many  other  things  fail.  It  is  one  of  the  best  aids  to  peace 
time  training.  It  can  be  fostered  by  successful  partici- 
pation in  sports,  a  winning  baseball  or  football  team  will 
start  the  spirit  better  than  almost  anything  else.  Compe- 
tition with  other  units  in  training  subjects  will  foster  it. 
It  is  a  plant  that  needs  judicious  watering.  It  can  be 
increased  by  the  use  of  suggestion.  Suggestion  is  a 
powerful  tool  to  build  with  if  properly  used.  Every 
officer  should  study  psychology,  especially  the  psychology 
of  the  crowd  if  he  wishes  to  be  a  successful  leader. 
Whenever  your  unit  gains  a  slight  success  intensify  the 
effect  by  remarking  upon  it  and  use  the  spirit  thus  en- 
gendered to  win  again.  Appeal  to  it  often  when  it  has 
gained  sufficient  strength. 

An  example  of  its  use  was  the  case  of  a  troop  of  cavalry 
that  was  to  march  through  and  camp  near  a  certain  village 
in  the  Philippines.  Seven  other  troops  of  the  regiment 
had  marched  through  there  on  different  days.  Each  one 


TROOP  TRAININGS-MORALE  FACTORS     45 

had  had  trouble  owing  to  the  virulently  fighting  qualities 
of  a  certain  brand  of  native  gin  that  was  dispensed  there. 
This  troop  was  lined  up  after  its  arrival  in  camp.  The 
men  were  told  that  the  regimental  commander  had  ad- 
vised making  a  detour.  They  were  told  that  the  troop 
commander  had  replied  that  he  had  perfect  confidence 
in  this  troop  and  would  camp  there  without  any  trouble. 
The  men  were  then  asked  if  that  confidence  was  to  be 
justified.  The  men  said  nothing.  That  was  the  only 
troop  of  the  regiment  that  succeeded  in  making  the  march 
without  trouble.  An  appeal  to  their  manhood  as  well  as 
to  the  esprit  de  corps. 

Example  and  its  Effect  upon  Morale: 

To  realize  the  powerful  effect  of  example  an  officer 
should  again  be  advised  to  study  that  part  of  psychology 
which  pertains  to  the  crowd  and  the  crowd  mind.  The 
effect  of  the  example  of  the  leader  is  far-reaching  and 
important  upon  the  led.  This  should  be  kept  in  mind 
constantly  by  the  officer.  His  bearing,  his  dress,  his  man- 
nerisms are  all  unconsciously  copied  by  his  men.  If  he 
is  tired  on  a  long  march  he  cannot  show  it,  as  it  flies  like 
wildfire  down  the  column.  If  he  is  anxious,  if  things 
are  going  wrong  in  combat  he  cannot  show  it  as  it  has 
worse  effect  then  than  at  any  other  time.  In  time  of  un- 
certainty and  danger  the  leader  is  especially  watched. 
Men's  minds  become  almost  childlike.  They  want  some- 
one stronger  than  themselves  to  direct.  In  time  of  hard- 
ship the  officer  with  a  joke  on  his  lips  and  a  cheerful  de- 
meanor will  bring  in  men  and  animals  comparatively 
fresh.  The  snarling,  irritable  type,  who  has  not  strength 
of  character  enough  to  keep  his  real  feelings  to  himself, 


46  MODERN  CAVALRY 

will  bring  in  a  crowd  of  tired,  sullen  men.  The  mental 
is  so  closely  allied  to  the  physical  and  the  effect  of  the 
leader  so  great,  that  the  one  type  of  officer  will  raise  the 
spirits  and  morale  of  his  men  and  keep  them  fresh  and 
fit,  with  some  reserve  strength  always  left,  while  the  other 
type  will  have  them  dropping  by  the  wayside.  Remember 
that  the  officer  is  watched  by  a  hundred  eyes.  He  is  only 
one  amongst  many.  He  cannot  be  too  careful  as  to  the 
character  of  the  example  he  sets. 

Remember  that  growling  and  grumbling  lengthen  the 
miles  and  add  to  the  hardships.  When  you  take  hold  of 
an  outfit  in  which  this  spirit  is  rampant,  break  it  up.  Call 
your  non-commissioned  officers  in  to  aid  (in  this  as  in 
everything).  Tell  them  that  there  is  too  much  growling 
in  the  outfit  and  you  want  to  break  it  up.  They  will  go 
at  it  with  ridicule,  with  jokes  and  with  methods  that  you 
cannot  use.  Do  not  forget  to  call  your  non-commis- 
sioned officers  in  when  you  want  to  adopt  a  policy.  They 
are  pleased  by  the  confidence  shown  and  will  lie  awake 
nights  thinking  of  means  to  aid  if  you  handle  them 
properly.  They  are  more  nearly  in  touch  with  the  pulse 
of  feeling  in  the  organization  than  you  are,  they  are  closer 
to  the  men.  Make  them  your  allies  in  all  cases.  Do  not 
be  too  proud  to  ask  them  for  suggestions.  Many  of  them 
have  been  at  the  game  many  years  and  have  picked  up  a 
lot  of  knowledge  of  sorts. 

Physical  Well  Being  and  Its  Effect  Upon  Morale: 

Every  effort  must  be  made  to  raise  the  physical  standard 
of  the  men  entrusted  to  you.  Not  alone  because  this 
turns  better  citizens  back 'to  civil  life  but  because  a  man 
is  a  more  cool,  resourceful  and  courageous  soldier  when 


TROOP  TRAINING— MORALE  FACTORS     47 

he  is  physically  fit.  You  must  have  a  good  athletic  or- 
ganization. The  solution  of  the  physical  problem  is  sport 
and  more  sport.  Games  in  which  one  unit  competes 
against  the  other  are  good.  Football,  baseball,  basket  ball, 
boxing  and  swimming  are  all  valuable.  Every  soldier 
should  be  taught  the  rudiments  of  boxing  at  least.  It  in- 
creases his  poise  and  self-confidence  to  an  undreamed  of 
extent.  Your  men  must  be  practiced  at  running  not  only 
for  the  value  to  them  but  because  of  the  tactical  value  of 
having  men  well  able  to  move  swiftly  dismounted.  It  is 
especially  valuable  in  advance  guard  work  where  a  cavalry 
unit  can  dismount  and  by  a  quick  run  outflank  the  enemy 
and  drive  him  out.  It  is  valuable  against  hostile  in- 
fantry, tired  with  marching  and  burdened  with  a  pack, 
a  cavalryman  can  run  all  around  them  and  shoot  them  up 
if  he  is  fit.  Swimming  is  valuable  in  case  of  destroyed 
bridges  in  war.  It  gives  a  man  confidence  in  crossing 
water  even  if  he  does  not  have  to  swim. 

Remember  that  the  army  that  is  the  more  physically  fit 
has  a  big  edge  on  the  enemy  from  the  start.  It  is  a  prime 
consideration  in  considering  the  factors  that  build  up' 
morale. 

The  Effect  of  Dress: 

An  officer  must  not  forget  how  much  his  self-confidence 
and  efficiency  is  lowered  when  he  is  dressed  in  an  ill  fitting 
uniform.  The  same  thing  applies  to  the  men.  One  of 
the  first  things  to  do  with  a  newly  joined  recruit  is  to  get 
him  to  the  tailor  and  have  his  uniform  fitted  properly. 
One  of  the  first  signs  of  reform  in  the  case  of  an  old 
offender  is  the  fact  that  he  begins  to  shine  up  and  shows 
his  renewed  self-respect  by  the  neatness  of  his  clothing. 


48  MODERN  CAVALRY 

There  is  a  lesson  in  this.  A  snappy  outfit,  that  dresses 
well  will,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  reflect  their  efficiency 
in  other  ways.  It  is  a  small  point  but  is  one  pf  those 
small  points  whose  cumulative  effect  makes  the  difference 
between  a  good  organization  and  a  poor  one. 

Conclusions: 

We  have  gone  into  the  subject  of  morale  enough  to 
show  that  it  is  an  important  matter.  It  is  well  worthy 
the  study  of  an  officer.  Time  spent  upon  this  phase  of 
his  work  is  time  well  spent.  He  must  study  his  men  from 
day  to  day,  he  must  not  only  study  his  subordinates  but 
he  must  study  his  seniors  and  analyze  them  and  their  effect 
upon  him.  There  are  some  that  get  a  high  degree  of 
work  and  enthusiasm  from  him :  why  ?  There  are  others 
with  regard  to  whom  he  feels  that  any  slight  exertion  is 
an  immense  labor.  Why  is  this?  He  must  weigh  and 
analyze  and  out  of  it  all  must  formulate  for  himself  a 
working  code  that  will  fit  any  group  of  men  anywhere. 
Once  he  has  done  this  he  has  added  immeasureably  to  his 
equipment  as  an  officer  and  as  a  leader. 


CHAPTER  IV 

TROOP    TRAINING THE    OFFICER 

The  man  who  rides  into  danger  for  the  love  of  it,  the 
man  who  keenly  enjoys  cross-country  going  and  -polo, 
contains  in  his  disposition  the  germs  of  success  as  a 
cavalry  officer.  After  all  the  tumult  and  the  shouting  of 
tactics  and  strategy,  of  paper  work,  of  schools,  of  auto- 
matic rifles  and  all  the  thousand  and  one  things  that  a 
cavalry  man  has  to  be  proficient  in,  the  fact  still  remains 
that  he  has  to  have,  as  a  base,  the  love  of  the  horse  and 
all  that  pertains  to  him. 

Chief  among  these  are  the  mounted  sports.  These  are 
valuable  to  the  cavalry  officer,  first,  because  they  are  a 
test  of  heart  and  courage,  secondly  because  they  teach 
him  to  think  at  the  gallop,  to  judge  pace,  to  study  ground, 
to  know  the  capabilities  of  a  horse  and  above  all  to  keep 
him  fit  to  take  the  field  even  at  an  advanced  age. 

No  officer  who  is  not  an  enthusiastic  horseman  has  any 
place  in  the  cavalry.  This  is  based  upon  purely  practical 
considerations.  The  horse  enthusiast  is  the  man  who  will 
study  the  horse  and  make  the  most  of  his  capabilities.  The 
enthusiastic  cavalry  horseman  is  the  man  who  will  get 
better  results  from  his  horses  and  bring  them  in  in  better 
shape  than  the  man  lacking  in  this  spirit.  There  is 
another  reason  also,  the  fact  that  mental  efficiency  de- 

49 


50  MODERN  CAVALRY 

pends  so  much  upon  physical  well  being.  The  horseman 
is  usually  a  fitter  man  at  greater  age  than  the  man  who 
has  no  such  interest.  This  may  be  one  of  the  reasons 
why  so  many  cavalrymen  rise  high  in  every  war.  At  the 
time  that  age  begins  to  dim  the  faculties  of  another  man, 
the  cavalryman,  who  has  been  a  consistent  horse  lover,  is 
usually  more  mentally  alert  through  having  kept  physi- 
cally fit  throughout  his  life. 

Every  opportunity  to  indulge  in  mounted  sports  should 
be  granted  to  our  officers.  Polo  at  last  seems  to  have 
come  into  its  own,  officially  recognized  and  fostered  by 
the  Government.  Polo  is  the  finest  sport  for  the  cavalry 
officer.  There  is  another,  however,  that  is  almost  equally 
valuable.  That  is  fox-hunting.  There  are  any  number 
of  excellent  hunt  clubs,  whose  members  are  hospitable, 
whose  packs  are  excellent  and  whose  country  can  give  a 
multitude  of  thrills  any  morning,  that  are  situated  along 
the  Atlantic  seaboard.  It  is  hoped  that  some  system  of 
rotation  of  regiments  will  be  worked  soon  to  enable 
officers  to  get  their  fair  share  of  eastern  service.  They 
should  avail  themselves  of  this  hunting  whenever  possible. 
A  substitute  can  be  found  in  the  Western  posts  by  or- 
ganizing paper  chases.  A  good  paper  chase  laid  over  a 
stiff  course  is  a  fair  test  of  horsemanship.  In  the  Ameri- 
can Forces  in  Germany  a  good  course  is  laid  out  over  the 
hills  back  of  Forts  Ehrenbreitstein  and  Asterstein  every 
Sunday  and  many  officers,  from  the  Commanding  General 
on  down,  turn  out. 

There  is  no  comparison  between  the  somewhat  cold 
and  mechanical  jumping  that  an  officer  gets  in  the  show 
ring,  the  riding  hall  or  jumping  pen  compared  to  the  same 
thing  across  country,  with  a  good  crowd  all  riding  hard. 
It  is  a  better  test  of  horsemanship  and  gives  an  officer  a 


TROOP    TRAINING— THE    OFFICER        51 

good  eye  for  country  as  well  as  a  better  knowledge  of  his 
horse's  capabilities.  It  teaches  him  to  ride  boldly  and  is 
thereby  a  direct  aid  to  cavalry  work  in  campaign. 

The  cavalry  officer  must  keep  himself  fit.  The  posses- 
sion of  a  horse  and  polo  pony  or  two  will  not  do  this 
unless  he  throws  himself  body  and  soul  into  sports.  He 
will  be  subjected  to  more  strain,  more  exposure  and  more 
privation  than  the  officers  of  other  branches  when  on 
campaign.  If  he  is  not  prepared  beforehand  the  un- 
accustomed strain  will  break  him  when  the  country  most 
needs  his  services. 

Next  to  keeping  himself  physically  fit  and  of  equal 
importance,  is  the  question  of  keeping  himself  mentally 
fit.  The  work  of  cavalry  on  campaign  is  largely  a  matter 
of  good  judgment  upon  the  part  of  its  officers.  The 
cavalry  officer  has  more  initiative  in  war  than  most  officers. 
He  is  less  under  the  direct  supervision  of  an  immediate 
superior.  It  is  precisely  for  this  reason  that  his  initiative 
should  spring  from  knowledge.  The  infantry  officer  is 
thoroughly  trained  in  combat  work.  The  work  of  the 
artillery  officer  is  almost  purely  combat  work.  The 
cavalry  officer,  who  has  to  be  trained  to  use  a  great  many 
more  weapons  and  combinations  of  weapons  than  either, 
is  not  sufficiently  trained  tactically.  He  may  become  a 
good  machine  gunner,  a  good  musketry  instructor,  or  a 
good  horseman.  What  he  is  in  grave  danger  of  not  be- 
coming is  a  trained  cavalry  tactician,  capable  of  using  all 
these  weapons  and  all  forms  of  attack  and  knowing  when 
and  where  not  to  use  them. 

The  cavalry  officer  must  be  a  highly  trained  specialist. 
It  is  not  believed  that  we  specialize  enough  in  our  army. 
We  require  an  officer  to  be  capable  of  handling  any  job 
at  any  time  from  spending  a  few  million  dollars  in  dis- 


52  MODERN  CAVALRY 

bursements  to  taking  charge  of  an  aviation  camp.  This 
undoubtedly  has  some  value  in  giving  an  understanding 
of  these  tasks.  But  the  success  of  any  commercial  ven- 
ture depends  upon  picking  the  trained  man  for  the  right 
place,  the  salesman  for  the  road  work,  the  advertising 
man  for  the  publicity,  etc.  Looked  at  from  the  same 
viewpoint  the  cavalry  organizations  of  our  army  should 
only  be  officered  by  cavalry  officers.  And  simply  carrying 
the  crossed  sabres  on  the  collar  does  not  imply  neces- 
sarily that  a  man  is  a  cavalryman. 

What  then  is  meant  by  a  cavalryman?  An  officer 
who  is  first  and  foremost  a  horseman,  who  is  able  and  fit 
to  march  his  unit  great  distances  and  bring  it  in  in  shape 
to  fight,  who  has  an  instinctive  knowledge  of  what  forma- 
tion and  weapon  to  use  in  emergency  and  who  is  fitted 
by  his  training  to  cooperate  tactically  with  other  arms 
for  the  good  of  the  whole,  a  man,  in  short,  who  is  in- 
terested in  cavalry  as  a  fighting  arm.  If  an  officer  is  not 
interested  in  the  combat  possibilities  of  his  branch  he  has 
no  place  in  it. 

In  no  other  branch  does  the  influence  of  the  leader  exert 
such  an  influence  as  it  does  in  the  cavalry.  For  this 
reason  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  assess  the  value  of  any 
given  force  of  cavalry.  This  influence  is  marked  at  all 
times ;  it  is  marked  in  war  to  a  much  greater  extent  than 
in  most  other  branches.  How  many  times  in  history  has 
good  cavalry,  poorly  led,  produced  results  worthy  of  the 
poorest  cavalry?  Cavalry  cannot  be  officered  by  leaders 
who  are' liable,  by  lack  of  trained  judgment,  to  throw  it 
away  in  the  hour  of  need.  Its  relative  size  makes  it 
much  more  valuable  proportionally.  Given  900  cavalry- 
men to  20,000  infantrymen,  the  relative  value  of  each 
cavalryman  to  his  division  commander  is  much  greater 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER         53 

than  that  of  each  infantryman.  It  is  more  difficult, 
moreover,  to  replace  both  the  cavalryman  and  his  horse. 
For  these  reasons  there  must  be  no  waste  of  cavalry 
through  poor  leadership. 

The  cavalry  officer  of  almost  any  grade  requires  a 
higher  degree  of  combined  tactical  training  than  the 
officer  of  most  other  branches.  He,  opposing,  or  co- 
operating (commanding  an  independent  unit  in  many 
cases)  with  all  branches,  has  to  have  a  deep  knowledge  of 
tactics  as  a  whole.  How  are  his  reconnaissance  reports 
to  be  effective  and  valuable  if  he  has  not  the  remotest 
idea  of  what  bearing  his  report  has  upon  operations? 
How  can  he  show  as  he  is  required  to  do,  initiative  in  ab^- 
sence  of  orders,  if  he  has  no  foundation  of  tactical  train- 
ing upon  which  to  base  initiative?  How  is  he  to  base 
reconnaissance  reports  from  the  viewpoint  of  higher  com- 
mand if  he  has  no  conception  of  what  the  higher  com- 
mand is  driving  at? 

The  tactical  training  of  a  cavalry  officer  should  be 
thorough.  He  should  be  tested  in  the  tactics  of  his 
branch.  Upon  his  failure  to  pass  a  certain  number  of 
tests  he  should  be  transferred  to  some  branch  or  position 
where  he  will  not  need  so  high  a  degree  of  the  quality 
of  tactical  leadership.  He  should  read  and  study  the 
possibilities  of  his  own  branch.  It  might  be  advisable 
to  have  him  write  an  occasional  thesis  on  stated  phases 
of  cavalry  work  or  history  to  stimulate  his  study.  The 
war  game  should  be  part  of  the  equipment  of  every 
garrison.  He  should  have  a  fair  acquaintanceship  with 
the  tactics  of  other  branches,  to  enable  him  to  cooperate 
intelligently  with  or  fight  against  them. 

Excellence  in  tactical  things  should  open  a  door  of 
further  advancement  to  him  if  he  perseveres  and  shows 


54  MODERN  CAVALRY 

ability.  Excellence  in  the  'regiment  should  lead  to  the 
Cavalry  School  with  the  future  possibility  of  making 
the  General  Staff  as  a  goal.  European  armies  can  teach 
us  a  great  deal  as  regards  the  proper  stimulation  of  the 
ambitions  of  officers. 

The  value  of  all  this  is  that  study  and  reflection  lead 
an  officer  to  form  a  doctrine  or  a  set  of  principles,  to 
evolve  for  every  situation  a  rough  working  plan  that 
becomes  part  of  his  nature.  When  the  emergency  arises 
he  will  have  no  time  to  reason.  He  will  have  to  act  in- 
stinctively. His  •  instinct  should  be  trained  so  that  no 
situation  finds  him  lacking  in  resource  or  in  the  means 
of  solving  it. 

It  is  Von  Moltke  who  is  reported  to  have  said,  "People 
say  that  one  must  learn  by  experience ;  I  have  always  en- 
deavored to  learn  by  the  experience  of  others. "  In  that 
saying  lies  the  whole  sum  and  substance  of  the  reasons 
for  study.  It  is  to  learn  by  the  experience  of  others.  If 
ten  minutes  of  study  now  can  mean  the  saving  of  the 
lives  of  fifty  men  and  horses,  the  winning  of  a  decision 
over  the  enemy,  reputation  gained  and  safety  to  the  army, 
in  the  future,  then  ten  minutes'  study  is  well  repaid.  It 
can  mean  all  of  these  things. 

Sir  John  French  has  written  a  preface  to  a  work  of 
von  Bernhardi's  that  is  well  worth  reading,  "Let  him  (the 
cavalry  officer)  continue  to  study  profoundly  the  train- 
ing tactics  and  organization  of  the  best  foreign  cavalry. 
Let  him  reflect  long  and  deeply  upon  the  opinions  of 
such  acknowledged  authorities  as  Field  Marshal  Sir 
Evelyn  Wood  and  General  von  Bernhardi.  Let  him  keep 
abreast  with  every  change  in  the  tendencies  of  cavalry 
abroad,  so  that  he  may  help  us  to  assimilate  the  best  of 
foreign  customs  to  our  own.  Finally  let  him  realize  the 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER         55 

great  mental  and  physical  strain  that  modern  war  will  im- 
pose on  the  cavalry,  and  let  him  preserve  that  'mens  sana 
in  corpore  sano/  that  equable  balance  between  study  and 
action,  which  alone  will  enable  him  to  rise  superior  to 
every  difficulty  in  the  great  and  honorable  calling  to 
which  he  belongs."  * 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  many  and  excellent  reports 
made  by  our  observers  in  cavalry  work  abroad  will  be 
put  in  such  shape  that  they  can  be  disseminated  among 
the  cavalry  officers  for  their  instruction. 

It  is  well  for  the  military  student  to  remember  that 
his  main  task  is  to  strip  all  subjects  of  their  non-essen- 
tials. He  must  endeavor  to  reduce  all  subjects  to  their 
most  simple  and  basic  elements.  The  tendency  in  mili- 
tary writings  is  to  overlay  the  profession  with  a  mass  of 
verbiage  and  practice  that  has  no  relation  to  the  object 
in  view. 

The  young  officer  must  keep  the  idea  of  war  constantly 
in  his  mind  and  not  allow  his  energies  to  be  diverted 
from  preparation  for  war.  He  must  constantly  prac- 
tice both  himself  and  his  men  in  every  situation  that  could 
possibly  arise.  He  must  have  imagination.  An  officer 
lacking  in  imagination  will  not  only  be  a  poor  trainer  of 
troops  in  peace  but  he  will  be  a  poor  leader  in  war, 
through  a  lack  of  ability  to  visualize  the  probabilities  of 
the  enemy's  actions.  Imagination  can  be  cultivated  by 
study  and  reflection.  A  proper  forecast  of  the  future  can 
be  acquired  by  studying  the  past. 

We  have  discussed  the  mental  and  physical  needs  of 
the  officer.  What  more  is  necessary?  In  addition  to  be- 
ing a  sportsman  and  a  student  he  must  be  an  organizer,  a 
leader  and  a  teacher. 

1  "Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace,"  von  Bernhardi — preface. 


56  MODERN  CAVALRY 

It  is  Very  surprising  how  many  younger  officers  have 
failed  to  grasp  the  essential  principles  of  organization. 
The  cavalry  drill  regulations  lay  down  clearly  the  mech- 
anics of  this  but  few  grasp  the  spirit.  Many  excellent  offi- 
cers work  hard  drilling  and  training  a  troop  of  one  hun- 
dred men  instead  of  handling  an  organization  composed 
of  several  platoons  of  two  squads  each.  The  gaining  of 
results  through  subordinate  leaders,  the  principles  of 
the  allocation  of  duties,  and  the  utilization  of  all  the  en- 
ergies of  all  the  subordinates  not  only  to  train  the  men 
but  to  train  and  make  efficient  group  leaders  in  war  is 
a  subject  that  will  well  repay  the  time  spent  in  its  study. 

It  is  highly  important  that  the  officer  should  learn  early 
in  his  service  to  have  his  will  carried  out  through  the  me- 
dium of  subordinate  leaders.  He  must  rarely  command 
men  directly.  He  must  always  work  through  their  im- 
mediate commanders,  the  non-commissioned  officers. 

The  attitude  of  many  officers  is  fundamentally  wrong 
from  this  viewpoint.  The  officer  in  too  many  cases 
usurps  the  prerogatives  of  the  sergeant,  to  the  lowering 
of  his  own  prestige  and  the  lessening  of  the  value  of  the 
sergeant.  The  officer  places  too  much  stress  on  the  hand- 
ling of  the  individual  soldier  and  his  training  and  instruc- 
tion. He  considers  his  own  training  as  a  group  leader 
or  tactical  leader  merely  incidental.  He  will  never  have 
well-trained  subordinates  nor  will  he  acquire  that  high  de- 
gree of  tactical  training  necessary  to  a  cavalry  officer  un- 
less he  defines  his  relation  to  this  phase  of  the  work. 

If  he  usurps  the  duties  of  the  non-commissioned  offi- 
cer he  leaves  that  excellent  individual  nothing  to  do  but 
act  as  a  fifth  wheel.  He  devotes  time  to  doing  the  ser- 
geant's work  that  he  should  devote  to  perfecting  himself 
as  a  combat  leader,  the  practice  of  having  his  will  car- 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER         57 

ried  out  through  the  medium  of  subordinate  leaders  being 
an  essential. 

The  enthusiasm  and  energy  of  many  officers  leads 
them  to  take  the  sergeant's  command  from  him  and  han- 
dle the  men  directly.  This  is  bad  for  the  sergeant  as  he 
will  inevitably  lose  interest  and  his  energy  is  no  longer 
available  for  the  organization  to  use.  In  the  British 
army  they  carry  things  almost  too  far  to  the  other  ex- 
treme. They  leave  things  in  the  hands  of  the  non-com- 
missioned officer  that  we  would  never  dream  of  doing. 
The  British  non-commissioned  officer  is  certainly  devel- 
oped by  the  system,  however,  into  a  most  dependable 
person.  We  have  better  non-commissioned  officer  mate- 
rial than  the  British  but  we  do  not  develop  it  to  the  ex- 
tent that  they  do. 

Next  comes  the  question  of  leadership.  Leadership  is 
rather  an  indefinite  term.  Reduced  to  its  simple  terms 
it  resolves  itself  into  the  faculty  of  securing  prompt,  will- 
ing and  intelligent  obedience. 

The  officer  must  not  take  obedience  for  granted  simply 
because  the  Articles  of  War  and  Army  Regulations  re- 
quire obedience.  It  is  not  the  ever  present  factor  that 
the  layman  might  imagine.  Obedience,  perfect,  implicit, 
willing  and  intelligent  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  things 
to  secure.  That  it  is  not  always  secured  is  generally  the 
fault  of  the  leader.  He  has  perhaps  not  expressed  his 
order  clearly  enough.  It  was  perhaps  clear  in  his  own 
mind  but  he  failed  to  convey  his  idea  to  the  subordinate. 
Someone  quotes  General  Grant  as  saying  that  he  wrote 
every  order  with  one  of  his  subordinates  in  mind,  a  par- 
ticularly slow-witted  and  dense  individual.  He  made  the 
order  so  clear  that  he  could  convince  this  man.  He  felt 
that  if  he  understood  it  anyone  else  could. 


58  MODERN  CAVALRY 

Another  reason  for  failures  in  obedience  is  the  bear- 
ing and  manner  of  issuing  an  order.  Many  times  an 
officer  issues  an  order  in  an  easy  conversational  way  that 
leaves  considerable  doubt  in  the  mind  of  his  hearer  as  to 
whether  he  is  not  simply  indulging  in  conversation.  An 
officer  must  be  careful  of  this,  he  must  train  himself  to 
give  incisive,  clear  cut  and  unmistakable  orders  that  will 
not  leave  room  for  the  slightest  element  of  doubt.  Apro- 
pos of  this  it  is  wise  for  an  officer  to  remember  that  the 
more  he  uses  his  voice  with  his  men  the  more  accustomed 
they  become  to  it  and  familiarity  breeds  a  certain  amount 
of  contempt.  The  officer  who  is  continually  talking  has 
nothing  left  when  the  time  for  quick  action  comes.  He 
must  cultivate  the  habit  of  letting  his  subordinates  do 
most  of  the  talking.  When  his  voice  is  raised  it  should 
be  raised  decisively;  he  will  soon  find  that  if  he  follows 
this  plan,  when  he  does  raise  his  voice,  every  man's  and 
every  horse's  head  goes  up.  His  words  are  listened  to. 
This  may  have  an  important  bearing  on  some  future  time 
of  stress  and  strain  when  order  can  only  be  made  out 
of  chaos  by  the  influence  of  the  leader's  voice. 

Implicit  obedience  is  necessary.  A  higher  type  of  obe- 
dience is  the  type  that  is  both  implicit  and  cheerfully  will- 
ing. That  can  only  come  from  loyal  and  contented  subor- 
dinates. They  strive  in  the  Navy  for  what  is  called 
"a  happy  ship."  It  is  considered  a  more  efficient  ship. 
The  "happy  ships"  have  a  faculty  of  making  excellent 
scores  at  target  practice  and  of  "delivering  the  goods" 
generally. 

Work  is  important.  Results  are  more  important.  Many 
officers  do  not  differentiate  enough  between  the  two.  An 
organization  simply  going  through  the  motions  at  com- 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER         59 

mand  is  working  satisfactorily  according  to  that  type  of 
officer.  With  nothing  more,  that  type  of  work  is  me- 
chanical and  productive  of  no  lasting  results.  A  con- 
tented organization  does  not  dissipate  its  energy  in 
grumbling,  in  going  absent  without  leave ;  in  keeping  the 
guard  house  full  and  the  courts  martial  busy.  It  con- 
centrates its  energy  upon  that  one  thing,  a  striving  for 
battle  efficiency.  A  mechanical  performance  of  duties 
by  command,  rote  and  schedule  may  simulate  a  working 
for  fighting  efficiency  but  it  will  not  realize  that  stand- 
ard. The  first  crucial  test  will  prove  it  unsound.  The 
most  important  factor  after  all  we  have  to  work  with  in 
the  service  is  the  human  factor.  Study  of  it  will  repay 
an  officer. 

The  next  important  quality  for  an  officer  to  possess  is 
the  ability  to  teach.  The  necessity  of  inculcating  a  high 
degree  of  knowledge  in  all  ranks  in  the  cavalry  admits  of 
no  gainsaying.  The  extreme  dispersion  of  the  cavalry 
formations  in  campaign,  the  high  degree  of  knowledge 
required  for  intelligent  reconnaissance  and  reporting 
work  and  the  comparatively  greater  degree  of  responsi- 
bility resting  on  the  lower  ranks,  makes  it  essential  that 
they  all  be  trained  to  cooperate  intelligently  with  higher 
command.  They  must  be  trained  to  look  at  things  from 
the  viewpoint  of  several  grades  in  rank  above  them.  To 
accomplish  this  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  that  the  cavalry 
soldier  be  taught  to  think.  He  must  not  only  be  taught 
the  use  of  his  individual  weapons  but  must  be  shown 
his  important  place  in  the  great  army  team.  He  must  be 
taught  to  produce  a  high  degree  of  intelligent  coopera- 
tion. 

To  sum  up  then:  our  ideal  cavalry  officer  must  be  an 


60  MODERN  CAVALRY 

enthusiastic  horseman,  he  must  be  a  student,  he  must  be 
an  organizer,  a  leader  and  a  teacher.  In  addition  to  this 
he  must  have  the  faculty  of  being  a  good  team  man. 
There  are  two  kinds  of  polo  players,  there  is  the  "grand 
stand  player,"  perfectly  willing  at  any  time  to  ride  off  his 
own  team  mate  and  break  up  his  team  to  make  a  goal 
himself  and  thereby  gain  the  plaudits  of  the  side  lines, 
who  imagine  that  making  goals  is  all  there  is  to  polo. 
Then  there  is  the  other  type  who  lies  back  coolly,  rides 
off  interference  and  thus  permits  his  team  to  score.  The 
latter  type  would  be  a  good  man  to  have  in  campaign. 
An  officer  must  not  only  have  the  ability  and  desire  for 
cooperation  with  his  own  branch  but  he  must  remember 
that  his  is  not  the  only  branch,  that  wars  are  won  by  the 
cooperation  of  all  branches.  Usually  the  most  bitter 
critic  of  another  branch  is  the  man  that  knows  least  about 
his  own.  Langlois,1  in  his  work,  "The  Lessons  of  Two 
Recent  Wars/'  has  this  to  say  of  the  British  army  in  the 
South  African  War,  "Each  arm  acted  on  its  own.  .  .  . 
Comradeship  can  only  be  fostered  in  peace.  ...  In 
England  it  exists  neither  between  the  different  arms  nor 
between  one  battalion  and  another.  .  .  .  Good  fel- 
lowship in  the  fight  can  only  be  produced  by  good  fellow- 
ship in  time  of  peace  and  the  latter  results  from  a  life  in 
common."  A  good  team  will  win  against  an  aggregation 
of  good  players  any  time.  And  this  applies  with  par- 
ticular force  to  the  great  game  of  war. 

The  foregoing  attempts  to  outline  some  of  the  quali- 
ties that  go  to  the  making  of  the  excellent  cavalry  offi- 
cer. Given  an  officer  with  these  qualities,  energetic  and 
ambitious,  of  distinct  value  to  the  Government,  what  are 

1  Langlois'  "Lessons  from  Two  Recent  Wars/'  page  70,  quoted 
in  "Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington,  page  175. 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER        61 

the  factors  that  might  tend  to  lower  his  morale  or  nullify 
his  efforts? 

One  of  the  factors  is  undoubtedly  a  certain  uneasy  lack 
of  confidence  in  the  future  of  his  own  branch.  The 
remedy  for  this  lies  in  a  study  of  the  World  War  and  a 
discounting  of  the  thoughtless  statements  of  ill-informed 
persons  whose  whole  knowledge  of  the  war  is  comprised 
in  their  own  small  share  in  a  limited  sector.  A  close 
study  of  the  World  War  as  a  whole  should  convince  the 
most  skeptical,  not  only  that  cavalry  did  its  share  in  that 
immense  conflict  but  that  as  a  result  of  it,  and  the  new 
methods  there  made  use  of,  the  cavalry  has,  if  anything, 
a  greater  future  before  it. 

Another  factor  is  the  question  of  Mexican  Border  ser- 
vice. This  is  ceasing  to  be  the  bugbear  that  it  was  sev- 
eral years  ago,  when  an  officer  had  to  leave  his  family  in 
the  North  and  live  in  the  sage  brush  and  sand  in  a  tent 
for  years.  With  a  proper  system  of  rotation  of  regi- 
ments on  the  border  which  it  is  hoped  will  be  put  into 
effect,  with  an  increase  and  enlargement  of  the  border 
posts,  better  barracks  and  quarters  and  stables,  service  on 
the  border  will  lose  some  of  its  terrors.  Its  advantages 
must  not  be  lost  sight  of  at  that ;  the  exceedingly  healthy 
outdoor  life  that  it  is  possible  to  lead  there  at  all  times  of 
the  year;  the  knowledge  that  officers  and  men  gain  in 
campaign  conditions ;  the  excellence  of  the  country  for 
cavalry,  with  its  broad  open  spaces,  are  some  advantages 
that  a  cavalryman  truly  fond  of  his  profession  can  appre- 
ciate. The  great  drawback  is  the  lack  of  conveniences 
and  comforts  for  an  officer's  family.  This  is  a  weak  spot 
as  the  normal  life  of  a  man  impels  him  to  marry  and  make 
a  home  for  himself.  Many  excellent  officers  have  trans- 
ferred from  the  cavalry  for  this  reason  and  there  will  be 


62  MODERN  CAVALRY 

danger  of  more  if  the  conditions  so  easily  remedied  are 
not  taken  in  hand.  There  is  no  necessity  for  an  officer 
living  in  war  conditions  at  all  times. 

Probably  the  greatest  factor,  one  of  the  reasons  that 
officers  do  not  like  to  serve  with  troops,  has  yet  to  be 
touched  upon.  It  is  a  serious  condition  directly  influenc- 
ing the  efficiency  of  the  cavalry  service.  It  is  that  ener- 
getic, loyal  and  efficient  service  with  troops  is  only  occa- 
sionally and  almost  accidentally  noted  upon  an  officer's 
efficiency  record. 

There  is  in  the  first  place  no  scientific  or  standard 
method  of  judging  an  officer  as  a  troop  or  unit  com- 
mander. He  is  given  a  vague  rating  upon  leadership, 
intelligence,  etc.,  all  matters  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  his 
next  higher  commander.  He  may  have  had  the  organi- 
zation with  the  smallest  number  of  disciplinary  reports, 
he  may  have  had  the  best  administered  unit,  he  may  be 
exceptionally  keen  and  efficient  tactically,  his  troop  may 
be  the  best  shooting  troop  in  the  regiment.  None  of  this 
is  likely  to  appear  upon  his  record.  His  mark  depends 
upon  the  vague  and  variable  impressions  of  a  succession 
of  higher  commanders,  based  in  very  many  cases  on  lim- 
ited personal  knowledge  of  the  officer  concerned. 

It  is  strongly  to  be  hoped  that  this  lack  of  system  in 
so  important  a  thing  will  soon  be  changed  for  the  bet- 
ter. If  not  there  is  a  serious  danger  that  the  energies  of 
the  younger  officers  will  be  blunted.  There  should  be  a 
fair,  impartial  and  uniform  test  of  an  officer  as  a  unit 
commander.  He  must  be  tested  by  results  gained.  He 
must  stand  or  fall  on  the  results  of  these  tests. 

His  unit  should  be  the  criterion.  Provisions  for  carry- 
out  the  proper  tests  could  be  made  by  higher  authority. 
These  could  take  the  form  of  the  issuing  of  tables  con- 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER        63 

taining  standards  of  proficiency  in  training  in  all  its 
phases,  training  proper,  troop  management,  horse  man- 
agement, tactical  ability,  disciplinary  ability,  etc. 

A  special  form  of  efficiency  record  should  be  put  into 
use.  It  should  contain  headings  devised  for  ratings  for 
all  of  the  subjects  considered  essential  to  a  cavalry  offi- 
cer. Take  administration,  for  example ;  this  could  be 
rilled  in  by  the  regimental  commander  from  a  special  rec- 
ord, kept  by  the  adjutant,  of  all  administrative  faults 
and  virtues  of  that  particular  officer.  This  would  indi- 
rectly have  the  effect  of  taking  a  load  of  worry  from  the 
adjutant's  shoulders  for  the  tardy  submission  of  reports 
and  communications,  the  necessity  of  returning  papers 
for  correction,  etc.  A  simple  notation  every  time  there 
was  a  fault  and  a  comparison  at  the  end  of  a  stated  period 
with  the  records  of  all  other  officers  would  soon  fix  a 
standard  for  this. 

Troop  training  would  be  one  of  the  simplest  things  to 
judge.  The  application  at  stated  periods  of  standard  tests, 
the  comparison  of  the  total  results  with  all  other  units  in 
the  regiment  and  a  noting  of  the  same  on  the  efficiency 
record.  Tactical  ability  could  be  handled  by  the  same 
means,  preferably  by  actual  problems  upon  the  terrain, 
these  to  be  suited  to  the  officer's  grade  and  length  of  ser- 
vice. 

The  disciplinary  standing  of  the  officer's  unit  should  be 
immediately  reflected  upon  his  efficiency  record.  This  is 
a  simple  matter  to  determine,  simply  a  comparison  at 
stated  periods  of  the  total  disciplinary  reports  with  the 
average  of  the  command  and  the  marking  of  the  offi- 
cer on  the  results. 

The  sum  of  these  requirements  and  others  judged  nec- 
essary would  determine  in  a  very  fair  and  thorough  man- 


64  MODERN   CAVALRY 

ner  the  standing  of  an  officer  as  a  leader  of  units  in  his 
grade.  It  would  tend  to  eliminate  the  consistently  ineffi- 
cient and  would  give  a  goal  to  strive  for  to  many  excel- 
lent and  hard  working  officers  who  now  feel  that  their 
work  is  not  observed  and  noted.  This  would  end  the 
feeling  that  it  was  necessary  to  get  some  "coffee  cooling 
job"  in  order  to  be  favorably  commended.  It  would  be  a 
positive  record  instead  of  the  negative  record  now  in 
vogue  and  would  end  the  feeling  that  service  with  troops 
was  unrewarded  service. 

After  the  sheep  have  been  separated  from  the  goats 
by  this  method,  then  only  officers  of  proved  ability  with 
troops  should  be  sent  to  troops.  Increase  by  this  means 
the  prestige  of  troop  duty,  make  it  an  honor  rather  than 
a  punishment.  Remember  that  our  duty  is  to  fight ;  we 
require  good  leaders  in  war  in  the  cavalry  above  all  other 
branches.  It  would  be  the  greater  part  of  wisdom  to 
weed  out  the  poor  ones  and  encourage  the  good  ones  in 
peace  time. 

The  cavalry  officer  must  remember  above  all  that  he  has 
comparatively  only  a  short  time  in  which  to  teach  the 
mass  of  things  that  each  cavalry  trooper  must  learn.  The 
officer  should  study  the  fine  points  of  teaching  the  ele- 
ments of  the  military  game  and  its  essentials.  He  must 
learn  to  separate  the  essential  from  the  non-essential,  he 
must  develop  practical  instruction  in  lieu  of  theoretical, 
realizing  that  the  soldier  learns  more  by  being  shown  than 
he  does  by  being  talked  at.  He  must  take  advantage  of 
all  psychological  aids  and  learn  thereby  the  best  and  most 
approved  method  of  combining  brain  and  muscle.  He 
must  learn  to  state  facts  tersely  and  in  an  interesting 
manner,  realizing  that  the  soldier's  brain  quickly  tires  of 
long-drawn-out  explanations. 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  OFFICER        65 

Above  all  the  cavalryman  must  remember  what  it  is 
all  about.  He  must  stick  to  the  main  issue,  war  and  prep- 
aration for  war.  Von  Clausewitz,  who  was  the  first  to 
analyze  and  realize  how  completely  Napoleon  had 
smashed  the  old  traditions,  the  "old  fencing,"  the 
rococo  methods  of  making  war  previous  to  his  time  and 
whose  work  on  it  is  the  foundation  of  modern  military 
thought  says,  apropos  of  sticking  to  the  main  issue, 
"Every  activity  in  warfare  therefore  necessarily  relates  to 
combat,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  The  soldier  is  lev- 
ied, clothed,  armed,  exercised,  he  sleeps,  eats  drinks  and 
marches,  all  merely  to  fight  at  the  right  time  and  place."  l 

The  great  essential  is  to  train  soldiers  for  fighting.  In 
our  efforts  to  accomplish  this  let  us  not  forget  another 
great  essential,  that  we  must  also  train  officers  for  lead- 
ing. 

laOn  War,"  von  Clausewitz,  Vol.  I,  Book  I,  page  37. 


CHAPTER  V 

TROOP  TRAINING THE  HORSE 

The  expression  "training  the  horse"  that  we  hear  so 
often  in  the  cavalry,  should  be  amplified  to  make  the  ex- 
pression "training  the  horse  for  war."  Anything  ex- 
tending beyond  that  necessity  should  be  taken  from  the 
sphere  of  work,  of  drill  schedules  and  from  training 
proper.  The  training  that  extends  beyond  direct  neces- 
sity should  be  placed  where  it  belongs,  amongst  pleasures 
and  sports.  The  difference  should  be  sharply  defined. 

There  are  so  many  opinions  and  differences  of  opin- 
ion on  the  subject  of  horse  training  that  it  is  wise  to  nar- 
row the  field  of  discussion  to  simply  the  training  of  the 
horse  for  war.  This  does  not  tend  to  disregard  the  im- 
mense value  of  the  horse  as  an  instrument  of  pleasure  or 
the  direct  value  of  mounted  pursuits  and  sports  generally. 
The  question  is  now :  what  is  the  standard  of  training  that 
we  require  for  the  horse  to  fit  him  for  his  place  in  cam- 
paign ? 

He  must  be  hard  and  fit  to  carry  his  rider  and  the 
weight  of  the  pack  for  long  distances  upon  successive 
days.  He  must  be  able  to  pick  his  way  across  country  at 
speed.  He  must  be  able  to  pass  obstacles  of  not  too  great 
a  height  or  width.  He  must  be  handy  enough  for  his 
rider  to  use  his  weapons  mounted.  He  must  be  docile 

66 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  HORSE          67 

and  trained  so  as  to  not  hinder  his  rider's  mounting  and 
dismounting. 

The  next  point  is  to  decide  as  to  what  degree  of  train- 
ing is  necessary  in  order  to  enable  him  to  reach  this  stand- 
ard. It  is  only  a  matter  of  taking  the  methods  we  now 
have  and  cutting  the  amount  to  what  is  necessary  for  the 
purpose  in  view,  arranging  for  this  amount  of  training 
and  testing  the  horses  after  they  have  been  trained.  Let 
hours  be  spent  outside  of  working  time,  encourage  every 
man  and  officer  to  work  on  his  horse  and  make  horseman- 
ship a  pleasure,  but  keep  in  view  the  fact  that  we  are 
working  for  war  and  let  us  differentiate  between  pleasure 
and  business.  In  our  working  hours  let  us  prepare  for 
war ;  in  our  rest  and  recreation  periods,  encourage  every- 
thing that  will  indirectly  help  us  in  preparation  for  war. 
Modern  warfare  has  become  too  scientific  a  game,  we 
have  too  many  things  to  teach  the  soldier  in  working 
hours  to  allow  any  more  than  the  proper  amount  of  time 
necessary  on  each  subject. 

A  great  aid  to  attaining  the  necessary  degree  of  train- 
ing would  be  the  stimulation  of  the  soldier's  interest  in 
his  horse.  He  is  driven  now  by  unimaginative  methods 
in  training  and  long  hours  of  drill  spent  in  acquiring  un- 
necessary things,  to  look  upon  his  horse  as  only  an  addi- 
tional source  of  labor.  Means  must  be  adopted  to  make 
the  condition  of  a  man's  horse  a  source  of  punishment 
or  commendation  if  he  fails  or  succeeds  in  handling  it 
properly  on  the  daily  routine.  He  should  be  made  to  feel 
that  he  is  just  as  responsible  for  the  condition  of  his 
horse  as  he  is  of  his  gun.  In  many  organizations  there 
is  a  feeling  of  divided  responsibility  in  this  respect. 

The  soldier  is  detailed  to  some  fatigue  duty,  he  is  ab- 
sent from  stables  for  some  cause:  does  he  worry  about 


68  MODERN  CAVALRY 

his  horse  ?  He  does  not,  he  knows  that  someone  will  look 
after  it.  The  responsibility  for  the  care  of  the  mount 
rests  upon  the  stable  sergeant,  the  first  sergeant,  the  pla- 
toon commander  or  some  one  else,  it  does  not  rest  on  the 
soldier.  This  condition  is  unsafe  in  that  it  leads  to  a  gen- 
eral lack  of  care  for  the  horses  on  the  march  and  in  cam- 
paign, and  the  organization  in  which  it  is  most  prevalent 
is  the  organization  that  will  turn  up  with  the  smallest 
strength  in  effectives  after  a  few  weeks  of  campaigning. 

The  solution  of  the  problem  is  to  assign  a  man  a 
horse,  the  animal  to  be  his  as  long  as  he  cares  for  it  prop- 
erly. Make  him  groom  it  every  day  no  matter  what  duty 
he  is  upon.  If  he  cannot  get  to  stables  at  stable  time  let 
him  come  later  and  groom  under  the  supervision  of  the 
stable  sergeant,  or  for  the  inspection  of  the  stable  ser- 
geant. This  may  seem  to  defeat  the  object  of  interesting 
a  man  in  his  horse  by  increasing  the  amount  of  his  drudg- 
ery. It  can  be  lessened  by  lessening  the  amount  of  time 
he  is  required  to  attend  duties  that  take  him  from  stables. 
Moreover,  every  man  absent  from  stables  means  that 
some  other  man  has  to  groom  an  extra  horse  which  is  a 
daily  task  that  does  not  increase  the  man's  interest  in  him. 
Make  it  a  fixed  rule  that  every  man  is  to  groom  his  own 
horse  every  day;  then  the  few  extra  horses  that  are  left 
because  of  a  man  absent  sick  or  for  some  other  un- 
avoidable cause  can  be  groomed  by  detailing  several  men 
upon  them,  which  would  make  the  labor  almost  negligible. 

Allow  the  trooper  more  individual  work  with  his 
mount  and  cut  down  the  amount  of  mechanical  riding 
around  in  a  circle  to  a  minimum.  Let  him  compete  for 
some  prizes  in  the  troop,  squadron  or  regiment  for  the 
condition  and  training  of  his  mount.  A  great  deal  of 
instruction  will  be  absorbed  by  the  man  under  such 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  HORSE          69 

a  method  and  he  will  be  a  better  cavalry  soldier  for 
it. 

He  will  be  more  prone  to  give  heed  to  the  teachings 
of  his  instructors  when  they  advise  him  as  to  the  care  of 
the  horse  when  alone,  how  to  watch  for  every  chance  to 
rest  it,  to  examine  its  bits  and  saddling  at  every  oppor- 
tunity, to  give  it  every  chance  to  nibble  a  mouthful  of 
grass  or  to  drink  whenever  opportunity  offers.  He  will 
be  more  prone  to  ease  the  horse  over  rough  going,  to  dis- 
mount when  making  a  steep  ascent  and  to  watch  his  back 
and  legs  and  report  the  condition  of  his  shoeing,  if  he  is 
fond  of  his  mount  and  desirous  of  keeping  him.  The 
sum  total  of  these  minor  things,  their  observance  or  ne- 
glect make  the  difference  between  an  organization  that 
remains  at  all  time  close  to  full  strength  and  one  that  is 
depleted  below  its  effective  power  after  a  few  weeks  of 
campaigning. 

When  training  the  trooper,  stress  should  be  put  upon 
campaign  riding  and  the  individual's  care  of  the  horse. 
He  should  constantly  be  warned  of  all  the  little  things 
that  save  or  break  a  horse  on  the  march.  He  should  be 
taught  more  individual  care  of  his  horse  and  a  little  less 
of  the  refinements  of  riding  than  he  now  receives.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  individual  soldier  will  be 
very  often  detached  in  the  cavalry  service  and  that  upon 
the  extent  of  his  knowledge  of  the  care  of  the  horse  will 
depend  the  accomplishment  of  his  mission.  We  see  many 
excellent  organizations,  with  horses  in  good  condition, 
smoothly  gaited  and  well  handled  while  under  the  eye  of 
the  officer.  But  let  almost  any  of  his  men  get  away  from 
his  watchful  eye  and  every  principle  is  violated.  Very 
often  non-commissioned  officers  cannot  be  trusted  even 
to  march  a  unit  smoothly  at  the  trot  when  ordered  to 


70  MODERN  CAVALRY 

move  out  on  their  own.  How  many  times  do  you  see  a 
troop  that  has  come  to  the  drill  field  smoothly  under  the 
command  of  the  officer  sent  back  under  a  non-commis- 
sioned officer  and  return  like  a  mob !  They  are  not 
trained  in  gaiting  and  are  not  trained  in  a  great  many  other 
things  that  have  to  do  with  the  efficiency  of  the  horse. 

It  is  a  lesson  sometimes  to  compare  two  troops  in  the 
regiment,  perhaps  both  in  the  same  line  and  adjacent.  In 
one  troop  about  half  the  horses  are  restless,  are  fidgeting, 
stamping  and  shifting  their  position  with  heads  tossing 
and  tails  switching.  Another  troop  seems  to  be  standing 
tranquilly  and  easily.  Inspect  the  first  troop  closely.  You 
find  curb  chains  too  tight,  throat  latches  cinched  up  like 
girths,  equipment  pressing  against  the  horse  uncomfort- 
ably, bits  too  low  or  too  high  in  the  horse's  mouth,  in 
other  words  a  multitude  of  little  things  wrong.  It  is  the 
lack  of  attention  to  little  things  that  means  lost  horse- 
flesh. The  men  of  one  organization  are  properly  trained 
and  their  troop's  commander  has  an  eye  for  every  detail 
wrong;  in  the  other  the  men  do  not  know  and  have  no 
method  of  finding  out  as  their  troop  commander  does  not 
know. 

These  things  occur  in  time  of  peace  in  the  post  where 
a  horse's  work  is  not  exhausting,  where  he  is  fed  and 
watered  regularly,  where  he  is  inspected  by  competent 
people  on  his  return  to  stable,  and  immediately  given  at- 
tention if  he  needs  it.  How  much  more  will  their  cumu- 
lative effect  be  under  campaign  conditions  where  these 
attentions  are  not  possible?  How  much,  for  instance, 
does  a  soldier  know  about  feeding  and  watering  a  horse 
and  how  to  care  for  him  when  away  from  the  solicitude 
and  system  of  the  stable  sergeant?  "Just  as  in  any  busi- 
ness the  profits  are  effected  by  small  and  seemingly  petty 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  HORSE          71 

economies,  so  in  a  regiment  it  is  the  small  economies  of 
horse  flesh  which  mount  up  to  a  great  sum  in  a  month 
or  so  of  campaigning."  * 

The  great  cause  of  losses  of  horse  flesh  on  campaign 
is  that  so  much  of  the  cavalry  work  is  necessarily  dis- 
persed ;  the  trooper  is  on  his  responsibility  to  a  great  ex- 
tent. If  he  has  gained  no  idea  of  the  limitations  and 
needs  of  his  horse  in  peace  he  is  certain  to  be  an  expen- 
sive liability  in  war.  He  ordinarily  has  simply  ridden  his 
horse  to  and  from  drill,  at  drill  and  at  equitation  or  per- 
haps on  a  carefully  conducted  march  or  two.  He  has 
never  been  faced  with  a  mission  in  which  there  was  any 
danger  of  overriding  his  mount  or  failing  to  find  care  for 
him  when  he  arrives  at  his  destination.  As  a  conse- 
quence the  moment  he  finds  himself  in  such  a  situation  he 
begins  automatically  to  wear  his  horse  down  to  the  break- 
ing point. 

Campaign  principles  of  horse  management  must  be 
instilled  into  the  soldier.  It  is  one  of  the  most  important 
parts  of  his  instruction.  The  officers  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers  must  preach  and  reiterate  these  principles 
until  they  become  part  of  his  nature.  He  must  be  made 
into  an  enthusiastic  horseman  who  develops  enough  af- 
fection for  his  mount  to  be  willing  and  anxious  to  take 
every  care  of  it. 

Every  subordinate  leader  must  be  trained  constantly 
to  observe  the  horses  under  his  care.  The  best  way  of 
accomplishing  this  is  to  hold  every  one  responsible  for 
the  horses  of  his  unit,  the  sergeants  for  their  sections 
and  the  lieutenants  for  their  platoons.  Once  a  forceful 
commanding  officer  of  an  organization  severely  corrects 
an  individual  or  two  who  is  not  rendering  a  good  account 

*"Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington,  page  204. 


72  MODERN  CAVALRY 

of  his  stewardship  and  commends  those  who  are,  the  idea 
will  begin  to  become  part  and  parcel  of  the  outfit. 

Men  and  officers  must  be  warned  against  carrying  un- 
authorized articles  which  add  to  the  weight  of  the  horse's 
load  on  the  march.  The  use  of  the  horse  as  an  easy  chair 
must  be  treated  as  a  crime.  An  English  observer  tells  of 
seeing  in  1914  an  entire  brigade  of  French  cuirassiers, 
both  men  and  horses  tired  after  arduous  work,  which  re- 
mained at  a  halt  for  over  one  hour,  every  man  in  the  bri- 
gade lounging  in  the  saddle  throughout  the  whole  time. 
The  memoirs  of  French  cavalry  officers  tell  of  the  many 
nights  that  the  saddles  and  packs  were  left  on  the  horses 
while  the  men  slept  holding  the  reins.  The  French  cav- 
alry was  nearly  ruined  as  a  tactical  force  by  the  lack  of 
knowledge  of  horse  care  on  the  march  and  campaign  upon 
the  part  of  officers  and  men.  The  British  were  enabled 
to  do  more  brilliant  and  important  work  with  smaller 
forces  because  of  the  knowledge  they  displayed  in  the 
care  of  the  horses.  They  learned  their  lesson  in  the 
South  African  War  where  the  lesson  cost  them  about 
twenty-two  million  pounds  sterling  and  untold  lives  and 
time. 

The  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  must  set  an 
example  of  solicitude  for  the  horses.  The  trooper  must 
be  taught  the  habit  of  looking  to  his  horse  the  moment 
he  puts  feet  to  ground  and  before  he  rolls  the  cigarette 
or  starts  chaffing  with  his  neighbor.  The  need  for  all 
this  care  of  minor  details  must  be  explained  to  him  so  as 
to  ensure  that  he  will  carry  it  out  intelligently  when  he 
is  out  from  under  the  eye  of  his  superiors.  He  must  be 
taught  the  principles  of  horse  feeding,  that  a  horse's 
stomach  is  small  and  requires  several  feeds.  The  dog  is 
a  carnivorous  animal,  his  food  is  highly  concentrated.  He 


TROOP  TRAINING— THE  HORSE          73 

can  gorge  once  in  twenty-four  hours  and  keep  well  and 
fit.  The  horse  is  a  grazing  animal.  His  nourishment 
has  to  be  absorbed  from  a  great  deal  of  bulk. 

The  horse  cannot  tell  of  his  discomfort  or  his  pains.  It 
needs  a  watchful  eye  on  the  part  of  his  rider  or  the  offi- 
cers and  non-commissioned  officers.  The  experienced 
horsemaster  can  very  often  tell  from  the  expression  of 
an  animal  whether  or  not  all  is  well  with  him. 

An  ounce  of  prevention  is  better  than  a  pound  of  cure 
for  more  reasons  than  one  in  regard  to  the  care  of  horses. 
But  if  even  the  ounce  of  prevention  fails  and  a  horse  does 
receive  some  minor  injury  or  fall  heir  to  some  minor  ail- 
ment the  better  part  is  to  take  him  immediately  from 
ranks  and  try  to  have  him  cured.  The  remount  service 
in  the  Palestine  campaign,  where  they  had  it  very  well 
organized,  was  responsible  for  turning  back  and  saving 
great  numbers  of  horses.  It  is  better  to  save  a  trained 
animal  and  return  him  to  duty  than  to  break  him  down 
for  good  and  then  be  forced  to  replace  him  with  a  poorly 
conditioned  remount,  if  it  is  possible  to  replace  him  at  all. 
We  will  require  a  well  organized  system  of  mobile  vet- 
erinary columns  to  prevent  any  wastage  of  horseflesh. 
The  study  of  this  phase  of  the  cavalry  problem  alone 
should  lead  to  some  excellent  results. 

Nansouty  said  to  Murat  after  the  latter  had  crossed 
the  Niemen  in  Napoleon's  Russian  campaign  and  had 
only  18,000  horses  left  out  of  the  43,000  that  he  had 
started  with  two  months  previously,  "The  horses  of  the 
cuirassiers,  not,-  unfortunately,  being  able  to  sustain  them- 
selves on  their  patriotism,  fell  down  by  the  road  and  died." 

There  is  always  a  large  amount  of  wastage  in  horse- 
flesh in  campaign.  Most  of  it  is  preventable  by  measures 
taken  in  peace  time.  Of  these  measures  the  most  effec- 


74  MODERN  CAVALRY 

tive  is  a  high  degree  of  knowledge  upon  the  part  of  the 
officers  and  men  as  to  the  care  of  horses.  This  training 
can  be  had  in  peace  time  if  due  attention  is  paid  to  the 
education  of  the  individual.  One  of  the  best  means  of 
making  this  education  "stick"  is  to  cultivate  a  high  degree 
of  personal  responsibility  and  liking  for  his  mount  in  each 
individual  soldier  of  cavalry, 


CHAPTER  VI 

AUXILIARIES  WITH   CAVALRY 

Cavalry  is  itself  a  combatant  branch.  It  must  on  occa- 
sion fight  with  or  against  infantry,  artillery  and  machine 
guns  in  the  same  manner  as  infantry.  To  enable  it  to 
do  this  effectually  it  is  necessary  that  cavalry  be  furnished 
with  the  same  aids  that  are  furnished  the  infantry.  It 
will  have  the  same  opponents  as  infantry.  These  will 
be  machine  guns,  barb  wire,  tanks,  armored  cars,  artil- 
lery and  aeroplanes.  The  infantry  division  will  contain 
neutralizing  agents  for  all  of  these.  The  cavalry  division 
must  contain  no  less. 

After  all  is  said  most  of  these  innovations  tend  to  neu- 
tralize each  other  as  time  goes  on.  Battle  is  decided  by 
men.  But  an  enemy  strength  in  certain  auxiliaries  that 
is  not  met  by  an  equal  strength  on  our  own  side  puts  our 
men  at  a  disadvantage.  Our  cavalry  must  not  be  impeded 
in  its  main  role — which  is  to  fight.  The  cavalry  division 
must  be  enabled  to  carry  out  its  basic  combat  duty,  the 
ability  to  hurl  a  mass  of  men  on  to  the  battle  field.  It 
must  have  all  deterrent  mechanical  factors  on  the  enemy's 
side  neutralized  by  corresponding  or  superior  factors  on 
our  own  side. 

Field  Marshal  Allenby  in  his  message  to  the  Ameri- 
can Cavalry  in  the  January  number  of  the  Cavalry  Jour- 
nal says  " Armed  with  weapons  of  precision,  rifle  and  ma- 

75 


76  MODERN  CAVALRY 

chine  guns,  in  addition  to  its  old  time  equipment  of  sword 
and  lance  and  supported  by  mobile  quick-firing  artil- 
lery, cavalry  can  adapt  itself  to  any  conditions  .  .  . 
Cavalry  enterprise  is  aided,  too,  by  mechanical  means  of 
transport,  lorries,  tanks,  armored  cars  assuring  supply, 
while  fighting  cars  and  swiftly  moving  tanks  can  work 
in  cooperation  with  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  over  any 
ground.  The  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles,  now 
forming  part  of  the  armament  of  our  cavalry,  give  of 
themselves  great  independence  of  action.  By  adopting 
every  helpful  device,  the  mounted  arm  can  continually 
improve  its  fighting  power." 

The  main  need  of  our  cavalry  is  a  higher  degree  of 
cooperation  with  horse  artillery.  Next  in  importance  is 
the  need  for  closer  cooperation  and  communication  with 
the  air  forces.  Next  in  order  would  be  the  necessity  for 
tanks,  armored  cars,  motor  cycles,  increased  signal  com- 
munications and  caterpillar  tractors.  With  these  auxil- 
iaries cavalry  need  not  be  content  with  simply  fighting 
against  cavalry.  It  is  a  worthy  antagonist  for  any  branch 
or  combination  of  branches.  The  ability  to  fight,  and  to 
fight  under  any  and  all  conditions  is  the  ideal  for  which 
to  strive  in  our  service. 

A  cry  that  will  be  raised  by  some  will  be  one  pointing 
out  a  fancied  loss  of  mobility.  Horse  artillery  does  not 
detract  from  the  mobility  of  cavalry.  There  are  few 
places  where  the  horsed  guns  cannot  go.  Places  where 
they  are  unable  to  go  will  in  most  cases  resolve  them- 
selves into  places  where  they  are  not  needed  any  way. 
The  rapid  development  of  the  whippet  tank  idea  should 
give  us  a  light  and  speedy  cross-country  tank  that  can 
follow  cavalry  anywhere.  The  armored  car  question  is 
simply  a  question  of  motor  transportation.  It  is  hoped 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  77 

that  the  caterpillar  truck  will  develop  into  a  dependable 
factor  in  our  supply  problem,  especially  in  waste  country. 
The  cooperation  of  all  these  auxiliaries  will  be  availa- 
ble for  the  cavalry  in  all  conditions  and  they  will  not  de- 
tract from  cavalry  mobility.  Cooperation  entails  unity 
of  action,  and  unity  of  action  entails  similarity  of  move- 
ment. In  this  case  similarity  of  movement  resolves  it- 
self into  capabilities  for  like  speed.  Nothing  is  added  to 
the  cavalry  division  that  will  detract  in  the  slightest  from 
its  marching  speed.  On  the  other  hand  it  will  possess 
added  units  of  greater  speed  under  certain  conditions. 
While  speed  is  not  all  of  cavalry  mobility,  the  problem  is 
now  to  work  out  types  of  mechanical  traction  that  will 
cover  all  classes  of  country.  This  problem  seems  to  be 
fairly  on  the  road  to  solution.  The  final  result  will  be 
speedy  machine-gun  and  field-gun-bearing  types  of  light 
tanks  and  caterpillar  trucks  that  can  accompany  cavalry 
anywhere  and  that  will  add  immeasurably  to  its  radius 
of  action  and  to  its  offensive  power. 

The  need,  now,  is  to  study  the  points  of  cooperation 
and  fullest  utilization  of  the  good  qualities  of  these  aux- 
iliaries. This  study  is  only  possible  with  the  assignment 
of  these  units  to  cavalry,  preferably  to  the  cavalry  divi- 
sion. A  tactical  policy  to  govern  their  use  could  soon  be 
formulated  under  these  conditions.  Some  few  points  in 
relation  to  each  which  have  been  developed  during  the 
last  war  are  noted  here. 

Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry: 

One  of  the  heritages  of  the  old  two-company  post  days 
in  our  Army  is  the  lack  of  opportunity  that  is  found  to 
learn  cooperation  with  other  branches  in  peace  time. 


78  MODERN  CAVALRY 

What  Rimington  calls  "The  watertight  compartment"  at- 
titude has  obtained  to  a  great  extent.  Our  greatest  loss 
in  this  respect  is  the  lack  of  opportunity  we  have  had  in 
the  cavalry  to  learn  the  fine  points  of  cooperation  with 
horse  artillery. 

This  cooperation  requires  a  high  degree  of  knowledge 
and  understanding  of  each  other's  problems  upon  both 
sides.1  It  requires  a  carefully  worked-out  system  of  tac- 
tics designed  to  develop  the  best  points  of  each  branch  in 
combination.  To  develop  to  the  highest  degree  the  attack 
possibilities  of  cavalry  we  must  have  close  cooperation 
with  horse  artillery.  One  of  the  infantry  principles  has 
resolved  itself  into  making  no  attack  without  the  sup- 
port of  artillery.  This  necessity  is,  if  anything,  greater 
in  the  cavalry. 

From  the  policy  of  determining  standard  principles  of 
procedure  or  methods  of  action,  a  cavalry  tactical  prin- 
ciple, in  other  words,  that  will  insure  team  work  and  in- 
telligent initiative,  flows  the  necessity  of  carrying  out  this 
policy  in  respect  of  cooperation  with  other  branches.  A 
definite  policy  must  be  laid  down  and  followed  in  train- 
ing so  that  in  war  time  there  will  be  no  necessity  for  com- 
plicated orders  to  cover  each  case.  This  applies  both  to 
cooperation  with,  and  action  against,  different  branches. 

Cavalry  accompanied  by  modern  horse  artillery  and 
machine  guns  and  highly  trained  in  fire  power,  as  well 
as  in  cooperation  with  its  auxiliary  arms,  will  be  the 
offensive  force  of  the  future  in  wars  of  movement.  But 
we  cannot  secure  the  high  degree  of  cooperation  neces- 
sary in  war  unless  we  practice  it  in  peace  time.  Lang- 
lois'  "Lessons  from  Two  Recent  Wars,"  referring  to  the 

1  Langlois,  "Lessons  from  Two  Recent  Wars,"  page  140,  quoted 
in  "Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington, 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  79 

British  and  Boer  War  says :  'The  English  took  no  steps  in 
peace  to  correct  and  strengthen  any  union  between  the 
arms,  and  evil  overtook  them.  I  cannot  insist  too  much 
on  this  point,  and  we  (the  French)  must  profit  by  this 
lesson." 

Our  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  must  be  quartered 
within  working  distance  of  each  other.  If  this  is  not 
feasible  we  should  hold  a  sufficient  number  of  combined 
problems  per  year  properly  to  instruct  our  officers.  A 
variety  of  problems  could  be  worked  out,  teaching  not 
only  this  phase  of  combat  work,  but  teaching  many  other 
important  things;  cavalry  staff  work  and  the  service  of 
intelligence,  amongst  many. 

The  German  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  state:  "The 
Horse  Artillery  will  often,  by  its  fire,  cause  the  foe  to  dis- 
close his  strength  and  thus  help  reconnaissance.  In  union 
with  Maxim's  it  enables  the  opposition  of  the  enemy  in 
occupied  positions  and  defiles  to  be  overcome,  and  thus 
spares  the  Cavalry  the  dismounted  attack." 

"Horse  artillery  and  machine  guns  enable  the  Cavalry 
to  hem  in  at  long  range  the  enemy's  marching  column  to 
cause  them  to  partially  deploy;  through  flank  fire  to 
change  the  direction  of  their  march." 

Horse  artillery  drives  the  enemy  out  of  positions  and 
therefore  permits  the  cavalry  commander  to  utilize  the 
most  precious  quality  of  his  branch,  its  mobility. 

The  Germans  learned  their  lesson  in  1870  when  there 
was  no  trace  of  cooperation  between  their  artillery  and 
cavalry.  It  was  held  that  cavalry  in  battle  had  no  need 
of  artillery.  In  1907  the  view  point  was  completely 
changed  and  horse  artillery  and  machine  guns  ordered  to 
remain  with  the  cavalry  throughout  the  course  of  the  en- 
gagement. It  is  a  question  as  to  whether  some  of  the 


80  MODERN  CAVALRY 

great  failures  in  mounted  action  in  1870  would  not  have 
been  overwhelming  successful  had  they  been  properly 
prepared  for  by  the  action  of  artillery  and  supported  by 
that  arm. 

The  English  learned  the  lesson  of  cooperation  of  horse 
artillery  and  cavalry  in  their  Boer  War.  They  applied 
this  lesson  brilliantly  in  the  World  War. 

The  whole  question  of  artillery  cooperation  with  cav- 
alry is  one  phase  of  the  great  cavalry  need,  the  augmenta- 
tion of  fire  power. 

In  the  mounted  attack  alone  there  are  great  possibili- 
ties with  the  proper  support  of  artillery.  The  Palestine 
campaign  proved  conclusively  that  thin  lines  of  rapidly 
moving  horsemen,  properly  supported  by  fire  action, 
could  cross  in  a  few  seconds  and  with  small  loss,  ground 
that  the  infantry  could  cross  only  in  a  vastly  longer  time 
and  with  heavy  loss. 

Our  colonels  and  brigadiers  must  have  an  opportunity 
to  learn  the  fullest  capabilities  of  the  combination  of  fire 
and  shock  which  reaches  almost  its  highest  culmination 
in  the  mounted  attack  supported  by  artillery.  To  learn 
to  handle  this,  horse  artillery  must  be  available  and  in 
reach  for  combined  training. 

For  the  cavalry  to  ever  amount  to  anything  in  our  ser- 
vice, we  must  look  beyond  the  platoon  and  troop  and 
think  in  terms  of  regiments,  brigades  and  divisions.  The 
Europeans  considered  it  necessary  to  have  horse  artillery 
assigned  to  the  cavalry  brigade  and  to  have  the  brigadier 
trained  in  combining  the  action  of  the  two.  As  one  of 
our  regiments  is  about  equal  to  a  European  brigade,  it 
may  be  necessary  to  have  horse  artillery  assigned  to  de- 
tached regiments.  In  any  action  against  European  or 
Asiatic  cavalry  we  would  be  the  sufferers,  if  we  do  not 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  81 

strengthen  our  fire  power  with  horse  artillery.  Criticize 
European  cavalry  as  we  like,  we  are  no  less  than  foolish  if 
we  do  not  follow  their  lead  when  they  outstrip  us  in  any 
particular.  The  particular  in  which  they  outstrip  us  now 
is  in  learning  to  combine  cavalry  action  with  the  action 
of  other  arms.  German,  French  and  English  cavalries 
carried  it  out  in  the  war  to  a  much  greater  extent  than 
we  have  ever  done,  even  in  the  Civil  War.  We  must 
modernize  ourselves  in  this  particular. 

There  are  several  factors  that  must  be  considered  in 
the  close  cooperation  of  horse  artillery  and  cavalry.  The 
mobility  of  the  two  is  almost  equal.  The  equipment  of 
horse  artillery  may  have  to  be  slightly  modified,  owing 
to  the  fact  that  horse  artillery  batteries  will,  from  the 
nature  of  cavalry  work,  act  less  in  battalion  units  and 
function  more  as  individual  batteries.  Officers  of  each 
branch  must  be  educated  in  the  possibilities  of  the  other 
branch.  This  could  best  be  done  by  requiring  them  to  serve 
for  a  short  course  of  training  attached  to  the  other 
branch.  • 

Cavalry  tactical  movements  must  take  into  considera- 
tion the  needs  of  horse  artillery ;  i.  e.,  in  mounted  action 
they  must  be  careful  to  avoid  masking  the  fire  of  their 
batteries,  they  must  aim  at  keeping  the  artillery  informed 
at  all  times,  signal  communications  must  be  amplified  for 
better  liaison  with  the  batteries,  and  artillery  commanders 
must  be  trained  sufficiently  in  cavalry  tactics  to  enable 
them  to  act  with  good  judgment  in  the  absence  of  in- 
structions. 

In  working  against  mounted  enemy  forces  supported 
by  horse  artillery,  the  cavalry  commander  must  maneuver 
to  the  end  of  always  making  the  enemy  mask  his  batter- 
ies and  making  his  own  cavalry  unmask  the  fire  of  his 


82  MODERN  CAVALRY 

supporting  batteries.  He  must  maneuver  to  lead  or  drive 
the  enemy  cavalry  under  his  own  artillery  fire,  or  move 
to  have  them  enfiladed.  He  must  make  all  mounted  at- 
tacks with  the  object  of  permitting  his  batteries  to  con- 
tinue their  fire  until  the  last  second. 

One  of  the  great  objects  in  the  attack  would  be  to  give 
our  own  guns  the  best  target  possible  as  long  as  possi- 
ble. In  preparation  for  a  mounted  action  the  horse  ar- 
tillery commander  must  receive  his  orders  first.  Then 
an  attempt  should  be  made  to  combine  the  shock  and  fire 
action  so  that  one  should  not  nullify  the  other ;  in  other 
words,  make  the  artillery  line  of  fire  and  the  line  of  the 
cavalry  attack  at  an  angle  sufficiently  great  to  insure  that 
one  does  not  interfere  with  the  other.  The  highest  degree 
of  concealment  must  be  striven  for. 

It  is  essential  that  the  artillery  be  kept  from  observa- 
tion, both  from  the  ground  and  from  the  air.  This  con- 
sideration must  not  weigh  as  heavily  on  the  horse  artil- 
lery as  upon  other  types.  It  will  very  often  be  neces- 
sary for  horse  artillery,  in  order  to  add  a  decisive  note,  to 
move  very  much  farther  forward  and  well  up  with  its 
cavalry  than  would  be  the  case  when  operating  in  conjunc- 
tion with  infantry.  This  would  apply  especially  to  the 
rear  guard  action  and  the  pursuit. 

The  escort  for  the  guns  must  not  be  allowed  to  be  tied 
down  and  immobilized,  but  must  be  free  to  act,  mounted 
or  dismounted,  must  not  be  so  near  the  guns  as  to  be  re- 
cipients of  "overs"  or  "shorts"  from  opposing  artillery, 
and  must  have  a  high  degree  of  initiative.  They  must 
provide  security  by  reconnaissance  and  not  simply  wait 
until  something  hits  them. 

The  cavalry  command  must  never  allow  its  role  to  de- 
generate into  that  of  a  simple  escort  for  the  guns,  It 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  83 

must  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  guns,  while  a  very  impor- 
tant auxiliary,  are  still  an  auxiliary. 

The  artillery  commander  must  seek  important  targets. 
When  supporting  the  attack  and  after  the  period  when 
his  fire  endangers  his  own  cavalry,  he  must  switch  his 
fire  to  the  enemy's  supports,  or  to  his  led  horses.  He 
must  be  ready  to  drop  his  shells  on  any  means  of  egress 
liable  to  be  taken  by  the  retreating  enemy.  He  can  con- 
tribute materially  to  the  course  of  the  action  by  seeking 
out  and  locating  new  targets  and  pointing  them  out  by 
bursts  of  fire  to  the  cavalry  commander ;  i.  e.,  the  un- 
expected appearance  of  reserves  or  reinforcements, 
enemy  artillery,  etc.  He  can  herald  any  new  movements 
of  the  enemy  by  this  means  and  greatly  assist  the  cavalry 
commander. 

The  artillery  commander  must  have  full  confidence  in 
his  supporting  cavalry  and  must  know  that  they  will 
make  every  effort  to  save  his  guns  if  need  arises.  Nearly 
every  modern  war  has  in  it  many  incidents  such  as  Gren- 
f ell's  heroic  rescue  of  the  guns  with  the  Qth  Lancers  in 
1914.  Cavalry  officers  must  remember  that  cavalry  is 
very  often  called  upon  to  save  the  guns  of  their  own  side 
and  to  capture  the  enemy  guns. 

Armored  Cars: 

The  question  of  armored  car  cooperation  with  cavalry 
is  one  well  worth  our  study.  The  armored  car  is  espe- 
cially valuable  in  advance  or  rear  guard  work.  An  ex- 
ample of  close  cooperation  is  given  in  the  Palestine  cam- 
paign, noted  elsewhere  in  this  volume.  The  operations  of 
armored  cars  with  the  5th  Cavalry  Division  in  Palestine 
October  7th  to  26th,  give  much  food  for  thought.  In 


84  MODERN  CAVALRY 

these  operations  valuable  work  was  done  by  the  armored 
cars  as  reconnoitering  agents.  In  country  with  fair  roads 
they  can  be  exceedingly  valuable  and  result  in  the  saving 
of  much  horse  flesh.  They  would  also  be  valuable  in  par- 
tisan warfare,  operating  against  irregular  or  guerrilla 
troops.  In  the  action  with  the  5th  Division  in  Palestine, 
there  were  examples  of  armored  car  reconnaissance,  of 
combats  between  opposing  armored  cars,  and  combats  of 
armored  cars  with  cavalry. 

A  type  of  armored  car  that  could  also  be  used  for  the 
carriage  of  anti-aircraft  guns  would  be  exceedingly  valu- 
able to  the  cavalry.  Cavalry  is  vulnerable  to  attacks  from 
the  air,  both  bombing  and  machine  gun  fire.  It  is  vul- 
nerable when  in  mass  or  marching  on  the  roads,  and  its 
picket  lines  and  camps  are  especially  good  targets.  It 
was  found  necessary  in  the  Palestine  campaign  to  guard 
the  picket  lines  against  aerial  attacks.  There  must  always 
be  some  form  of  reserve  defense  in  the  event  of  the  de- 
feat or  temporary  absence  of  our  own  air  forces. 

The  armored  car  should  have  a  turret,  equipped  with 
a  machine  gun  or  light  field  gun.  The  field  gun  should 
be  large  enough  to  engage  hostile  armored  cars  and  there- 
fore should  have  sufficient  muzzle,  velocity.  It  might  be 
advisable  to  have  a  proportion  of  anti-tank  guns,  with 
armor-piercing  projectiles. 

A  suggested  French  organization  for  an  armored  car 
unit  is  to  have  a  battalion  divided  into  three  companies, 
with  one  extra  light-section  for  supply  and  repairs.  The 
company  would  contain  four  sections  and  one  echelon. 
The  section  would  comprise  three  cars,  two  machine  gun 
cars  and  one  light  cannon  car.  The  combat  unit  would 
be  the  section.  These  are  never  to  be  placed  on  duty 
with  units  less  than  the  French  squadron.  They  must  be 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  85 

placed  under  the  orders  of  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
cavalry  which  they  are  to  support. 

The  usual  formation  is  with  two  machine  gun  cars  on 
the  flanks  of  the  light  cannon  car,  which  carries  the  sec- 
tion commander.  The  French  recommend  that  a  car 
company  be  assigned  to  the  brigade  and  a  battalion  to  the 
cavalry  division.  The  battalion  commander  would  be 
under  direct  orders  of  the  divisional  commander. 

The  tactical  use  of  the  armored  car  must  be  governed 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  a  delicate  instrument.  It  is  above 
all  essential  to  avoid  wearing  it  out  for  feeble  results.  It 
should  not  be  used  on  minor  reconnaissance  duty  or  in 
general  such  duties  as  would  place  it  at  the  disposition 
of  units  of  cavalry  smaller  than  a  French  squadron. 

Motor  Cycles: 

A  substantial  aid  to  cavalry  would  be  the  attachment  of 
numbers  of  motor  cycles.  They  would  result  in  a 
saving  of  horse  flesh  in  campaign.  They  could  be  used 
to  considerable  advantage  in  the  service  of  reconnais- 
sance and  would  wonderfully  speed  up  the  service  of 
communication.  French,  Belgian  and  German  cavalry 
authorities  seem  to  concur  in  the  value  of  cyclist  troops, 
as  accompanying  troops  for  cavalry.  There  are  possi- 
bilities in  the  development  of  motor  cycle  troops  for  the 
same  purpose.  It  is  not  known  whether  this  possibility 
has  ever  been  tested  in  our  army. 

Signals: 

A  portable  wireless  set  that  could  be  carried  on  four 
Ford  cars,  with  all  equipment  and  personnel,  including 


86  MODERN  CAVALRY 

two  days'  rations  and  water,  was  used  very  successfully 
in  the  Palestine  campaign.  Its  range  was  twenty-five  to 
thirty  miles.  It  can  be  carried  either  as  a  pack  or  a  wagon 
set.  Corps  headquarters  used  a  larger  set,  with  a  radius 
of  about  eighty  miles.  Each  division  in  Palestine  carried 
two  of  the  first  sets,  so  as  to  enable  the  station  to  be  kept 
open  behind  while  the  division  was  moving  to  the  new 
station  in  front. 

The  signal  forces  with  cavalry  should  be  easily  sub- 
divisible, so  as  to  permit  the  detachment  of  sufficient 
strength  with  even  smaller  units  than  the  regiment.  It 
might  be  advisable  in  our  cavalry  to  be  able  to  send  light 
wireless  sets  with  our  squadrons  and  heavier  sets,  with 
greater  sending  radius,  for  the  brigades  and  divisions. 

In  Palestine  many  other  means  of  secondary  communi- 
cation were  used,  and  gave  varying  results.  The  helio- 
graph was  used  as  secondary  communication ;  experi- 
ments wer?  even  made  in  heliographing  by  moonlight. 
The  buzzer  gave  the  best  results  as  a  rule,  but  sometimes 
broke  down.  In  addition  to  all  these,  lamps,  flags,  motor 
cyclists,  gallopers  or  mounted  officers,  mounted  soldiers, 
and  pigeons  were  used  when  circumstances  demanded. 

In  the  use  of  wireless  in  campaign,  the  mistake  made 
by  the  Germans  in  their  advance  in  1914,  of  sending  un- 
coded  messages,  should  not  be  repeated.  In  this  advance 
von  Kluck  complained  that  the  wireless  was  listened  in 
upon  by  the  enemy,  and  many  plans  disclosed  thereby, 

Tanks: 

It  is  not  definitely  known  yet  what  stage  of  develop- 
ment can  be  reached  in  tank  construction  and  improve- 
ment. The  tank  is  essentially  an  infantry  weapon  at  its 


AUXILIARIES  WITH  CAVALRY  87 

present  stage  of  development.  There  seems  to  be  strong 
reason  for  believing  that  the  English  have  developed  a 
type  of  light  whippet  tank  that  may  fulfill  cavalry  re- 
quirements. This  tank  is  stated  to  have  a  speed  of  twenty 
miles  an  hour  across  country,  a  cruising  radius  of  some 
two  hundred  miles,  and  to  be  so  delicately  balanced  that 
it  can  be  run  over  a  brick  on  the  roadway  without  crush- 
ing it.  A  great  fault  of  the  tank  has  been  its  effect  upon 
road  surfaces.  Its  chief  drawback  is  its  vulnerability  to 
direct  artillery  hits.  There  seems  to  be  only  one  exam- 
ple of  a  combat  between  tanks  on  the  Western  Front. 
In  this  combat  the  results  were  indecisive. 

The  tank  is  chiefly  useful  against  machine  gun  nests 
and  wire.  It  may  be  found  necessary  in  any  future  war 
to  attach  enough  of  the  whippet  type  of  tank  mentioned 
above  to  the  cavalry  to  overcome  the  above  antagonists. 

Anti- Air  craft  Guns: 

It  will  undoubtedly  be  necessary  in  the  next  war  of 
any  magnitude  to  provide  anti-aircraft  protection  for  the 
cavalry.  The  size  of  the  cavalry  masses,  both  upon  the 
march  and  in  camp  (when  their  picket  lines  afford  a 
tempting  target)  will  make  them  very  liable  to  attack  from 
aerial  machine-gunning  or  bombing.  This  contingency 
should  be  guarded  against  by  the  assignment  of  anti-air- 
craft guns  to  the  cavalry  division  to  provide  security.  The 
possibility  of  the  defeat  of  our  own  air  force  and  the 
consequent  loss  of  its  protective  power,  must  always  be 
held  in  mind. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CAVALRY   TACTICS — MOUNTED  ACTION 

To  decry  the  mounted  offensive  abilities  of  cavalry  be- 
cause of  modern  weapons,  is  to  show  a  poor  grasp  of  one 
of  the  underlying  principles  of  war — the  value  of  the 
offensive.  It  is  also  indicative  of  a  lack  of  study  of  the 
lessons  of  the  most  recent  war  at  least,  not  to  mention 
past  wars  in  modern  times. 

The  American  cavalry  officer  must  not  be  a  faddist — 
enthusiastic  about  this  weapon  or  that,  to  the  exclusion 
of  other  weapons — he  must  not  be  an  exponent  of  one 
form  of  action  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  To  adopt  this 
narrow  attitude  of  mind  is  wilfully  to  disregard  the  pow- 
ers and  capabilities  of  his  own  branch  and  to  limit  him- 
self to  a  circumscribed  course  of  action.  He  must  be 
prepared  to  use  any  and  all  forms  of  action  and  weapons 
when  the  opportunity  presents  itself  for  each  special 
type. 

To  enable  himself  to  do  this  with  not  only  good  but 
exceedingly  rapid  judgment  he  should,  by  study,  experi- 
ment and  reflection  have  formulated  for  himself  a  work- 
ing code  ready  for  instantaneous  use  in  time  of  emer- 
gency. This  code  should  be  a  set  of  working  rules,  each 
rule  containing  the  elementary  principles  as  to  the  use  of 
each  form  of  attack,  each  weapon  and  combined  forms 
of  attack  and  weapons. 

88 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION     89 

He  must  not  be  a  bigoted  enthusiast  concerning  the  use 
of  cavalry  mounted  but,  on  the  other  hand  must  assign 
it  its  proper  place  in  the  tactical  scheme  of  things.  The 
mounted  attack,  while  not,  as  formerly,  the  sum  and  end 
of  all  cavalry  work,  is  still  an  important  thing,  both  from 
its  moral  and  from  its  physical  effects. 

The  moral  effects  are  of  two  kinds — the  influence  upon 
the  spirit  of  the  cavalry  that  is  anxious  to  close  with  the 
enemy,  and  the  effect  upon  the  enemy.  Its  great  value  to 
us  is  the  offensive  spirit  that  it  inculcates.  This  is  of 
such  importance  as  to  make  it  highly  probable  that,  if 
given  two  opposing  cavalry  forces — all  other  factors  be- 
ing equal — the  side  that  enthusiastically  sought  the  de- 
cision with  the  sword,  whenever  opportunity  offered, 
would  very  quickly  rise  superior  in  morale  to  the  side  that 
dropped  to  the  ground  every  time  the  enemy  came  in 
view.  Continued  insistence  upon  fire  action  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  ought  else  will  inevitably  blunt  the  offensive 
spirit  of  any  cavalry.  Cavalry  fire  action  as  opposed 
to  cavalry  shock  is  an  illustration  of  the  defensive  atti- 
tude as  compared  to  the  offensive  spirit. 

The  old  fallacy — upon  which  so  many  discouraging  de- 
cisions were  formerly  made  at  our  field  exercises — that 
every  time  a  rifle  is  fired  somebody  drops — has  been 
pretty  well  exploded.  Some  one  has  computed  the 
amount  of  metal  it  takes  to  kill  or  wound  an  individual 
in  modern  war  at  well  over  a  ton. 

General  Parker  x  has  compared  the  vulnerability  of  the 
target  offered  by  the  dismounted  man  advancing  500 
yards  to  that  of  the  target  offered  by  a  mounted  man  and 
his  horse  advancing  the  same  distance.  A  mounted  man 
presents  little  more  than  twice  the  target,  head  on,  offered 

1  "The  Mounted  Rifleman,"  Brig.-Gen.  Parker. 


90  MODERN  CAVALRY 

by  the  dismounted  man.  A  dismounted  man  advancing 
by  rushes  presents  a  full  target  for  3  minutes  and  a 
prone  target  for  10  minutes.  The  mounted  man  covers 
the  same  ground  in  i  minute.  It  is  figured  out  roughly 
that  the  mounted  man  and  his  mount  are  exposed  to 
about  one  half  the  fire  that  the  dismounted  man  receives. 

Add  to  this  the  moral  effect  of  a  line  of  horses,  sur- 
mounted by  a  crest  of  gleaming  steel,  swiftly  and  irre- 
sistibly advancing ;  the  effect  upon  the  defending  rifleman 
and  his  nerves  is  bound  to  be  destructive  to  markmanship 
when  you  add  to  this  the  difficulty  of  hitting  a  moving 
target  and  the  fact  that  both  man  and  horse  will  continue 
to  advance  unless  absolutely  vitally  hit,  thus  giving  the 
effect  of  invulnerability — the  total  gives  a  whole  lot  to 
the  efficiency  of  the  mounted  attack. 

As  to  the  difficulty  of  hitting  a  rapidly  advancing 
target  an  incident  is  cited  by  Rimington  that  occurred  in 
the  South  African  War.  A  group  of  picked  shots  had 
been  left  by  a  British  cavalry  outfit  to  fire  at  long  range 
upon  a  small  force  of  Boers  moving  along  their  front  at 
extreme  range.  The  officer  in  charge,  who  was  also 
firing,  suddenly  noticed  that  the  Boers  had  changed  di- 
rection and  that  about  seventy  of  them  were  galloping 
rapidly  towards  his  party.  He  gave  orders  to  continue 
firing  until  the  last  possible  second.  He  himself  picked 
out  one  Boer,  slightly  in  advance,  mounted  upon  a  white 
horse.  He  fired  an  entire  clip  at  this  man,  firing  steadily. 
When  the  attacking  horsemen  came  dangerously  closer  he 
mounted  his  party  and  rejoined  his  unit  at  speed.  When 
last  seen  the  Boer  on  the  white  horse  was  still  in  the  lead. 
When  opportunity  offered  he  compared  notes  with  the 
men  of  his  party.  It  seems  that  they  had  all  picked  the 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION     91 

same  target  at  whom  they  had  collectively  discharged 
about  forty  rounds. 

The  lessons  of  the  Palestine  campaign  should  teach 
us  that  first,  there  are  occasions  when  mounted  attack 
against  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire  is  not  only  possible  but 
highly  preferable ;  secondly,  that  cavalry,  like  infantry, 
is  entitled  to  support  in  its  attack  and  should  be  sup- 
ported by  the  fire  of  rifles,  machine  guns  or  artillery  to 
secure  the  best  effects. 

The  cavalry  that  dismounts  in  face  of  hostile  cavalry, 
unless  it  has  hopes  of  ambushing  or  surprising  the  same, 
is  on  the  defensive.  It  has  been  proved  upon  numerous 
occasions — and  by  many  famous  generals — notably  Gust- 
avus  Adolphus,  Charles  XII  of  Sweden,  Turenne, 
Conde,  Frederick  the  Great  and  others — that  the  cavalry 
which  dismounts  in  the  face  of  opposing  cavalry  or  re- 
ceives it  at  a  halt  with  mounted  fire  will  be  caught  and 
ridden  down.  To  argue  that  the  rate  of  fire  was  slow 
in  the  days  of  these  leaders  is  to  forget  that  the  trained 
infantry  and  cavalry  of  those  days  had  in  many  cases, 
due  to  their  formation  in  many  ranks,  a  rate  of  fire  at 
shorter  range  that  closely  approximates  the  fire  rate  of 
today. 

It  has  been  proved  upon  many  occasions  that  mounted 
infantry  cannot  last  in  the  field  against  cavalry.  Sooner 
or  later  they  will  be  caught  in  the  saddle  and  then  they 
are  finished.  In  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1864  the 
Southerners,  though  admirable  horsemen,  were  armed 
only  with  the  rifle  and  were  defeated  by  the  Federals 
under  Sheridan,  who  were  trained  in  both  fire  and  shock. 

The  true  ideal  for  our  cavalry  is  the  ideal  of  combined 
action,  the  use  of  fire  and  shock,  artillery  and  machine 


92  MODERN  CAVALRY 

guns  well  up  and  used  with  a  high  degree  of  cooperation 
and  intelligence,  a  high  state  of  training  in  rifle  and  auto- 
matic fire  in  the  ranks  and  a  thorough  confidence  in  the 
thrusting  sword.  We  must  be  balanced  cavalrymen, 
quick  to  seize  the  advantage  of  every  weapon  and  style 
of  combat  that  will  enhance  our  physical  and  moral 
superiority  and  lower  that  of  the  enemy. 

The  question  of  pistol  or  sabre  in  the  mounted  attack  is 
argued  at  great  length  in  our  service.  It  is  the  modern 
American  shape  of  the  old  controversy,  as  old  as  the  his- 
tory of  cavalry,  the  question  of  ballistics  from  the  horse's 
back,  a  question  that  has  been  rising  periodically  for  cen- 
turies since  the  time  of  the  Parthian  horse  bowman. 

The  rise  of  the  Zulu  dynasty,  and  its  stubborn  fight 
against  the  might  of  the  British  Empire  can  be  traced 
to  one  fact,  that  the  Zulu  dynasty  forbade  its  warriors 
to  throw  their  assegai  and  forced  them  to  close  and  use 
them  as  stabbing  weapons.  Whoever  issued  that  dictum 
understood  the  morale  that  accrues  to  the  side  which 
insists  upon  closing  with  the  enemy  in  shock. 

The  pistol  is  a  valuable  weapon,  a  typically  American 
weapon.  It  is  our  heritage;  every  youngster  who  has 
read  a  dime  novel  is  imbued  with  the  romance  and  the 
love  of  the  pistol.  Insofar  it  is  valuable.  It  is  a  weapon 
in  which  a  man  has  confidence,  a  begetter  of  morale,  a 
steadier  of  courage.  The  lone  mounted  scout,  picking  his 
way  over  perilous  terrain,  is  twice  the  man  for  having 
the  pistol  strapped  to  his  hip  and  twenty-one  rounds  of 
ammunition  ready  to  hand  in  convenient  clips.  The 
patrol  is  twice  as  bold  for  having  the  pistol  and  being 
able  to  use  it.  Its  value  and  the  appreciation  in  which 
the  average  American  holds  it  can  be  seen  from  the  fact 
that  every  "doughboy"  in  France  that  could  beg,  bor- 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION     93 

row,  steal  or  pick  one  up  from  the  field  had  a  pistol  at- 
tached to  him.  That  these  exerted  an  enormous  effect 
upon  the  American  morale  as  a  whole  there  can  be  no 
gainsaying. 

As  a  cavalry  weapon  for  the  shock,  for  the  gaining 
of  ascendancy  over  the  enemy  cavalry,  for  use  in  mass 
it  is  not  the  ideal  weapon.  The  ideal  weapon  is  the  cold 
steel,  the  long  sharp  sword  whose  gleam  can  cast  terror 
into  the  enemy  and  whose  weight  and  length  provide 
an  objective  upon  which  the  cavalryman  can  concentrate 
the  whole  of  his  energy  and  lust  of  slaughter  as  the 
infantryman  does  on  his  bayonet.  It  is  the  concrete 
expression  of  the  desire  for  contact,  the  desire  to  close 
and  smash  with  the  enemy.  This  desire  must  find  ex- 
pression if  our  cavalry  is  to  remain  superior  to  its  an- 
tagonists. To  keep  the  cavalry  spirit  we  must  keep  the 
sword.  It  is  our  concrete  expression  of  the  will  for 
the  offensive.  And  without  the  offensive  spirit  cavalry 
is  as  nothing. 

Without  the  sword  we  become  mounted  infantry.  In 
other  words,  we  lose,  for  the  reason  that  mounted  in- 
fantry is  not  equal  to  good  infantry  and  can  always  be 
beaten  by  good  cavalry.  Let  us  become  balanced  cavalry- 
men, not  faddists,  wholly  prejudiced  against  this  weapon 
and  that,  but  with  an  all  around  development,  capable  of 
using  each  weapon  and  form  of  attack  as  the  situation 
requires.  Thus  and  thus  only  can  we  fulfil  the  role  that 
we  will  be  called  upon  to  fill  in  the  next  war. 

Too  much  improper  training  in  the  use  of  the  sabre  will 
lead  to  a  lack  of  confidence  in  it  on  the  part  of  the 
average  soldier.  Its  instruction  time  should  be  cut  to 
the  limit  consistent  with  practical  use.  An  ability  to  point 
the  sabre  at  the  enemy  and  to  ride  him  down  should 


94  MODERN   CAVALRY 

be  all  that  is  required  in  training  as  it  is  all  that  is  re- 
quired in  war.  It  is  not  possible  to  make  the  American, 
cavalryman  a  finished  swordsman  and  moreover  it  is 
not  necessary.  If  he  is  taught  that  the  sabre  is  a  weapon 
of  undoubted  value,  taught  to  handle  it  but  not  bored 
excessively  in  practice  with  it,  and  most  of  the  instruction 
concentrated  upon  the  rapid  gallop  straight  to  the  front, 
he  will  have  more  confidence  in  it  when  the  opportunity 
for  its  use  occurs. 

This  confidence  could  also  be  increased  by  the  substitu- 
tion of  a  lighter,  more  graceful  and  better  balanced 
weapon  for  the  present  atrociously  ugly,  ill-balanced  and 
ungainly  sword. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  three  out  of  the  five 
brigades  of  the  Australian  Light  Horse,  who  had  no  arme 
blanche,  applied  for  the  sword  before  the  big  advance 
of  1918  as  a  result  of  their  experience  in  the  previous 
months.  It  is  stated  that  the  two  remaining  brigades 
made  a  similar  request  just  before  the  signing  of  the 
armistice. 

It  is  futile  to  talk  of  frontal  attacks  mounted  against 
unshaken  infantry.  The  experience  in  the  world  war 
has  shown  that  if  infantry,  from  one  reason  or  another, 
is  in  such  condition  that  success  would  attend  a  hurried, 
dismounted  attack  of  the  regular  cavalry  variety,  a 
mounted  attack  will  succeed  and  result  in  saving  of  time 
and  lives,  to  an  incomparably  greater  degree.  The  object 
of  the  infantry  attack  is  to  come  to  close  quarters  and 
cold  steel.  This  is  also  the  cavalry  object. 

One  factor  in  favor  of  the  mounted  as  against  the 
dismounted  attack  is  the  superior  morale  that  results  from 
the  former.  There  is  certainly  a  feeling  of  innate  su- 
periority on  the  part  of  the  man  who  rides  on  a  horse 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION      95 

over  the  man  who  walks  upon  the  ground.  Another 
factor  is  the  demoralization  produced  in  the  enemy  by  the 
combination  of  numbers  and  speed.  In  March,  1917, 
the  5th  Cavalry  Division  (British)  charged  Villers  Faucon 
and  two  other  villages.  Many  Germans,  posted  in 
trenches  and  behind  wire,  put  up  their  hands  while  the 
cavalry  were  still  some  distance  off.  One  of  them  in 
reply  to  the  question  as  to  why  they  had  done  this,  stated : 
"It  would  have  been  all  right  if  infantry  had  been  at- 
tacking us,  but  what  can  one  do  when  the  cavalry  gallops 
at  one!" 

One  of  the  chief  arguments  in  favor  of  the  sword  is 
the  value  of  such  a  weapon  in  the  rencontre  of  small  de- 
tachments where  the  side  that  attacks  first  at  the  great- 
est speed  will  drive  off  the  enemy.  It  is  claimed  that  the 
British  cavalry  in  1914  gained  the  superiority  in  morale 
over  the  Uhlans  because  they  rode  at  the  enemy  on  sight, 
who,  in  many  cases,  was  caught  in  the  act  of  trying  to 
dismount  to  fire. 

Offensive  action  on  the  part  of  one  cavalry  compels 
the  other  to  corresponding  activity  or  to  the  loss  of  its 
''edge"  or  morale.  Two  cavalry  forces  that  stand  off 
and  take  pot  shots  at  each  other  will  never  have  any 
violent  contact  nor  will  the  action  of  either  one  be  decisive. 
The  moment  one  begins  to  take  the  initiative,  or  to  push 
its  opponent  it  will  have  to  have  recourse  to  the  steel 
and  the  other  will  have  to  retaliate  in  kind  or  rest  con- 
tent with  defeat. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  there  are  charges  and 
charges.  The  charge  against  cavalry  is  the  type  that 
requires  consideration  of  some  factors  that  cannot  be 
omitted.  Very  few  of  us  consider  the  charge  more  than 
in  one  way — a  quick  forming  of  line  to  the  front  and  the 


96  MODERN  CAVALRY 

development  of  speed.  This  is  wrong  as  it  will  lead  at 
the  best  to  indecisive  results.  The  following  points  must 
be  observed:  I.  The  enemy  must  be  kept  ignorant  until 
the  last  moment  as  to  the  point  of  attack.  2.  The  leader 
must  retain  control  over  his  unit  as  long  as  possible.  3. 
He  must  be  able  to  pick  his  angle  of  attack.  To  accom- 
plish these,  it  is  best  to  move  rapidly  to  the  flank,  keeping 
in  column  as  long  as  possible,  until  opposite  the  point 
selected,  then  form  line  by  wheeling  into  line — fours 
right  or  left — and  attack. 

De  Brack,  in  his  excellent  work  on  cavalry  says,  "When 
you  charge  make  a  change  of  front  and  attack  them  in 
flank.  This  maneuver  can  always  be  successfully  prac- 
ticed against  an  enemy  like  the  English,  who  make  a 
vigorous  and  disunited  charge,  whose  horses  are  not  very 
manageable,  and  whose  men,  brave  but  uninstructed,  be- 
gin the  charge  too  far  away  from  the  enemy." 

In  the  training  for  the  mounted  attack,  great  stress 
must  be  laid  upon  prompt  rallying.  The  advantage  of 
this  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  unit  most  quickly  rallied  is 
available  for  further  concerted  action,  either  mounted  or 
dismounted,  and  can  act  as  a  new  reserve.  The  more 
quickly  the  unit  can  be  gotten  in  hand  the  more  quickly 
is  it  available  to  parry  a  counter  attack  or  to  move  against 
fresh  bodies  of  the  enemy. 

Cromwell,  who  in  addition  to  his  other  qualities  was 
one  of  the  greatest  English  cavalry  leaders,  realized  the 
necessity  of  rallying  speedily  after  the  charge.  He  gained 
many  successes  through  this  faculty  alone.  "After  Ru- 
pert's defeat  Cromwell  rallied  well  and  quickly  and  re- 
formed ready  for  the  next  job  at  hand.  The  pursuit  of 
Rupert's  troopers  was  intrusted  to  the  smallest  fraction 
sufficient  to  do  the  work  efficiently  .  ,  .  after  each  at- 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION     97 

tack  he  reforms  quickly  and  in  good  order  ready  for 
the  next  effort  .  .  .  attacks  the  Royal  infantry.  .  .  . 
Towards  the  end  of  the  battle  he  is  rallied  and  ready  to 
meet  yet  another  effort;  ready  to  meet  Lucas'  and  Gor- 
ing's  squadrons."1 

In  peace  time  we  do  not  carry  problems  to  a  logical 
conclusion.  What  is  to  happen  after  the  charge  is  driven 
home?  the  cavalry  or  infantry  ridden  down?  the  position 
captured?  We  do  not  practice  this  phase  of  the  attack 
sufficiently.  In  meeting  these  situations  the  rally  is 
one  of  the  most  important  means.  It  should  be  practiced 
constantly  in  peace  time. 

Some  necessary  factors  in  the  mounted  attack  against 
cavalry  are:  the  maintenance  of  cohesion  at  speed,  not 
starting  the  charge  too  soon,  skillful  utilization  of  the 
terrain,  hitting  the  enemy  in  flank,  keeping  out  supports 
and  reserves  and  rallying  quickly. 

The  Palestine  campaign  proved  that  the  cavalry  charge, 
far  from  being  a  thing  of  the  past,  has  assumed  a  new 
value.  This  value  is  gained  through  the  proper  com- 
tination  of  fire  and  shock.  The  speed  with  which 
mounted  troops  can  cross  a  fire-swept  zone  is  a  great 
factor  in  their  favor.  Fire  alone  will  not  stop  the  mounted 
attack  supported  by  fire.  Impassable  obstacles  will  stop 
it.  In  terrain  free  from  impassable  obstacles  and  with 
proper  support  of  machine  guns,  artillery  or  dismounted 
fire  from  other  portions  of  the  command,  cavalry  can 
cross  a  fire-swept  zone,  mounted,  if  they  move  in  waves, 
in  extended  order  and  move  with  speed.  The  moral 
effect  of  such  an  attack  is  very  high.  It  is  in  close  co- 
operation with  fire  power  that  cavalry  mounted  attacks 
reach  their  greatest  efficiency. 
1  "Cromwell,"  Capt.  P,  A.  Charrier,  page  n. 


98  MODERN   CAVALRY 

Machine  guns  and  horse  artillery  should  be  well  for- 
ward and  should  be  trained  to  a  high  degree  of  coopera- 
tion. The  advantage  of  forming  the  charge  to  a  flank 
is  this — that  it  uncovers  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and 
machine  guns.  Wellington  criticized  the  British  officers 
in  the  Peninsular  campaign,  speaking  of  the  l  "trick  our 
officers  have  acquired  of  galloping  at  everything;  they 
never  think  of  maneuvering  before  an  enemy."  It  is  not 
possible  in  these  days  to  do  much  maneuvering  before 
an  enemy ;  it  is  possible  to  reason  out  the  manner  of  the 
attack  with  judgment  and  knowledge  of  the  ground,  and 
to  issue  clear-cut  orders  to  subordinates  before  the 
launching  of  a  charge. 

Take  plenty  of  time  for  initial  reconnaissance.  In 
large  bodies  move  forward  slowly  so  as  to  give  time 
for  the  patrols  to  send  back  information.  The  com- 
mander should  ride  well  forward,  accompanied  by  his 
subordinates,  especially  his  machine  gun  or  artillery  com- 
mander. He  should  strive  for  the  advantage  of  quicker 
deployment  and  correct  direction  of  attack.  He  must 
follow  the  principle  of  keeping  his  troops  under  cover 
from  view  and  fire  until  plans  are  made,  and  then  only 
send  them  forward  when  this  is  completed. 

The  mounted  attack  against  cavalry  should  not  neces- 
sarily lead  to  the  melee  but  should  be  an  attempt  to  break 
the  enemy  by  the  impact  of  a  solid  mass.  The  melee 
is  usually  indecisive  as  it  absorbs  the  strength  of  both 
combatants.  The  best  example  of  the  value  of  solid  at- 
tacks is  the  action  of  the  closely  formed  I3th  Dragoon 
Regiment  which  in  the  Franco-Prussian  war,  at  the  battle 
of  Mars-la-Tour,  defeated  and  drove  away  the  French 
Brigade  Montaigu  who  were  in  disorder  after  having 

1  Quoted  in  "Our  Cavalry,"  Rimington,  page  42. 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION      99 

made  an  easy  prey  of  the  loth  German  Hussars.  It 
may  be  impossible  to  rally  a  unit  after  it  has  once  been 
committed  to  the  charge.  For  this  reason  it  is  essential 
always  to  keep  out  one  or  more  reserves.  The  cavalry 
fight  of  Mars-la-Tour  in  1870  was  finally  decided  by  the 
second  line  of  the  i6th  Dragoons  who  threw  themselves 
in  from  the  rear. 

In  the  cavalry  fight  mounted  it  should  be  the  endeavor 
to  secure  the  advantage  of  the  outer  lines — that  is  to 
attack  concentrically.  As  this  forces  the  enemy  to  re- 
treat concentrically,  his  lines  of  retreat  cross  each  other. 
The  second  advantage  is  that  in  case  of  a  repulse  the  re- 
tirement can  be  made  eccentrically  and  the  enemy's  pur- 
suit dissolves  against  a  multiplicity  of  objectives. 

Against  dismounted  cavalry  always  endeavor  to  at- 
tack the  led  horses  by  a  detachment  of  a  part  of  the* 
command.  Artillery  should  be  attacked  like  infantry — in 
successive  waves. 

When  in  face  of  a  hostile  cavalry  of  any  degree  of  ac- 
tivity, mounted  combat  will  be  frequent.  This  will  be 
especially  against  small  detachments  of  the  enemy.  If  the 
enemy  shows  superior  force  endeavor  to  lead  him  under 
the  fire  of  machine  guns  or  dismounted  portions  of  the 
command. 

Every  attack  made  on  horseback  is  a  case  of  risking  all 
to  gain  all.  It  will  mean  a  certain  amount  of  risk. 
Whoever  avoids  it  will  always  have  an  excuse.  With 
a  desire  for  mounted  attack  comes  also  the  desire  for 
the  offensive — and  it  is  the  offensive  that  wins. 

It  is  not  believed  that  mounted  charges  in  units  larger 
than  the  regiment  (American)  will  occur  in  the  future. 
The  large  massed  charges  of  the  Napoleonic  days  are 
things  of  the  past  as  they  provide  too  great  a  target  for 


ioo  MODERN  CAVALRY 

hostile  artillery  and  machine  guns.  In  units  from  the 
regiment  down,  the  charge  should,  and  will  be,  a  thing  of 
frequent  occurrence.  The  idea  of  the  charge  should  al- 
ways be  kept  in  mind  to  preserve  the  essential  boldness 
and  offensive  spirit  of  cavalry. 

Attacks  against  artillery  should  be  sought  for.  There 
are  many  of  these  which  will  have  a  strong  probability  of 
success.  Some  of  these  are  surprise  attacks  against  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  firing  batteries,  attacks  against  bat- 
teries on  the  march  and  against  artillery  unsupported  by 
infantry.  Ammunition  columns  can  be  attacked  suc- 
cessfully. It  may  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  on  some 
occasions,  to  silence  a  battery,  or  to  divert  its  fire  if  only 
for  a  few  moments.  Surprise  is  the  essential  in  this 
as  in  all  charges. 

Mounted  action  implies  the  offensive  which  implies 
taking  the  initiative.  The  taking  of  the  initiative  is  in 
itself  a  powerful  aid  to  the  raising  of  the  morale  of  one's 
own  side  and  the  lowering  of  the  enemy's.  It  is  human 
nature  to  feel  instinctively  that  there  is  a  good  and  well 
founded  reason  for  the  courage  of  the  aggressive  person. 
He  must  have  a  foundation  for  his  belief  in  his  invulner- 
ability and  in  his  power  to  damage,  or  so  instinct  leads 
one  to  reason.  This  instinct  leads  opponents  to  surrender 
their  initiative  in  cases  where  there  is  very  slight  physical 
justification  for  it. 

We  have  many  combinations  of  weapons  and  forms  of 
the  mounted  attack.  We  have  the  choice  of  the  pistol 
and  the  sword — or  a  combination  of  the  two.  We  have 
the  choice  of  attacking  in  a  solid  line,  in  a  succession  of 
solid  lines,  in  waves  of  foragers,  and  combined  mounted 
and  dismounted  action.  Each  has  its  value.  The  main 
thing  is  to  realize  that  our  offensive  spirit  in  the  cavalry 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION    101 

must  always  find  outlet  and  be  fostered  in,  and  by,  the 
horse,  as  an  ally,  in  our  attack,  -  -,  ; 

The  pistol  and  the  sabre,' miist" not  be 'compared  and 
one  or  the  other  'discarded..  They  ,are  both  necessary 
each  in  its  place  and  fo'r  its ^pie.cikt "situation/:  The  pistol  is 
a  deadly  weapon  properly  handled.  More  instruction 
must  be  had  in  its  use.  It  undoubtedly  kills  more  of  the 
enemy  than  the  sabre.  In  comparing  the  killing  qualities 
one  must  remember  the  old  proverb  which  says  that 
battles  are  not  won  by  the  numbers  of  people  killed  but 
by  the  numbers  of  people  frightened. 

There  are  many  examples  of  mounted  charges  against 
infantry  in  the  World  War.  One  decisive  charge  was 
that  of  the  Bavarian  Uhlan  Brigade,  near  Lagarde,  on 
the  nth  of  August,  1914,  against  a  battalion  of  French 
infantry.  The  infantry  was  over-ridden  and  was  forced 
into  the  line  of  fire  of  a  battery  which  caused  them  many 
losses.  Another  example  of  a  successful  German  charge 
was  that  on  the  26th  of  September,  1914,  when  three 
squadrons  of  the  3rd  Guard  Uhlans  charged  successfully 
against  two  companies  of  French  infantry.  This  infantry 
was  driven  into  Le  Mesnil.  Here  it  was  caught  under  the 
fire  of  the  1st  Guard  Uhlans,  who  were  dismounted.  The 
French  Infantry  was  forced  to  retreat  to  Rocquigny,  with 
a  loss  of  forty-five  dead  and  a  great  number  of  prisoners. 
On  the  25th  of  August,  1914,  the  German  ist  Life  Hus- 
sars charged  against  a  French  infantry  battalion,  taking 
four  hundred  prisoners  and  four  machine  guns. 

One  of  the  most  brilliant  charges  against  dismounted 
troops  occurred  in  Palestine  on  September  3Oth,  when 
the  4th  and  I2th  regiments  of  the  Australian  Light  Horse, 
after  bombarding  the  Kaukab  line  held  by  2,500  rifles 
and  numerous  machine  guns,  charged;  the  4th  regiment 


102  MODERN  CAVALRY 

making  the  frontal  charge,  while  the  I2th  regiment  charged 
on  the  left  "flank.  The  -charge*  was  entirely  successful. 
Seventy-two  prisoners  and  twelve  machine  guns  were  cap- 
tured immediately,  while  most  of  the  defenders  were 
ridden  driver*  in  tile  pursuit.  £\o 

Another  brilliant  charge  was  that  against  a  retreating 
column  in  the  same  campaign,  on  the  2nd  of  October. 
The  3rd  Australian  Light  Horse  Brigade  pursued  the 
enemy,  who  was  escaping  near  Damascus.  The  brigade, 
after  riding  hard  for  six  miles,  charged  the  retreating 
column  before  guns  could  be  unlimbered  or  machine  guns 
brought  into  action.  They  captured  1,500  prisoners,  in- 
cluding a  divisional  commander,  and  three  guns  and  26 
machine  guns. 

The  capture  of  the  town  of  Beersheba  by  the  4th  Aus- 
tralian Light  Horse  Brigade  was  an  excellent  example  of 
cavalry  offensive  power.  On  October  3ist  this  brigade 
made  a  surprise  attack  on  Beersheba.  Alternate  lines 
dismounted  during  the  course  of  the  charge  and  cleaned 
up  trenches,  while  other  lines  galloped  through  into  the 
town,  capturing  this  strong  Turkish  position,  with  1,148 
prisoners.  This  attack  rolled  up  the  Turkish  left  flank. 

A  charge  by  ten.  troops  of  the  Warwick  and  Worcester 
Yeomanry  succeeded  in  facilitating  the  march  of  the 
6oth  Division  on  November  8th,  in  Palestine.  This 
charge  was  against  a  strong  position.  It  was  completely 
successful.  In  addition  to  the  prisoners,  n  field  guns 
and  4  machine  guns  were  captured.  This  was  an  excellent 
example  of  offensive  advance  guard  work. 

On  November  I3th  the  Royal  Bucks  Hussars  and 
Dorset  Yeomanry  charged  the  El  Mughar  Ridge  from  the 
Wadi  Jamus.  This  cavalry  force  rode  4,500  yards  across 
an  open  plain,  devoid  of  cover,  and  subjected  through- 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION    103 

out  to  a  heavy  shell,  machine  gun,  and  rifle  fire.  The 
whole  hostile  position  was  captured  and  consolidated, 
resulting  in  the  capture  of  1,096  prisoners,  two  field 
guns  and  fourteen  machine  guns. 

Another  example  of  good  advance  guard  work  by 
cavalry  was  the  charge  on  November  8th  at  Huj  by 
Worcester  and  Warwick  Yeomanry,  on  a  Turkish  rear 
guard.  This  resulted  in  the  capture  of  12  field  guns 
and  the  breaking  of  the  Turkish  resistance. 

On  September  22nd  a  cavalry  charge  by  the  i8th  Lan- 
cers (i3th  Brigade)  succeeded  in  repelling  a  Turkish 
attack  against  Nazareth.  The  attack  was  made  by  about 
700  Turks.  After  a  short  fight  the  Lancers  charged, 
repulsing  the  attack  and  capturing  311  prisoners  and  4 
machine  guns. 

Another  example  of  the  charge  in  conjunction  with  the 
advance  guard  was  that  that  occurred  in  the  pursuit  which 
had  reached  the  Plain  of  Esdraelon.  As  the  advance 
guard  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  debouched  from  the 
defile  at  Lejjun,  a  Turkish  battalion  with  several  machine 
guns  was  observed  deploying  on  the  plain  below.  They 
were  charged  without  hesitation  by  the  leading  regiment, 
the  2nd  Lancers,  and  in  a  few  minutes  the  division  was 
able  to  continue  its  advance.  Less  prompt  action  would 
have  caused  fatal  delay  in  this  case. 

The  engagement  at  Haifa  gives  some  brilliant  examples 
of  the  mounted  attack  against  infantry,  artillery  and  ma- 
chine guns.  On  approaching  that  place  the  I5th  Cavalry 
Brigade  was  met  by  the  fire  of  a  battery  of  77*5  on  the 
slopes  of  Mount  Carmel.  At  least  ten  machine  guns 
covered  the  entrance  to  the  town.  The  Jodhpur  Lancers 
made  a  brilliant  charge,  riding  over  the  machine  guns  and 
pursuing  the  enemy  through  the  streets.  A  squadron  of 


104  MODERN  CAVALRY 

the  Mysore  Lancers  was  sent  over  Mount  Carmel  at 
the  same  time,  to  turn  the  place  from  the  south.  They 
captured  two  Turkish  naval  guns,  mounted  on  the  ridge 
of  Carmel  and  made  a  very  gallant  and  successful  charge 
in  the  face  of  a  very  heavy  machine  gun  fire.  The  Turks 
made  a  very  stubborn  defense  of  Haifa  and  but  for  the 
dash  of  the  I5th  (Imperial  Service)  Cavalry  Brigade, 
would  have  undoubtedly  held  out  for  a  considerable 
length  of  time. 

Another  example  of  a  charge  against  riflemen  and  ar- 
tillery occurred  on  September  23rd,  near  Makt  Abu  Naj. 
The  patrols  of  the  29th  Lancers  were  fired  upon  by  forces 
which  were  covering  the  ford.  The  Middlesex  Yeomanry 
moved  around  the  enemy's  left  flank,  while  two  squadrons 
of  the  29th  Lancers  charged  a  mound  forming  the  center 
of  the  hostile  position,  and  captured  800  prisoners  and  15 
machine  guns.  There  were  two  charges  by  Jacob's  Horse 
on  the  left  bank,  which  were  held  up  by  hostile  artillery. 
The  accompanying  horse  artillery,  the  Hampshire  Bat- 
tery, was  ordered  into  action.  This  battery  was  imme- 
diately subjected  to  heavy  fire  from  two  concealed  enemy 
batteries.  A  squadron  of  the  Middlesex  Yeomanry  forded 
the  river  at  Makt  Fathallah  and  charged  these  batteries, 
putting  them  completely  out  of  action.  This  resulted  in 
the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy. 

There  were  some  examples  of  successful  charges  by 
the  Germans  in  1914.  On  the  ist  of  September  the  i8th 
Cavalry  Brigade  (iSth  and  i6th  German  Hussars) 
charged  in  waves  against  the  English  infantry.  This  in- 
fantry was  advancing  and  seriously  threatening  the  left 
wing  of  the  4th  German  Cavalry  Division.  The  charge 
was  successful  and  stopped  the  British  advance. 

On  the    loth   of   October   the   9th    Hussar    Regiment 


CAVALRY  TACTICS— MOUNTED  ACTION   105 

(German)  at  Orchies,  near  Lille,  captured  200  French 
replacement  troops  in  their  first  charge.  The  first  squad- 
ron of  the  regiment  thereafter  charged  a  wagon  column, 
marching  under  escort  of  infantry.  They  were  received 
by  rifle  fire.  In  spite  of  this  they  captured  5  officers,  250 
men,  36  horses  and  23  wagons.  The  mounted  men  with 
the  column  escorting  the  wagon  fled.  The  Hussars  lost 
in  this  engagement  3  dead,  2  officers  and  12  men  wounded, 
and  6  horses  killed.  The  enemy  lost  30  dead  and  40 
wounded,  in  addition  to  prisoners  and  the  train. 

Among  many  charges  recorded  during  the  war  there 
occurred  an  example  at  Fretoy,  September  7th,  1914, 
when  an  English  squadron  charged  a  German  squadron. 
The  English  made  the  charge  at  speed  while  the  Ger- 
mans seemed  to  have  charged  at  a  lesser  gait.  The  Ger- 
man charge  was  overthrown.  The  English  squadron 
rallied  and  came  into  action  again. 

In  1916  near  Bobocul,  Rumania,  three  squadrons  of  the 
24th  Guard  Dragoons,  charged  against  a  strong  Russian 
cavalry  force.  The  Russians  seem  to  have  partially 
avoided  the  charge  and  to  have  partially  met  it  by  mounted 
rifle  fire.  The  Germans  succeeded  in  driving  the  hostile 
cavalry  from  the  field. 

"By  adopting  every  helpful  device,  the  mounted  arm 
can  continually  improve  its  fighting  power.  Never- 
theless it  must  not  lose  faith  in  its  old  and  tried  weapons, 
the  sword  and  the  lance.  The  cavalry  leader  who  has  the 
knowledge  and  the  nerve  will  again  and  again  find  his 
opportunity  to  go  in  with  the  cold  steel.  Losses  must  be 
faced,  but  in  war,  as  of  old,  experience  teaches  that  a 
mounted  attack,  exactly  timed,  is  almost  always  success- 
ful, and  is  less  costly  than  a  prolonged  fire  fight."  * 

1Field  Marshal  Allenby,  American  Cavalry  Journal,  Jan.  19, 1921. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CAVALRY  TACTICS — DISMOUNTED  ACTION 

The  underlying  principle  of  cavalry  dismounted  action 
is,  that  ten  men  on  time  are  better  than  a  hundred  men 
five  minutes  too  late.  The  cost  of  the  cavalryman  as 
compared  to  the  infantryman  is  considerable.  To  justify 
this  expense  there  must  be  some  good  reason.  The  rea- 
son is  mobility.  Mobility,  shock  and  fire  power — the 
combination  of  these  factors  will  put  cavalry  again  back 
in  its  place  as  a  necessity  in  warfare.  The  correct 
balance  of  these  qualities  will  make  a  cavalry  a  powerful 
aid.  Insistence  upon  any  one  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
others  will  reduce  the  cavalry's  value  against  any  op- 
ponent who  balances  its  capabilities  properly. 

The  drawback  to  the  full  development  of  the  fire  value 
of  cavalry  as  compared  to  the  infantry  has  been  in  the 
past  the  necessary  shortage  of  men  absent,  caring  for 
led  horses.  The  dragoon,  or  dismounted  cavalry  prin- 
ciple is  almost  as  old  as  the  cavalry  itself.  The  very 
first  cavalry  was  organized  on  the  dragoon  principle — 
the  horse  simply  being  used  to  carry  the  warrior  to  the 
place  of  battle.  Arrived  there  he  dismounted  and  wielded 
sword  and  spear.  It  was  only  after  many  years  of  this 
use  of  cavalry  that  the  idea  of  the  charge  was  developed 
and  reached  a  high  state  under  Alexander.  Even  Alex- 

106 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  107 

ander  used  the  dragoon  principle  when  he  mounted  his 
most  skillful  footmen  upon  horses  in  the  pursuit  of 
Darius.  There  is  very  little  new  under  the  sun. 

What  is  new  in  the  present  day  and  time  is  the  de- 
velopment of  the  light  automatic  weapon.  This  gives  the 
cavalry  a  largely  increased  fire  power,  both  through  the 
increased  amount  of  fire  that  can  be  developed  and 
through  the  ability  of  the  cavalryman  to  carry  more 
ammunition  than  the  infantryman. 

The  use  of  shock  is  confined  to  comparatively  small 
operations.  Its  importance  for  these  and  its  moral  im- 
portance must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  The  fact  remains 
however  that  fire  power  is  the  main  consideration  for 
large  operations  and  is  the  justification  for  the  being 
of  cavalry.  Cavalry  must  develop  thoroughly  the  ability 
to  fight  along  side  of,  in  support  of,  and  as,  infantry  any 
time  it  is  called  upon.  This  ability  adds  to  the  importance 
of  the  arm  a  weight  that  it  has  lacked  since  the  invention 
of  the  breech-loading,  rapid-fire  small-arm.  The  proper 
development  of  fire  power  raises  cavalry  from  the  posi- 
tion of  an  auxiliary  to  that  of  a  highly  important  fight- 
ing branch. 

The  main  fighting  requirement  of  cavalry  is  that  it  shall 
be  able  to  move  swiftly  to  the  appointed  place  and  upon 
arrival  deliver  an  effective  volume  of  fire.  To  achieve 
this  the  cavalryman  must  combine  the  technique  of  his 
own  branch  with  the  requirements  of  modern  combat,  in 
other  words,  to  take  fullest  advantage  of  all  that  is  help- 
ful to  the  cavalry  and  to  combine  this  with  all  the  es- 
sential infantry  practice,  the  result  of  their  experience. 

It  must  be  understood  that  cavalry  has  too  many  diverse 
capabilities  and  is  too  difficult  of  replacement  to  sacrifice 
it  needlessly  to  perform  infantry  functions  when  there  is 


io8  MODERN  CAVALRY 

sufficient  infantry  present  to  solve  the  problem.  Cavalry 
should  not  be  used  as  infantry  when  there  is  any  oppor- 
tunity of  securing  infantry,  but  should  be  called  upon 
for  use  as  a  mobile  reserve  able  and  fit  to  move  to  any 
part  of  the  battle  line — to  reinforce  hard  pressed  infantry, 
to  fill  a  gap  in  the  line  or  to  drive  back  an  enemy  force 
that  has  forced  an  entry.  It  should  be  used  for  these 
emergencies.  Fullest  advantage  of  its  mobility  would  be 
taken  by  using  it  in  flanking  movements — both  to  rein- 
force a  threatened  flank  and  to  move  against  the  enemy 
flanks.  In  addition,  its  role  in  the  advance  or  the  re- 
treat makes  it  invaluable.  The  general  who  wishes  de- 
cisive victories  will  use  his  cavalry  only  for  these  purposes 
and  in  the  pursuit.  Napoleon's  remark  upon  one  occa- 
sion when  his  cavalry  failed  to  make  an  aggressive  pur- 
suit is  worth  quoting  "What,  no  guns  or  prisoners  cap- 
tured? This. day's  battle  has  been  useless." 

For  all  these  purposes  cavalry  has  need  of  fire  power 
and  the  highest  development  of  fire  power.  No  factor 
should  be  neglected  that  will  increase  fire  power.  Cavalry 
must  not  neglect  any  factor  that  will  increase  its  dis- 
mounted offensive  action.  The  cavalryman  ceases  to  be 
a  cavalryman  the  moment  that  he  commences  the  fight 
on  foot.  This  combat  has  to  be  carried  on  with  almost 
the  same  laws  that  govern  the  foot  soldier  in  the  same 
conditions.  The  chief  difference  is,  that  the  cavalry 
should  not  tie  themselves  down  with  a  long  slow  develop- 
ment of  fire  and  preparation  of  fire.  They  must  gain 
their  results  more  quickly  so  as  not  to  lose  the  advantages 
of  their  mobility.  For  this  reason  their  fire  power,  as 
compared  to  the  infantry,  must  be  stronger  proportion- 
ally. 

The  cavalryman  has  certain  advantages  over  the  in- 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  109 

fantryman.  First  that  he  arrives  on  the  field,  after  a  much 
longer  distance  covered,  but  much  less  fatigued  com- 
pared to  the  infantryman,  who  has  carried  a  heavy  pack. 
The  infantryman  has  also  to  use  the  same  set  of  muscles 
in  battle  that  he  used  on  the  march.  The  cavalryman  may 
have  his  riding  muscles  fatigued  but  has  a  comparatively 
fresh  set  to  carry  on  with  when  he  sets  foot  to  ground. 
He  has  not  been  under  the  necessity  of  carrying  his 
equipment  on  his  person  but  leaves  it  on  his  horse.  He 
can  carry  more  ammunition  upon  his  person  and  a  reserve 
upon  his  horse. 

He  labors  under  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  care  for 
his  led  horses.  This  makes  a  cavalry  unit  suffer  a  diminu- 
tion in  strength  amounting  from  one- fourth  to  one-tenth, 
upon  dismounting.  The  strength  of  cavalry,  unless  care- 
fully husbanded,  goes  down  relatively  faster  than  that  of 
infantry,  because  of  the  loss  of  horse  flesh  in  campaign — 
the  loss  of  a  horse  meaning  the  loss  of  a  man.  In  a 
populated  country  the  Germans  seized  all  bicycles  and 
wagons  to  obviate  this,  but  this  would  be  impossible  in  a 
sparsely  settled  area. 

The  problem  is  then  to  produce  with  smaller  numbers, 
the  same  volume  of  fire  as  the  infantry,  or  a  superior 
volume.  The  fact  that  the  cavalry  force,  by  its  ability 
to  range  far  and  wide,  to  appear  unexpectedly  on  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  to  disperse,  screen  and  de- 
ceive, to  threaten  the  enemy  arteries  of  supply  and  to 
protect  and  gain  information  for  its  own  force,  can 
render  itself  exceedingly  necessary  and  valuable  in 
ways  not  open  to  the  foot  soldier,  is  left  out  of  the  dis- 
cussion purposely.  The  question  now  is  of  fire  power 
and  the  steps  necessary  to  increase  it  within  the  cavalry 
itself.  The  other  modes  of  increasing  the  offensive  fire 


no  MODERN  CAVALRY 

power  of  cavalry  have  been  taken  up  in  a  preceding 
chapter  on  auxiliaries  with  cavalry. 

These  steps  are  now  being  taken — first  by  the  assign- 
ment of  automatic  rifles  to  the  troop  and  secondly  by 
the  formation  of  machine  gun  troops  and  squadrons.  This 
is  excellent  as  a  starter.  What  we  must  now  endeavor 
to  do  is  to  devise  several  things — one  being  the  best 
method  of  carrying  the  automatic  upon  the  horse,  sec- 
ondly the  distribution  of  the  automatics  in  the  troop. 
There  are  many  more,  the  question  of  the  carriage  of 
ammunition,  for  example,  that  will  have  to  be  worked 
out  by  tests  and  experiments. 

The  writer  while  commanding  the  Provisional  Squad- 
ron of  the  American  Forces  in  Germany  made  some  ex- 
periments which  may  be  of  interest.  It  was  established 
to  his  own  satisfaction — first,  that  the  automatic  rifle 
is  of  immense  aid  to  the  cavalry  in  increasing  its  fire 
power ;  secondly,  that  it  is  of  aid,  not  only  in  the  troop 
or  squadron  firing  line  but  as  an  aid  to  the  offensive 
power  of  small  patrols  and  contact  platoons,  small  ad- 
vance guards,  etc. ;  thirdly,  that  it  is  impracticable  to  carry 
the  Browning  automatic  upon  the  soldier's  person  and 
unsatisfactory  to  carry  it  upon  his  horse,  the  only  feasible 
method  being  to  carry  it  upon  a  led  horse.  In  this  case 
two  rifles  were  carried  slung  in  a  slightly  enlarged  gun 
boot  on  a  McClellan  saddle,  with  a  top  and  side  load 
of  clips  carried  in  ordinary  saddle  bags.  It  was  further 
established,  that  the  inclusion  of  led  horses  in  the  same 
units  with  the  regular  riflemen's  horses  was  unsatis- 
factory, and,  that  it  was  highly  desirable  to  develop  a 
type  of  automatic  rifle  lighter  than  the  present  Browning 
but  equally  efficacious,  that  could  be  carried  upon  the 
trooper's  horse  in  lieu  of  the  rifle,  with  every  man  armed 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  in 

therewith,  and  lastly,  that  until  such  a  weapon  was 
developed  and  issued  the  most  feasible  method  from  a 
tactical  viewpoint  was  to  make  an  automatic  rifle  platoon 
of  one  platoon  in  each  troop  leaving  the  other  two  as 
rifle  platoons.1 

This  last  for  several  reasons,  the  first  being  mentioned 
—the  drawback  to  mobility  and  rapid  mounted  action 
caused  by  the  inclusion  of  led  horses  in  the  sabre  and 
rifle  platoons.  The  ideal  form  of  mounted  action  seems 
to  be  the  combined  fire  and  shock.  With  a  troop  moving 
along  a  road,  the  column  interspersed  with  led  horses, 
it  is  going  to  be  difficult  both  to  form  line  quickly  and 
to  get  the  automatic  rifles  out  to  a  flank  to  commence 
firing  at  both  and  the  same  time.  The  better  system  is  to 
combine  all  the  automatic  rifles  in  one  platoon,  to  have 
this  platoon  move  at  the  rear  of  the  column,  its  com- 
mander to  ride  with  the  troop  commander.  In  an  emer- 
gency requiring  quick  action  the  shock  portion  of  the 
troop  could  form  line,  or  could  dismount  to  fight  on  foot 
as  circumstance  dictated,  while  a  swift  order  to  the  chief 
of  the  automatic  platoon  would  result  in  his  co-operation 
immediately  to  support  a  mounted  attack  by  fire  or  to 
reinforce  a  dismounted  firing  line. 

This  same  system  could  be  caried  on  up  to  the  squad- 
ron— the  automatic  platoons  forming  a  troop  which  could 
be  used  in  the  same  way.  The  automatic  platoon  could 
be  subdivided  into  sections  and  squads. 

The  formation  of  the  automatic  rifles  in  a  platoon  in 
the  troop  or  in  a  troop  in  the  squadron  would  be  no  bar 
to  assigning  them  to  units  ordered  to  detached  duty. 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  the  new  tables  of  organization 
have  been  issued  prescribing  exactly  this  formation,  of  two  rifle 
platoons  and  one  machine  rifle  platoon  per  troop. 


H2  MODERN    CAVALRY 

The  question  of  the  number  of  men  to  leave  with  the 
led  horses  simply  resolves  itself  into  a  question  whether, 
it  is  more  desirable  to  keep  the  led  horses  mobile  or  im- 
mobile. This  of  course  depends  upon  the  special  con- 
ditions obtaining,  but  the  safest  rule  is  to  keep  the  led 
horses  mobile.  The  cavalry  must  retain  its  freedom  of 
action ;  if  it  ties  itself  down  to  a  group  of  immobilized 
led  horses  it  is  parting  with  it.  With  the  augmentation 
of  his  fire  power  by  the  automatic  rifle  the  cavalryman 
can  make  up  for  the  absence  of  his  horseholders  by  an 
increase  in  the  rate  of  fire.  The  automatic  rifle  ends 
the  discussion  in  the  cavalryman's  mind  in  which  he 
tried  to  balance  the  advantages  of  more  mobility  and 
fewer  riflemen  or  less  mobility  and  more  riflemen.  The 
British  experience  in  Palestine  taught  them  that  im- 
mobilized led  horses  were  impracticable  and  dangerous, 
they  did  away  with  circling,  coupling,  etc.,  because  of 
the  danger  of  aerial  bombardment  by  machine  gun  or 
bomb — a  large  group  of  immobilized  led  horses  furnishing 
a  very  attractive  target,  difficult  to  conceal. 

He  can  have  both  mobility  and  fire  power  but  he  is  still 
under  the  necessity  of  caring  for  his  led  horses.  There 
are  some  new  factors  to  consider  in  this.  One  of  these 
is  the  power  of  aeroplane  directed  artillery — the  other 
the  power  of  aerial  bombardment.  These  two  considera- 
tions force  the  cavalryman  to  disperse  and  conceal  his 
led  horses  to  as  great  an  extent*  as  possible.  We  should 
practice  scatter1  formations  with  large  groups  of  led 
horses  and  accustom  men  and  horses  to  dispersed  forma- 
tions and  quick  assemblies  therefrom. 

It  is  essential  that  led  horses  be  quickly  available  for 
rapid  mounting  whether  for  a  swift  withdrawal  or  the 
surge  forward  in  pursuit.  To  facilitate  this,  designated 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  113 

officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  will  have  to  take 
charge  automatically,  the  senior  to  assign  areas  for  each 
unit  and  establish  means  of  communication  with  them 
and  with  the  firing  line.  This  should  be  an  important 
part  of  peace  time  training  so  that  in  war  there  will  be 
no  necessity  for  extemporization.  The  question  how  far 
from  the  field  of  fire  a  leader  should  dismount  should  be 
governed  by  the  principle  that  the  cavalry  is  to  move  for- 
ward mounted  as  far  as  possible  so  as  to  retain  its  mo- 
bility. It  will  probably  be  necessary  to  dismount  at  much 
greater  distance  than  we  are  accustomed  to  in  peace  time 
maneuvers.  It  may  be  necessary  in  many  cases  to  cover 
long  distances  on  foot  with  suitable  security  formations 
protecting  the  front  and  flanks. 

It  is  not  so  necessary  in  the  cavalry  that  the  line  of  ad- 
vance should  coincide  with  the  line  of  attack ;  it  will  often 
be  possible  to  change  the  base  of  the  attack  after  re- 
connaissance by  taking  advantage  of  the  mobility  of  all 
or  part  of  the  force. 

A  large  field  of  usefulness  and  value  is  opened  to 
the  cavalry  that  takes  fullest  advantage  of  its  mobility 
in  conjunction  with  its  fire  power.  Hostile  forces  can 
be  caused  considerable  loss  and  upsetting  of  their  dis- 
positions by  surprise  fire  on  our  part ;  a  quick  sharp  burst 
of  accurate  fire,  surprise  fire,  followed  by  rapid  mount- 
ing and  disappearance,  to  reappear  against  the  enemy 
from  another  angle,  should  be  the  form  used  against 
superior  forces,  especially  if  they  are  dismounted.  It 
takes  a  large  dismounted  force  some  time  to  deploy  and 
get  into  action  and  a  great  deal  of  loss  both  in  personnel 
and  in  time  can  be  effected  by  this  means.  It  is  best 
to  hold  the  fire  in  cases  of  this  nature  until  it  can  be 
opened  simultaneously.  The  coming  into  action  by 


114  MODERN   CAVALRY 

driblets  must  be  condemned  in  this  class  of  work.  The 
cavalry  must  attain  results  by  fire  more  rapidly  than  the 
infantry. 

The  cavalry  officer  must  always  keep  the  enemy's  flanks 
and  rear  in  mind.  He  must  especially  search  out  the 
enemy  flanks  in  rear  guard  action.  By  mobility  and  en- 
ergy a  comparative  handful  of  cavalry  can  hold  back 
great  numbers  of  pursuers  by  detaching  elements  to 
fire  into  their  flanks.  A  few  well  directed  bursts  of 
fire  into  an  enemy's  flanks  will  considerably  dampen  the 
ardor  of  an  enemy  pursuit,  force  him  to  make  disposi- 
tions for  this  unknown  danger  and  gain  valuable  time 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  main  body.  Rear  guard  ac- 
tions, to  be  successful,  will  especially  require  dependence 
upon  rifle  and  machine  gun  fire.  This  must  be  based 
upon  the  principle  of  the  withdrawal  of  alternate  units — 
one  part  of  the  force  mounting  under  cover  of  the  fire 
of  the  other.  A  skillful  officer  must  be  detailed  to  pick 
out  good  defense  positions  and  good  protection  for  led 
horses  in  the  rear. 

Dependable  service  of  security  must  insure  against  our 
being  caught  by  enemy  fire  while  in  the  act  of  mounting 
arid  dismounting.  Every  opportunity  should  be  taken 
to  catch  the  enemy  in  this  position.  It  must  not  be  for- 
gotten that  responsibility  for  security  rests  upon  the  com- 
mander of  every  unit  and  that  it  is  his  duty  to  supple- 
ment measures  that  he  considers  insufficient. 

It  will  not  always  be  possible  to  break  off  a  fire  fight 
when  once  entered  into.  The  cavalry  officer  must  not, 
however,  be  hypnotized  by  the  action  in  his  front  to  the 
neglect  of  hitting  the  enemy  in  flank  or  rear  by  a  mobile 
detachment.  This  is  one  of  the  best  means  of  withdraw- 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  115 

ing.  A  mounted  reserve  is  an  invaluable  thing  for  this 
purpose. 

A  mounted  reserve  can  also  be  of  invaluable  assistance 
in  guarding  the  led  horses  which  otherwise  may  be  at 
the  mercy  of  any  wandering  enemy  patrol.  It  can  also 
furnish  combat  patrols,  furnish  protection  to  the  flanks 
and  rear,  undertake  the  first  pursuit  and  cover  a  with- 
drawal. 

Cavalry  in  defense  must  fight  bitterly  and  be  prepared 
to  sacrifice  itself  to  the  last  man.  It  is  usually  so  situated 
that  its  position  has  an  important  bearing  in  relation  to  the 
rest  of  the  army.  The  Japanese  defence  of  Sandepu  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  was  an  example  of  an  excellent 
and  stubborn  defense  from  which  resulted  untold  good 
to  the  remainder  of  the  army. 

Training  must  include  training  for  speed.  The  differ- 
ence between  a  few  seconds  gained  or  lost  in  opening 
fife  may  mean  the  difference  between  gaining  an  en- 
gagement and  losing  it.  In  a  well-trained  troop  of  cavalry 
lire  has  been  opened  in  five  seconds  after  the  command 
to  fight  on  foot  has  been  given. 

Speed  on  foot  is  just  as  essential.  In  minor  operations, 
especially  against  heavily  laden  and  tired  infantry — a 
swift  run  of  a  few  hundred  yards  with  a  column  of 
lightly  equipped  and  comparatively  fresh  troopers  will 
often  put  one  into  position  to  outflank  and  roll  up  an 
enemy  force. 

Cavalry  must  not  engage  in  dismounted  frontal  at- 
tacks when  there  is  any  possibility  of  attacking  in  flank 
or  rear  or  by  the  charge.  A  dismouiited  frontal  attack 
should  be  the  exception  for  cavalry  and  it  should  be, 
moreover,  supported  as  are  the  infantry  frontal  attacks, 


ii6  MODERN   CAVALRY 

with  sufficient  artillery  and  machine  gun  support.  Cavalry 
under  these  conditions  will  have  the  same  problems  to 
solve  as  infantry  and  must  have  the  same  means  of 
solving  them  as  regards  armament  and  auxiliaries.  These 
attacks  must  be  made  in  depth. 

If  cavalry  is  to  fight  with  infantry  against  the  common 
foe  and  against  enemy  infantry  it  must  have  the  same 
means  of  attack  as  the  infantry.  The  only  radical  addi- 
tion necessary  in  the  cavalry  is  the  bayonet  as  regards  the 
equipment  of  the  individual.  He  must  have  some  means 
of  clinching  the  argument  of  battle.  We  have  seen  many 
dismounted  attacks  practiced  upon  our  drill  grounds 
and  combat  ranges.  All  the  attention  is  devoted  to  fire 
discipline  and  fire  control.  No  one  seems  to  bother  him- 
self as  to  what  it  is  all  about.  The  fact  that  fire  is  only 
the  preparation  for  the  attack  is  lost  sight  of.  The 
actual  attack  is  not  practiced.  What  is  the  soldier  to 
attack  with?  With  his  clubbed  rifle,  his  fists  or  the 
pistol?  It  is  extremely  doubtful  if  the  pistol  is  as  good 
a  dismounted  attack  weapon  as  the  bayonet.  The  bayonet 
is  the  final  argument  of  the  infantry.  If  the  pistol  were 
superior  they  certainly  would  have  adopted  it.  It  is  the 
cold  steel  that  finally  decides  the  infantry  attack.  It 
should  no  less  decide  the  cavalry  attack.  Training  in  its 
use  is  not  long  or  complicated — it  adds  very  little  to  the 
equipment  of  the  cavalryman,  he  has  a  fixture  already 
upon  his  rifle  for  its  attachment.  Its  weight  is  nothing 
to  worry  over. 

We  must  develop  training  in  fire  action  and  practice 
in  ammunition  supply.  A  great  deal  of  cavalry  fire  fight- 
ing involves  the  care  and  protection  of  led  horses,  and 
the  problems  of  rapid  mounting  and  dismounting.  All 
our  combat  work  should  be  in  conjunction  with  the  horse. 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  117 

The  spectacle  seen  so  many  times  of  cavalry  units  march- 
ing dismounted  to  the  combat  range,  there  to  spend  hours 
practicing  infantry  formations,  should  be  changed.  Every 
firing  problem  should  involve  the  passing  from  mounted 
to  dismounted  action,  the  care  of  led  horses,  establishment 
of  security,  the  use  of  mounted  reserves  and  the  passing 
from  dismounted  to  mounted  action.  This  will  be  of 
especial  value  as  so  much  of  the  cavalry  work  in  the 
opening  days  of  war  is  done  by  small  detachments, 
platoons,  troops,  etc.  We  must  practice  in  peace  what 
will  be  required  of  us  in  war. 

Practice  in  this  style  of  combat  work  will  develop  many 
faults  that  are  in  need  of  correction.  Some  of  the  most 
common  ones  observed  are  noted  here.  They  refer  prin- 
cipally to  the  work  of  squads,  sections  and  platoons. 

Automatic  rifles  too  slow  in  getting  into  action. 

Men,  especially  scouts  masked  fire  of  own  units  in- 
stead of  withdrawing  to  a  flank. 

Riflemen  too  slow  in. opening  up  emergency  fire. 

Men  remained  prone  in  cover  from  which  targets 
could  not  be  seen,  instead  of  moving  to  better  positions, 
or  sitting  or  kneeling. 

Leader  made  no  effort  to  find  out  if  his  men  could  see 
target. 

Leader  made  no  effort  to  change  men  after  he  had  seen 
their  inability  to  see  the  target. 

Men  did  not  set  sights  as  ordered. 

Leader  too  cautious. 

Range  to  new  targets  not  given  by  leader,  even  after 
he  could  see  shots  were  short  or  over. 

No  liaison  between  squads  of  a  section. 

Liaison  between  led  horses  and  firing  line  poor. 

Leader  allowed  men  to  fire  over  loose  dirt  bank — thus 


n8  MODERN  CAVALRY 

raising  a  cloud  of  dust  every  time  they  fired.  Would 
bring  down  machine  gun  and  artillery  fire. 

Many  leaders  did  not  direct  their  units  so  as  to  bring 
all  rifles  and  automatics  into  action — in  many  cases  less 
than  half  were  firing,  due  to  faulty  positions. 

Horses  not  properly  linked. 

Stirrups  not  placed  correctly. 

Led  horses  not  properly  distributed  amongst  holders, 
some  men  having  only  two,  while  others  had  five. 

Too  much  tendency  to  confusion,  talking,  shouting  in 
quick  transition  from  mounted  to  dismounted  action,  and 
vice  versa. 

Led  horses  not  properly  mobile  in  problems  requiring 
their  mobility. 

Led  horses  placed  directly  behind  firing  line  so  that  one 
would  have  suffered  from  the  "overs"  or  "shorts"  directed 
on  the  other. 

Tendency  to  allow  men  to  bunch. 

Advantage  not  taken  of  cover.  More  practice  required 
in  this,  difference  between  cover  from  view  and  cover 
from  fire  explained,  with  value  of  each. 

Scouts  content  with  galloping  back  madly  but  without 
information  upon  which  leader  could  act  intelligently. 

Many  section  leaders  take  command  of  their  nearest 
squad  instead  of  handling  two  sections: 

Section  leaders  split  squads  detaching  part  to  each  flank 
thereby  making  squad  leader  superfluous. 

Men  too  slow  in  passing  from  mounted  to  dismounted 
action  and  vice  versa. 

Unit  leaders  not  careful  enough  in  designating  respon- 
sible man  for  led  horses  and  giving  him  general  instruc- 
tions in  advance. 

Unit  leaders  not  skilled  in  making  personal  reconnais- 


DISMOUNTED  ACTION  119 

sance  while  men  and  horses  are  under  cover  from  fire 
and  view,  fixing  avenues  of  approach,  issuing  instructions 
to  subordinate  leaders  and  making  all  preliminary  dis- 
positions. 

No  proper  grasp  of  the  principle  of  fire  and  movement, 
advancing  one  unit  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  other. 

No  skill  in  handling  sub-divisions — not  enough  attempt 
made  to  secure  flanking  fire  with  automatics  for  example. 

The  whole  success  of  the  dismounted  work  depends 
upon  the  ability  and  degree  of  training  and  command 
shown  by  the  subordinate  leaders,  the  squad  and  section 
leaders  especially.  They  should  be  habituated  to  com- 
mand by  giving  them  authority  in  their  daily  work,  full- 
est authority  possible,  over  the  units  that  they  will  com- 
mand on  the  firing  line.  To  have  them  function  well  as 
leaders  in  the  firing  line  they  must  be  accustomed  to 
commanding  and  having  authority  over  their  men.  Other- 
wise they  will  simply  be  in  the  way  when  they  are  most 
badly  needed. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CAVALRY    TACTICS — VARIED    REQUIREMENTS 

The  Advance  Guard: 

The  advance  guard  is  primarily  a  security  formation 
for  advancing  troops.  For  cavalry,  with  its  offensive 
spirit,  it  is  the  first  blow  struck  at  the  enemy.  This  first 
physical  contact  is  very  important.  Two  things  can  hap- 
pen; the  first  being  that  the  advance  guard  may  be  effi- 
cient enough  to  push  on  through  any  interference  with- 
out interrupting  the  advance  of  the  main  body.  The 
second  possibility  is  that  the  advance  guard  may  involve 
itself  in  a  situation  from  which  it  is  impossible  to  with- 
draw. The  problem  then  for  the  main  body  is  to  extricate 
the  advance  guard  from  its  dilemma.  This  will  un- 
doubtedly involve  a  combat  under  conditions  that  were 
not  selected  by  the  main  body.  In  other  words,  an  im- 
properly handled  advance  guard  may  result  in  loss  of 
initiative.  For  this  reason,  it  is  important  that  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard  be  selected  carefully  and 
carefully  instructed.  It  is  important  that  the  commander 
of  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  command  be  well  up 
with  his  advance  guard. 

Napoleon  used  the  advance  guard  as  a  holding  force. 
This  is  an  essentially  offensive  use  of  this  formation.  It 
implies  sufficient  skill  upon  the  part  of  the  advance  guard 

120 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  121 

commander  to  meet  the  enemy  in  an  unfavorable  situa- 
tion, to  catch  him  off  guard  or  unprepared,  and  then  to 
grapple  with  him  and  hold  him  for  the  heavy  blows  of 
the  main  body. 

The  enemy  may  be  found  in  superior  strength.  With 
this  use  of  the  advance  guard  it  is  necessary  to  hold  him. 
The  duty  of  the  advance  guard  is  then  to  seize  strong 
points  and  with  rapid  rifle,  machine  gun  and  horse  ar- 
tillery fire  to  hold  the  enemy  until  the  arrival  of  the  main 
body.  This  necessitates  a  wide  front  and  plentiful  use 
of  ammunition.  The  advance  guard  in  such  a  situation 
acts  as  a  pivot  from  which  is  swung  the  crushing  blow  of 
the  main  force. 

In  order  to  fight  an  enemy  he  must  be  held  in  position. 
A  man  who  is  running  away  cannot  be  hurt  by  a  blow. 
He  has  to  be  held  by  one  hand  and  punched  with  the 
other.  An  attempted  use  of  these  tactics  was  made  by 
the  Germans  in  their  initial  attack  in  1914.  While  the 
British  were  in  retreat  on  the  25th  of  August,  the  Ger- 
mans wished  to  hold  them  for  an  outflanking  movement. 
To  accomplish  this  they  sent  forward  four  cavalry  divi- 
sions accompanied  by  one  Jaeger  battalion  and  a  large 
number  of  guns  and  howitzers  of  all  calibres.  The 
dogged  stubbornness  of  the  British  and  the  superiority 
and  dash  of  their  cavalry  made  the  scheme  ineffective  in 
this  case. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  advance  guard  is  pri- 
marily a  security  force.  Security  is  based  on  three  fac- 
tors, viz.,  time,  space  and  resisting  power  of  troops.  The 
first  two,  time  and  space,  are  comparatively  simply  fac- 
tors with  cavalry  mobility  as  aid.  Resisting  power  must 
be  increased  by  increasing  the  fire  power  of  cavalry 
units  proper  and  by  the  assignment  to  the  cavalry  of 


122  MODERN  CAVALRY 

auxiliaries  that  will  supply  it  with  added  power,  auto- 
mobile and  horse  artillery  and  a  plentiful  supply  of  ma- 
chine guns. 

The  advance  guard  commander  must  secure  the  unin- 
terrupted march  of  the  main  body  by  accelerating  its 
passage  through  cities  and  towns,  marking  the  streets  and 
leaving  directions  that  can  be  easily  followed.  He  must 
seize  the  mails  and  telegrams  in  hostile  countries.  He 
must  insure  the  absence  of  hostile  artillery  on  his  flanks. 
He  must  gather  all  information  possible  for  the  intelli- 
gence service  in  his  rear. 

The  work  of  the  advance  guard,  which  is  mostly  along 
roads,  would  be  enormously  facilitated  by  the  addition 
of  armored  cars.  These  could  be  rushed  through  to 
clean  out  small  parties  of  the  enemy  who  might  other- 
wise delay  and  hinder  the  march.  They  were  used 
for  this  purpose  in  the  first  phase  of  the  World  War  in 
1914. 

An  example  of  the  combined  use  of  cavalry  and  armored 
cars  in  the  advance  guard  is  found  in  the  action  of  the 
2Oth  Lancers  and  Armored  Car  Battery  moving  from 
El  Afule  in  the  Palestine  Campaign,  September  2Oth, 
1918.  On  debouching  from  the  pass,  Turkish  forces  in 
strength  were  found  astride  the  road.  One  squadron  dis- 
mounted, and  the  armored  car  battery  held  the  enemy  in 
front  by  fire  power  while  the  remaining  squadrons  of  the 
regiment  charged  the  left  flank.  The  Turks  were  dis- 
persed with  a  loss  of  46  killed  and  wounded  and  470 
captured. 

Communication  with  the  rear  would  be  aided  at  a  con- 
siderable saving  of  horse  flesh  by  the  addition  of  suffi- 
cient motor  cycles.  For  the  small  advance  guard,  these 
would  be  nearly  sufficient.  The  larger  force  would  re- 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  12^ 

quire  improved  means  of  communication — radio,  buzzer, 
aeroplane  messages,  etc. 

The  advance  guard  commander  must  be  thoroughly 
cognizant  of  his  general  and  special  mission.  He  should 
be  informed  as  to  whether  he  is  empowered  to  bring  on 
an  engagement  or  not.  He  must  be  well  aware  of  his 
responsibility  as  to  the  security  and  uninterrupted  advance 
of  the  main  body.  This  will  require  rapid  flank  move- 
ments to  oust  small  hostile  parties  from  his  front.  He 
must  seize  and  protect  the  march  through  defiles.  He 
must  seize  bridges  and  cover  crossings.  An  excellent 
example  of  this  duty  was  the  action  of  the  cavalry  under 
Allenby  in  1914  when,  in  the  pursuit  after  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  he  seized  the  bridge  at  Charly-sur-Marne 
and  Saulchery  and  advanced  'rapidly  to  the  high  ground 
north  of  Fontaine  Fauvel  covering  the  passage  of  the 
First  Corps  over  the  Marne. 

The  advance  guard  commander  must  keep  his  machine 
gun  and  artillery  commanders  well  up  with  him  towards 
the  front.  He  must  be  prepared  to  use  any  and  all  forms 
of  offensive  action ;  the  mounted  attack,  the  dismounted 
attack,  the  combination  of  fire  and  shock  and  the  fullest 
use  of  his  artillery  must  aid  his  mission  when  occasion 
requires. 

With  a  large  command,  he  must  cover  parallel  roads  as 
well  as  his  own  road.  He  must  constantly  keep  his  mis- 
sion in  mind.  In  the  advance,  he,  or  some  officer  detailed 
to  that  end,  must  constantly  observe  positions  for  led 
horses  in  case  there  should  arise  a  necessity  for  sending 
them  back. 

In  minor  operations  the  endeavor  of  the  cavalry  com- 
mander must  be  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  his  strength. 
This  would  apply  especially  to  a  holding  action.  Every 


124  MODERN   CAVALRY 

artifice  must  be  used  in  the  case  of  a  holding  attack  to 
convince  the  enemy  that  superior  forces  are  on  his  front. 
The  spirit  of  the  offensive  finds  its  highest  example 
in  the  proper  handling  of  the  advance  guard.  It  is  the 
first  blow  struck  at  the  enemy.  Upon  the  result  of  this 
blow  depends  in  a  great  measure  the  success  or  failure 
of  the  succeeding  operations. 

Rear  Guard: 

The  security  of  the  rear  of  a  retreating  body  is  one 
of  the  most  typical  of  cavalry  problems.  It  is  a  phase 
of  work  for  which  cavalry  is  unusually  well  fitted.  It 
requires  a  vigilant,  intelligent  and  courageous  commander. 
Cavalry  can  use  to  the  full  all  of  its  advantages  in  mobility 
and  fire  power  in  this  sort  of  work. 

The  problem  requires  that  an  advancing  enemy  should 
always  be  under  the  necessity  of  deploying  under  fire, 
that  he  should  be  covered  by  the  fire  of  alternate  units 
which  cover  each  other's  withdrawal  to  selected  positions 
in  the  rear.  It  requires  quick  decision  and  good  judgment 
in  the  matter  of  breaking  off  the  fire  action  and  in  mount- 
ing, in  selecting  alternative  defensive  positions  and  in 
protecting  led  horses. 

The  offensive  here  as  elsewhere  is  the  best  defensive. 
Cavalry  must  not  be  content  with  simply  moving  along 
the  road  pressed  back  by  an  advancing  enemy.  It  must 
hit  the  flanks  of  the  enemy.  It  must  guard  against  the 
enemy's  attempts  at  a  parallel  pursuit  by  covering  the 
flanks  of  the  main  body  as  well  as  its  rear.  It  must 
not  hesitate  to  sacrifice  itself  to  gain  time  for  the  with- 
drawal of  its  main  body.  It  must  use  fire  and  shock  and 
the  combination  as  they  seem  necessary. 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  125 

At  the  initiation  of  a  retreating  movement,  it  must 
cover  the  withdrawal  and  break  off  the  fight  by  great 
activity.  The  essential  points  in  this  stage  are  the  holding 
of  some  few  strong  points  firmly  while  the  main  body 
draws  away  under  their  protection.  The  pursuing  enemy 
is  liable  to  concentrate  his  attention  upon  these,  to  the 
neglect  of  the  main  body. 

To  realize  thoroughly  the  value  of  cavalry  in  the  rear 
of  a  retreating  force,  the  retreat  of  the  British  Army  in 
1914  must  be  studied.  The  value  of  the  cavalry  in  the 
rear  guard  was  especially  marked  in  these  operations. 
One  example  was  the  rescue  of  the  5th  Division  in  the 
retreat  from  Mons,  August  24th,  1914.  This  division  was 
dangerously  pressed  and  in  danger  of  being  outflanked 
by  the  pursuing  Germans.  De  Lisle  with  the  2nd  and 
Gough  with  the  3rd  Cavalry  Brigades  came  to  the  rescue. 
They  threatened  and  harassed  the  pursuers  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  take  this  pressure  off  the  retreating  division 
and  allowed  it  to  withdraw  in  good  order. 

Again  on  the  same  date  at  Solesmes  the  rear  guard  of 
the  3rd  -Division,  under  McCracken,  was  heavily  at- 
tacked. Allenby,  with  De  Lisle's  2nd  Cavalry  Brigade 
(4th  Dragoon  Guards,  9th  Lancers  and  i8th  Hussars) 
attacked  the  Germans  so  fiercely  as  to  force  them  to  de- 
sist and  thus  permitted  the  division  to  withdraw  un- 
molested. On  this  same  day  Grenfell,  with  the  gth  Lan- 
cers, saved  the  guns  of  an  artillery  unit  and  dragged  them 
off  the  field  safe  from  capture. 

On  the  26th  of  August  during  this  retreat,  after  sev- 
eral exhausting  and  demoralizing  days  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  reorganize  and  reform  the  British  forces. 
The  British  losses  to  date  had  been  some  15,000  officers 
and  rae£,,8p  gu&s,  mo&t  of  the  raackwe  guns  and  great 


126  MODERN   CAVALRY 

quantities  of  transport.  No  effective  stand  could  be  made 
until  order  was  produced  out  of  the  chaos  of  the  retreat. 
"To  enable  this  to  be  brought  about,  it  was  first  neces- 
sary to  look  to  the  cavalry"  (Field  Marshal  French)'. 
Allenby  was  given  orders  to  hold  off  the  enemy.  This 
he  accomplished  brilliantly.  Gough,  at  Saint-Quentin, 
with  the  3rd  Cavalry  Brigade  and  Chetwode,  with  the 
5th  Cavalry  Brigade,  at  Cerizy,  vigorously  attacked  the 
leading  troops  of  the  German  cavalry  at  both  these  places 
and  threw  them  back  with  loss  upon  their  main  bodies. 
This  enabled  the  infantry  and  the  remnants  of  the  artillery 
to  withdraw  to  a  new  line  and  re-form. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  British  Cavalry  saved  the 
British  Army  on  this  and  other  occasions  in  this  retreat. 
This  was  accomplished  by  fire  and  shock,  and  a  high 
degree  of  mobility,  combined  with  an  effective  use  of  the 
supporting  horse  artillery. 

In  Palestine  there  is  found  the  example  of  the  success- 
ful covering  by  the  Second  Light  Horse  Brigade  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  iSist  Infantry  Brigade  through  Es  Sir 
on  March  3ist,  1918. 

The  Germans  knew  the  value  of  cavalry  and  used  it  ex- 
tensively in  this  sort  of  work.  The  enemy  forces  oppos- 
ing the  British  advance,  after  the  tide  had  turned  at  the 
first  battle  of  the  Marne,  consisted  chiefly  of  cavalry 
with  a  strong  artillery  support  backed  up  by  Jaeger  de- 
tachments. Sir  John  French,  as  a  result  of  his  study  of 
the  German  cavalry  before  the  war,  states  that  they  were 
especially  trained  in  this  sort  of  work — rear  guard  actions 
—which  they  performed  in  this  retreat.  They  carried 
a  large  number  of  machine  guns  which  they  were  trained 
to  handle  very  efficiently.  To  each  brigade  of  cavalry 
was  attached  whenever  possible  a  regiment  of  Jaeger, 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  127 

picked  riflemen,  chosen  for  their  skill  in  shooting  and  in 
taking  advantage  of  ground.  These  troops  were  espe- 
cially valuable  for  the  defense  of  river  lines  and  positions 
which  were  intended  to  cause  delay  to  an  advancing 
enemy.  They  permitted  the  withdrawal  in  good  order  of 
the  First  Army  under  von  Kluck.  The  work  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps  Von  Marwitz  is  well  worth  studying  in 
this  campaign. 

Some  of  the  most  valuable  work  performed  by  the 
cavalry  in  the  whole  war  was  work  of  this  nature  in  the 
opening  phases  of  the  warfare  on  the  Western  Front. 
The  successful  performance  in  this  phase  of  cavalry  duty 
alone  would  justify  the  existence  of  the  branch. 

The  Pursuit: 

Cavalry  is  indispensable  to  that  army  commander  who 
wishes  decisive  victories.  Without  cavalry,  an  army  will 
fight  one  indecisive  battle  after  another,  continually  fight- 
ing the  same  antagonists  who  have  been  allowed  to  with- 
draw and  re-form.  The  use  of  cavalry  in  a  pursuit  is 
only  a  logical  carrying  out  of  the  theory  of  absolute  war 
—decision  by  battle — and  that  battle  is  not  decisive  in 
which  the  enemy  is  allowed  to  withdraw  in  good  order. 
This  theory  of  war  requires  that  an  enemy  force  shall 
be  thoroughly  broken  and  incapable  of  re-forming;  his 
tactical  unity  and  his  morale  thoroughly  destroyed. 

Without  aggressive  and  relentless  pursuit  the  enemy 
multiplies  because  the  same  units  are  fought  again  and 
again  with  the  heavy  proportion  of  losses  on  the  side  of 
the  attacking  forces. 

Beaten  troops  have  low  resisting  power  immediately 
after  a  battle,  They  are  psychologically  ripe  for  panic; 


128  MODERN  CAVALRY 

with  confidence  in  their  leaders  destroyed,  tactical  cohe- 
sion broken,  and  with  fatigue  and  uncertainty  adding  to 
the  whole.  At  such  moments  the  terror  inspired  by  the 
sudden  appearance  of  shouting  horsemen  venge fully 
spurring  into  the  mass  with  drawn  sword  will  effectually 
turn  a  retreat  into  a  rout. 

To  allow  beaten  forces  to  draw  off  unmolested,  to  reor- 
ganize and  to  be  again  forced  to  attack  is  very  poor 
generalship.  There  can  only  be  one  effective  pursuing 
force — this  is  cavalry. 

There  are  many  examples  in  history  of  the  failure  to 
use  cavalry  in  the  pursuit.  One  example  was  the  Prus- 
sian cavalry  at  Sadowa;  it  is  said  that  the  King  of 
Prussia  refused  to  let  it  pursue  in  order  to  spare  the 
enemy.  Another  example  was  the  Battle  of  Froesch- 
willer.  What  would  have  been  left  of  MacMahon's 
beaten  army  if  they  had  been  pursued  relentlessly  down 
the  Neiderbronn  Road! 

The  finest  modern  example  of  the  pursuit  value  of 
cavalry  is  found  in  the  Palestine  Campaign  of  Allenby. 
He  has  this  to  say  concerning  the  pursuit  by  his  cavalry 
(Report  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  October  3ist, 
1918) :  "The  Desert  Mounted  Corps  took  some  46,000 
prisoners  during  the  operations  (Sept.  igth — Oct.  3ist). 
The  complete  destruction  of  the  VII  and  VIII  Turkish 
Armies  depended  mainly  upon  the  rapidity  with  which 
their  communications  were  reached,  and  on  quick  deci- 
sion, in  dealing  with  the  enemy's  columns  when  they 
attempted  to  escape.  The  enemy  columns,  after  they  had 
out-distanced  the  pursuing  infantry,  were  given  no  time 
to  reorganize  and  fight  their  way  through.  In  these  bril- 
liant achievements,  the  regiment  of  French  cavalry  took 
its  full  share,  while  east  of  the  Jordan,  the  Australian 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  129 

and  New  Zealand  Mounted  Division,  by  its  untiring  pur- 
suit, threw  the  IV  Turkish  Army  into  a  state  of  disor- 
ganization, intercepted  the  garrison  of  Amman  and  com- 
pelled it  to  surrender." 

An  example  of  a  failure  to  reap  the  advantages  of 
victory  occurred  after  the  Battle  of  Mukden  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  Marshal  Oyama  stated  "If  I  had  had 
only  two  or  three  cavalry  divisions,  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  the  Russians  to  have  escaped  to  the  north. 
At  least  their  right  wing  would  have  been  destroyed  with 
a  proper  army  cavalry."  Another  example  of  the  danger 
due  to  lack  of  a  relentless  pursuit  is  afforded  by  the  situa- 
tion in  regard  to  the  Turkish  VII  Army  in  the  Palestine 
Campaign.  They  were  reported  by  von  Papen  to  Berns- 
torff  as  being  completely  broken  down  during  the  first 
phase  of  the  campaign.  Owing  to  delay  in  the  pursuit  by 
the  British,  which  delay  was  due  to  lack  of  water,  trans- 
port, etc.,  this  army  was  permitted  to  re-form.  It  after- 
wards put  up  a  stiff  and  bloody  resistance  in  the  moun- 
tains of  Judea.  Had  the  British  pursuit  of  this  force 
been  enabled  to  continue  this  army  would  have  been 
blotted  out  as  a  tactical  entity.  This  would  have  resulted 
in  a  great  saving  of  the  lives  and  time  that  it  finally  took 
to  defeat  them. 

On  the  Western  Front  there  are  many  examples  of  the 
pursuit  by  cavalry.  Sir  John  French  speaks  of  the  diffi- 
culties and  danger  caused  to  his  forces  by  the  pursuit  of 
the  German  cavalry.  This  cavalry  was  supported  by  ar- 
tillery and  Jaeger  closely  pressed  his  forces  in  their  retreat. 
They  were  especially  active  on  the  26th  of  August,  1914, 
when  the  British  were  driven  through  the  Foret  de  Mor- 
mal  by  this  force.  The  British  were  continually  forced  to 
fight  them  off  throughout  the  course  of  the  retreat,  This 


I3o  MODERN  CAVALRY 

pursuit  would  have  been  still  more  effective  if  the  Cavalry 
Corps  von  Marwitz  had  not  been  transferred  from  von 
Kluck's  First  Army  to  the  commander  of  the  Second 
Army  and  sent  off  on  a  wild  goose  chase  to  the  northwest 
when  it  was  badly  needed  in  the  pursuit  of  the  British. 

The  cavalry  which  pursues  directly  in  the  rear  of  a 
retreating  body  is  throwing  away  one  of  its  chief  advan- 
tages— mobility.  It  should  pursue  on  parallel  lines.  The 
enemy  is  certain  to  leave  strong  troops  directly  in  his 
rear.  These  must  be  worried  and  held  as  much  as  possi- 
ble but  energy  should  be  concentrated  on  his  flanks,  on 
getting,  if  possible,  ahead  of  him  and  holding  him  in 
front  of  some  obstacle  or  holding  him  up  on  his  line  of 
retreat.  The  pursuit  that  confines  itself  to  the  rear  of 
the  retreating  forces  can  be  held  up  by  a  few  rifles  and 
machine  guns  or  artillery.  The  pursuit  that  aims  at  the 
flanks  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  withstand. 

An  excellent  example  of  a  pursuit  carried  out  on  paral- 
lel lines  is  that  by  General  French  in  the  South  African 
War  in  his  pursuit  of  Cronje.  This  pursuit  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  Cronje,  who  was  intercepted  at  a  crossing 
of  the  Modder  River. 

An  example  of  parallel  pursuit  is  found  in  the  Palestine 
Campaign  after  the  break  through  by  the  infantry  on  the 
Ramleh  line.  The  infantry  was  engaged  in  breaking 
down  the  last  organized  resistance  of  the  Turks.  At  the 
same  time  the  swift  action  of  the  cavalry  insured  the 
success  of  the  operations  by  destroying  or  capturing  the 
whole  Turkish  force  east  of  the  Jordan  River.  Pressing 
along  all  night  in  parallel  columns,  the  4th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion on  Megiddo  (Lejjen)  and  the  5th  Cavalry  Division 
on  Abu  Shushesh  (a  few  miles  to  the  north),  the  Plain 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  131 

of  Esdraelon  was  reached  before  dawn  and  the  Turkish 
forces  rolled  up. 

Close  cooperation  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  is  es- 
sential to  an  effective  pursuit.  In  line  with  this,  it  is 
interesting  to  read  the  memorandum  issued  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  British  Forces  on  the  loth  of 
September,  1914,  after  the  First  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
"The  latest  experience  shows  that  the  enemy  never  neg- 
lects an  opportunity  to  use  all  his  available  artillery  in 
forward  positions  under  cover  of  cavalry  and  other 
mobile  troops. 

"Our  cavalry  is  now  organized  into  two  divisions,  the 
first  of  three,  the  second  of  two  brigades,  each  with  a 
brigade  of  horse  artillery.  During  the  present  phase  of 
the  operations,  which  consist  of  as  rapid  a  pursuit  and 
pressure  of  the  enemy  as  is  possible  in  his  retreat,  two 
corps  will  generally  be  in  the  first  line.  A  cavalry  division 
will  be  directed  to  work  on  the  front  and  flanks  of  either 
corps  and  well  in  advance.  The  commander  of  the  cav- 
alry will  remain  in  the  closest  concert  with  the  corps 
commander  on  the  flank  on  which  he  is  working. 

"The  corps  commanders  will  send  forward  with  their 
cavalry  as  much  of  their  field  artillery  as  can  be  usefully 
employed  in  harassing  the  enemy's  retirement.  They  will 
place  them  under  the  cavalry  commander  for  the  day, 
the  latter  officer  being  responsible  for  their  safety. 

"When,  owing  to  the  darkness,  the  field  artillery  can 
no  longer  find  useful  targets  they  will  be  withdrawn 
from  the  cavalry  back  to  the  division  to  which  they  be- 
long. Should  the  enemy  make  any  decided  stand  during 
such  operations  and  a  general  action  arise  or  become 
imminent,  the  field  artillery  in  front  will  either  fall  back 
or  retain  their  position,  at  the  discretion  of  the  corps 


132  MODERN   CAVALRY 

commander,  and  again  come  under  their  divisional  com- 
mander. The  withdrawal  from  under  the  supervision  of 
the  corps  commander  will  always  remain  at  the  discretion 
of  the  corps  commander."  * 

The  pursuit  by  fire  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  and  the 
retreating  forces  must  be  kept  under  fire  as  long  as  pos- 
sible while  the  mounted  pursuit  is  under  way. 

The  mounted  pursuit  must  not  be  too  reckless ;  many 
fine  cavalry  units  were  nearly  annihilated  by  rash  and  ill- 
considered  mounted  pursuits  of  German  forces.  These 
forces  drew  them  skilfully  under  the  fire  of  concealed 
machine  guns  or  artillery.  Many  French  cavalry  units 
met  serious  losses  in  this  manner. 

The  cavalry  commander  has  need  of  all  his  energy  in 
the  proper  carrying  out  of  a  pursuit.  He  must  magnify 
his  numbers  by  every  artifice.  Colonel  von  Alvensleben, 
in  1870,  with  three  small  squadrons  in  pursuit  of  the  re- 
treating French  so  harassed  and  worried  the  enemy  that 
a  large  army  of  70,000  men  was  convinced  that  it  was 
pursued  by  the  entire  German  forces.  The  plans  and  dis- 
positions of  this  force  were  changed  in  accordance  with 
this  viewpoint.  The  course  of  the  war  was  materially 
influenced  by  this.  Fighting  by  day  and  perpetual  sniping 
and  alarms  at  night  alarmed  the  enemy  and  disturbed  his 
rest  and  strengthened  his  belief  that  he  was  being  relent- 
lessly pursued. 

Cavalry  in  pursuit  must  never  lose  contact  with  the 
enemy.  After  the  Battle  of  Forbach  in  this  same  war, 
the  German  cavalry  lost  all  touch  with  the  enemy  and 
allowed  him  to  withdraw  unmolested.  The  touch  with 
the  enemy  is  exceedingly  liable  to  be  lost  in  the  first  flush 
of  victory  when  everyone's  mind  is  filled  with  the  duties 

1  "1914,"  Sir  John  French,  page  132. 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  133 

of  reorganizing  and  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  fatigue. 
No  consideration  should  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  a  relentless  pursuit  by  the  cavalry.  On  one  occasion 
Blucher  reprimanded  the  German  cavalry  for  failure  to 
pursue.  The  excuse  was  that  the  horses  were  too  tired. 
Bliicher's  reply  was  "No  attention  should  be  paid  to  the 
excuses  of  the  cavalry,  for  when  such  an  object  as  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  army  can  be  attained,  the 
country  can  well  spare  the  few  hundred  horses  that  die 
of  exhaustion." 

The  Raid: 

The  condition  of  the  enemy's  rear  and  line  of  com- 
munications is  much  more  sensitive  today  than  it  has  been 
in  past  wars.  This  is  due  to  the  modern  army's  increased 
dependence  upon  its  rear  with  all  its  thousand  and  one 
details  of  supply  for  the  highly  complicated  and  technical 
machine  at  the  front.  In  addition  to  the  opportunity  of 
stopping  the  flow  of  these  supplies,  even  for  only  a  short 
time,  a  raid  may  find  his  artillery  without  support,  his 
reserves  without  proper  security,  his  aeroplane  hangars 
may  be  demolished  and  railroads,  roads  and  bridges  de- 
stroyed. An  incalculable  amount  of  damage  may  be  done 
by  even  a  small  force  of  cavalry  daringly  led  and  well 
supplied  with  demolition  materials. 

Railroads  may  be  cut  and  important  arteries  of  supply 
irretrievably  harmed.  In  cutting  railways,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  they  should  not  be  cut  too  near  a  sta- 
tion or  shops  as  there  will  undoubtedly  be  repair  material 
and  means  available  at  those  places.  An  excellent  raid  of 
this  nature  was  carried  out  successfully  by  the  2nd  Light 
Horse  Brigade  on  March  25th,  1918,  in  the  Palestine 


134  MODERN  CAVALRY 

Campaign.  A  party  from  this  brigade  reached  the  Hejaz 
railway  seven  miles  south  of  Amman  and  blew  up  a  sec- 
tion of  the  line  during  the  night.  This  was  the  main  line 
of  the  Turkish  communications  and  its  interruption  caused 
untold  confusion  to  their  army. 

There  were  many  excellent  raids  by  the  Russian  and 
German  cavalries  on  the  Eastern  Front  in  the  World 
War.  Full  accounts  of  these  raids  are  not  yet  available 
for  study. 

The  French  cavalry  made  an  excellent  raid  productive 
of  good  results  on  the  German  communications  on  Sep- 
tember 1 7th,  1914.  They  operated  from  Roye  and  moved 
rapidly  east  as  far  as  the  neighborhood  of  Ham  and  Saint- 
Quentin.  Another  small  raid  by  a  single  squadron  of 
French  cavalry  at  the,  commencement  of  the  German 
retreat  from  the  Marne  nearly  succeeded  in  capturing 
von  Kluck  and  his  entire  staff  who  were  forced  to  take 
to  the  fields  with  any  weapon  they  could  find  in  order 
to  defend  themselves. 

There  is  a  report  of  a  decisive  raid  which  took  place 
in  the  Balkan  War  in  1912.  This  raid  was  performed  by 
the  Bulgarian  Brigade  Tanew,  after  the  Battle  of  Dedea- 
gatch.  This  brigade  succeeded  in  capturing  361  officers, 
13,500  men  and  8  guns.  Another  excellent  raid  was  the 
one  performed  by  a  Serbian  cavalry  regiment  after  the 
Battle  of  Kumanovo  in  Saloniki.1 

Many  raids  made,  of  which  there  are  some  notable 
examples  in  the  Civil  War,  accomplished  nothing  of  value 
and  on  the  other  hand  deprived  the  army  of  cavalry  when 
it  was  badly  needed.  A  notable  example  was  Wheeler's 
raid  into  east  Tennessee  which  left  Hood  without  cavalry 

'Balk,  'The  Development  of  Tactics  in  the  Wo^ld  War," 
(Berlin,  1920),  page  241. 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  135 

and  consequently  in  the  dark  as  regarded  Sherman's 
movements.  A  better  example  was  "]eb"  Stuart  before 
the  Battle  of  Gettysburg.  Mischenko's  raids,  as  well  as 
Rennenkampf's  reconnaissances  in  force  in  Manchuria, 
were  worthless  as  far  as  results  went.  Von  Pelet- 
Narbonne  states  that  the  failure  of  these  raids  was  due 
to  the  small  value  of  the  Cossacks,  who  were  neither 
trained  in  dismounted  offensive  action,  in  intelligence 
duties,  nor  had  they  a  keen  desire  to  use  the  steel.  The 
Russian  army  authorities  so  underestimated  the  Japanese 
power  that  they  failed  to  send  their  European  regiments 
to  Manchuria,  leaving  all  the  cavalry  work  to  the 
Cossacks.1 

An  example  of  a  successful  raid  was  that  performed  by 
two  squadrons  of  Japanese  cavalry  a  few  days  before  the 
Battle  of  Mukden.  This  was  admirably  timed.  The  280 
men  of  these  squadrons  marched  by  night  and  hid  by  day, 
reaching  and  blowing  up  an  important  railway  bridge 
200  kilometers  north  of  Tieh-Ling  directly  in  rear  of  the 
Russian  Army.  This  resulted  in  the  interruption  of  an 
important  line  of  communication  for  several  days.  It 
produced  a  panic  at  Russian  headquarters.  The  chief 
value  of  the  raid  consisted  in  the  fact  that  8,000  troops 
were  diverted  from  the  battlefield  of  Mukden  to  guard 
this  line. 

1  "Lectures  on  and  Cavalry  Lessons  from  the  Manchurian 
War,"  von  Pelet-Narbonne. 


CHAPTER  X 

CAVALRY    TACTICS — VARIED    REQUIREMENTS     (Continued) 

The  Mobile  Reserve: 

The  ability  of  cavalry  to  act  as  a  highly  mobile  reserve 
makes  this  arm  of  the  greatest  importance.  Its  value 
lies  mainly  in  its  ability  quickly  to  carry  offensive  fire 
units  to  the  place  of  need.  It  is  a  valuable  and  powerful 
weapon  in  the  hands  of  an  army  commander  for  a  variety 
of  purposes ;  to  swing  an  uncertain  issue  of  battle,  to 
bolster  up  a  weakened  line,  to  cover  a  retreat  and  to  or- 
ganize and  take  fullest  advantage  of  a  victory. 

Excellent  examples  of  the  use  of  cavalry  as  a  mobile 
reserve  will  be  found  in  a  study  of  British  operations  in 
1914,  especially  the  Battle  of  Ypres. 

In  addition  to  its  basic  mobility,  the  cavalry  division 
has  this  advantage  over  the  infantry  division  as  a  reserve, 
that  it  can  come  into  battle  with  all  its  parts  assembled 
including  field  guns,  and  other  auxiliaries  and  sufficient 
ammunition.  All  parts  are  equally  mobile  and  it  is  not 
forced  to  come  into  action  piecemeal  as  an  infantry  divi- 
sion often  is,  with  its  guns,  foot  troops  and  ammunition 
supplies  separated. 

The  British  and  French  both  maintained  forces  of  cav- 
alry throughout  the  war  for  use  as  a  mobile  reserve. 
Had  the  German  morale  not  broken  so  quickly  as  to  pre- 
clude further  physical  action  against  them,  the  forces  of 

136 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  137 

cavalry  that  remained  at  the  close  of  the  war  would  have 
been  very  valuable  to  carry  on  a  pursuit. 

The  functions  of  the  reserve  are  so  many  that  an  army 
commander*  must  use  wisdom  in  selecting  the  purpose  for 
which  he  intends  to  use  his  cavalry.  The  inclination  of 
many  higher  commanders  will  sometimes  dispose  them 
to  disregard  cavalry  as  a  battle  force.  In  line  with  this 
von  der  Goltz  l  says,  "It  is  not  sufficient  to  have  good 
cavalry,  it  must  be  well  handled  by  the  superior  authori- 
ties. These  latter  are  really  responsible  for  many  mis- 
takes unfairly  laid  at  the  door  of  the  cavalry."  The  cav- 
alry may  be  sent  miles  away  on  some  vague  mission  to  be 
absent  there  when  their  presence  in  the  battle  might  have 
an  overwhelmingly  decisive  effect.  German  cavalry  drill 
regulations  state  in  substance  that  while  attempts  upon 
distant  hostile  lines  of  communications  may  produce 
valuable  results,  they  must  not  distract  the  attention  of 
the  cavalry  from  its  true  battle  objectives. 

With  cavalry  absent  during  the  course  of  the  engage- 
ment many  contingencies  might  arise  requiring  its  pres- 
ence ;  a  flank  may  be  in  danger,  there  may  be  necessity 
for  a  desperate  counter-attack,  there  may  be  desperate 
necessity  for  any  number  of  things  that  the  presence  of 
a  mobile  reserve  would  insure. 

A  mass  of  modern  cavalry,  able  to  fight  mounted  or 
dismounted,  supplied  with  horse  artillery,  machine  guns, 
and  a  high  proportion  of  automatic  weapons  would  supply 
a  decisive  intervening  force  in  battle.  Rapidly  to  extend 
their  own  flank  when  it  is  threatened,  to  attack  the  ene- 
my's flanks,  to  drive  back  a  break-through  of  the  enemy's 
forces  on  any  part  of  the  line,  to  go  to  the  assistance  of 
hard  pressed  infantry,  to  minimize  the  effects  of  defeat 

1  "The  Nation  in  Arms,"  von  der  Goltz,  page  206. 


138  MODERN  CAVALRY 

and  to  reap  the  fruits  of  victory — all  of  these  are  the 
duties  which  cavalry  is  fully  capable  of  performing  as  a 
mobile  reserve. 

An  excellent  example  of  the  use  of  the  cavalry  as  a 
mobile  reserve  occurred  October  3ist,  1914,  in  the  second 
phase  of  the  Battle  of  Ypres.  A  gap  had  occurred  on  the 
right  of  the  7th  British  Division.  The  7th  Cavalry  Brig- 
ade (ist  and  2nd  Life  Guards  and  Royal  Horse  Guards) 
was  immediately  sent  and  succeeded  in  closing  this  gap 
and  keeping  the  line  intact. 

Another  example  of  the  use  of  cavalry  as  a  reserve  was 
on  November  29th,  1918,  in  Palestine,  when  a  hostile 
force  succeeded  in  penetrating  the  British  line  northeast 
of  Jaffa.  This  force  was  surrounded  and  captured  by  the 
Australian  Light  Horse,  who  were  swiftly  moved  to  the 
threatened  point.  On  the  3Oth  of  November,  1918,  a 
similar  fate  overtook  a  Turkish  battalion  which  attacked 
near  El  Burj ;  a  counter-attack  by  the  Australian  Light 
Horse  took  200  prisoners  and  destroyed  the  attacking 
battalion. 

Another  excellent  example  of  the  use  of  the  cavalry 
reserve  was  shown  in  this  same  campaign  November  5th, 
1918,  when  the  Yeomanry  Division  relieved  the  74th  In- 
fantry Division  to  enable  the  latter  to  join  the  main 
attack.  The  Yeomanry  Division  reached  Shellal  (some 
20  miles  as  the  crow  flies)  and  came  into  line  on  the  right 
of  the  74th  Infantry  Division,  2  miles  south  of  Am 
Kohleh  and  took  over  their  sector.  The  operations  near 
Am  Kohleh  were  in  the  nature  of  a  holding  attack,  while 
the  main  attack  was  being  developed  at  Kauwukah.  The 
horses  of  this  cavalry  division  were  sent  back  to  Beer- 
sheba,  distant  about  8  miles. 

The  saving  of  the  British  II  Corps  in  1914  by  the 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  139 

cavalry  under  Allenby  and  Sordet  is  a  good  example  of 
the  use  of  the  mobile  reserve  against  outflanking  attacks. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  cavalry  at  this  time  the  II 
Corps  would  assuredly  have  been  pinned  to  their  ground, 
outflanked  and  surrounded.  This  would  have  resulted  in 
the  loss  of  three  out  of  five  British  divisions  and  the  loss 
of  the  7th  Brigade  in  addition.  It  would  have  resulted, 
according  to  Sir  John  French,1  in  a  second  Sedan  for 
the  Allies. 

The  employment  of  the  French  7th  Cavalry  Division 
in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  a  good  example  of  the  use 
of  cavalry  as  a  mobile  reserve. 

The  mobility  of  this  reserve  must  be  used  offensively 
whenever  possible.  The  outflanking  operations  in  Pales- 
tine are  cases  in  point.  The  Anzac  Mounted  Division, 
the  Australian  Mounted  Division  and  the  7th  Mounted 
Brigade  outflanked  the  Beersheba  position  on  the  Gaza- 
Beersheba  line  October  30-3  ist,  1918.  The  4th  Australian 
Light  Horse  Brigade  of  the  Australian  Mounted  Division 
captured  Beersheba  by  a  mounted  charge,  galloping  over 
two  deep  lines  of  trenches  in  the  face  of  heavy  firo,  enter- 
ing and  seizing  the  town.  This  rolled  up  the  left  flank  of 
the  Turkish  position. 

The  attack  of  the  Northern  Corps  of  the  Niemen  Army 
against  the  Russian  Army's  right  flank  was  carried  out 
by  the  German  cavalry  corps  consisting  of  the  2nd,  6th 
and  8th  Divisions.  This  attack  was  decisive.2  Balk  says 
that  "Infantry  would  never  have  been  able  to  operate  at 
such  great  distance  from  the  main  body  and  accomplish 
such  results  in  a  short  space  of  time." 

In  our  own  Civil  War  decisive  results  were  gained  by 

1"iQi4,"  Sir  John  French,  page  80. 
•  *  "The  Development  of  Tactics  in  the  World  War,"  Balk. 


140  MODERN  CAVALRY 

the  use  of  cavalry  as  a  mobile  reserve.  A  study  of  Sheri- 
dan's operations  is  especially  valuable  in  this  connection. 
Another  excellent  example  of  the  value  of  a  mobile 
reserve  was  furnished  in  the  Battle  of  the  Aisne.  The 
advance  of  the  Guards  Brigade  to  the  Ostel  Ridge  had 
left  a  considerable  gap  between  them  and  the  nearest  unit 
of  the  II  Corps  and  also  between  the  I  Corps  and  the 
river.  A  German  attack  was  directed  upon  this  weak  spot 
almost  immediately.  Haig's  Corps  was  in  action,  cover- 
ing a  front  of  some  five  miles  and  not  a  single  man  could 
be  spared.  "Here  was  the  supreme  example," x  says 
Conan  Doyle,  "of  the  grand  work  that  was  done  when 
our  cavalry  were  made  efficient  as  dismounted  riflemen. 
Their  mobility  brought  them  quickly  to  the  danger  spot. 
Their  training  turned  them  in  an  instant  from  horsemen 
to  infantry.  The  I5th  Hussars,  the  Irish  Horse,  the 
whole  of  Brigg's  ist  Cavalry  Brigade  and,  finally,  the 
whole  of  De  Lisle's  2nd  Cavalry  Brigade  were  thrown 
into  the  gap.  The  German  advance  was  stayed  and  the 
danger  passed." 

The  Cavalry  Screen: 

The  use  of  the  cavalry  as  a  screen  is  practicable  if  the 
screen  is  used  offensively.  The  mere  physical  presence 
of  cavalry  spread  out  over  an  area  will  not  suffice.  With 
the  modern  facilities  for  aeroplane  observation,  it  is 
doubtful  if  the  cavalry  screen  will  be  of  much  value 
except  in  cases  where  the  hostile  air  force  has  lost  the 
control  of  the  air,  or  weather  conditions  prevent  aerial 
reconnaissance. 

1  The  British  Campaign  in  France  and  Flanders.  Conan  Doyle, 
page  173,  vol.  I. 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  141 

The  cavalry  screen  of  the  present  day  cannot  hope, 
with  an  active  enemy  reconnaissance  from  the  air,  to 
screen  the  movements  of  great  armies.  What  it  can  do 
is  to  screen  from  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy  the  tactical 
components  of  its  own  side.  It  can  interfere  and  keep 
enemy  intelligence  efforts  nullified  and  deny  all  the 
knowledge  to  the  enemy  forces  that  aerial  reconnaissance 
cannot  supply. 

This  sort  of  screening  means  the  movement  on  a  broad 
front  of  formed  bodies  each  with  its  own  security  dis- 
positions, rapid  infiltration,  rapid  mounting  and  dismount- 
ing, plentiful  use  of  ammunition  and  the  multiplying  of 
numbers  by  rapidity  of  action  and  mobility.  It  means 
offensive  action  throughout. 

Valuable  work  was  done  in  screening  operations  in  the 
German  advance  through  Belgium  in  1914  by  the  Cavalry 
Corps  von  Marwitz  and  von  Richthofen.  The  former 
commanded  the  II  Cavalry  Corps  (the  2nd,  4th  and 
9th  Cavalry  Divisions)  while  the  latter  commanded  the 
I  Cavalry  Corps  (The  Guard  Cavalry  Division  and  the 
5th  Cavalry  Division).  The  advance  of  the  I  and  II 
German  Armies  was  well  screened  by  this  cavalry.  This 
screening  work  was  especially  difficult  as  it  was  carried 
on  in  the  midst  of  the  hostile  Belgian  population. 

Excellent  work  is  also  said  to  have  been  accomplished 
by  the  Cavalry  Corps  Frommel  which  succeeded  per- 
fectly in  screening  the  change  of  direction  of  the  German 
Army  operating  in  the  region  of  Thorn. 

Deceiving  Enemy: 

A  large  field  of  usefulness  is  open  to  the  cavalry  which 
can  magnify  its  numbers  by  mobility  and  activity  and  lead 


142  MODERN  CAVALRY 

to  false  conclusions  and  dispositions  upon  the  part  of  the 
enemy.  This  has  been  done  innumerable  times,  notably 
in  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  where  the  movements  of 
whole  armies  were  changed  by  the  appearance  of  a  few 
cavalry. 

The  effect  is  sometimes  secured  unconsciously  and  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  enemy  has  exaggerated  the  forces  he 
observes.  A  case  in  point  was  the  occupation  of  the 
village  of  Sandepu  by  4^2  Japanese  squadrons  with  one 
horse  battery  and  six  machine  guns.  The  Russians  be- 
lieved this  force  to  be  5  battalions  of  infantry,  2  squad- 
rons of  cavalry,  44  field  guns  and  5  machine  guns. 

The  appearance  of  only  2  Japanese  squadrons  in  the 
rear  of  the  Russian  Army  at  the  Battle  of  Mukden  forced 
into  inactivity  19,000  rifles,  5,000  carbines  and  36  field 
guns. 

The  mere  *  appearance  of  a  cavalry  force  may  have  a 
decisive  effect,  as  occurred  at  the  Battle  of  Tarnakova  in 
September,  1914,  when  the  Russian  Cavalry  Division  of 
Novikov  had  a  decisive  effect  on  the  operations,  in  this 
case  neutralizing  nearly  an  army  corps. 

Cavalry  can  very  easily  simulate  infantry  and  can  de- 
ceive the  enemy  with  .regard  to  the  composition  of  its 
force  on  numerous  occasions.  This  would  be  of  value  in 
a  threatening  or  holding  attack.  It  can  very  easily  deceive 
the  enemy  in  regard  to  its  numbers  by  taking  full  advan- 
tage of  its  mobility. 

Cavalry  in  Combat: 

The  defeating  of  the  formed  bodies  of  the  enemy  will 
lead  to  the  purely  cavalry  fight  which  will  be  a  combina- 
tion of  fire  and  shock.  It  is  essential  that  we  do  not 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  143 

totally  disregard  the  possible  use  of  shock  action.  It 
will  undoubtedly  be  a  factor  in  any  war  of  movement. 
It  should  not,  however,  be  the  sum  and  aim  of  cavalry 
training  of  the  future  as  it  has  been  in  the  past. 

It  is  first  of  all  essential,  in  the  purely  cavalry  fight, 
that  the  commander  should  retain  touch  with  all  his  units. 
There  should  be  someone  responsible  for  this  to  take 
the  burden  off  his  shoulders.  One  system,  starting  with 
the  squadron,  is  to  have  two  intelligent  privates  detailed 
to  the  squadron  commander  from  each  troop,  who  have 
no  other  duty  than  to  keep  informed  of  their  respective 
units  and  be  prepared  to  carry  messages  to  them.  Each 
squadron  in  its  turn  details  a  non-commissioned  officer 
and  assistant  to  the  regimental  commander,  and  so  on  up. 

The  commander  must  not  fail  to  notify  his  senior  sub- 
ordinates where  to  assemble  in  case  of  a  reverse.  This 
point  should  be  determined  beforehand,  if  possible. 

Trains  must  be  provided  for.  They  must  be  in  such 
position  as  to  be  able  to  advance  or  retire  without  con- 
fusion. 

-If  the  result  of  the  fight  is  at  all  in  doubt  Spartan 
measures  must  be  taken  and  the  last  reserves  smashed 
in  without  thought  of  anything  except  victory.  Many 
an  uncertain  battle  has  been  lost  by  too  great  niggardliness 
with  reserves.  Daring  is  a  strong  factor  in  success. 

It  is  essential  never  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the 
spirit  of  cavalry  is  offensive  and  to  look  upon  a  tempo- 
rarily defensive  role  only  as  a  means  of  preparing  for 
the  counter  attack.  It  is  necessary  to  increase  the  rate 
of  fire  power  and  utilize  every  feature  of  the  ground  in 
order  to  release  men  for  this  counter  stroke. 

If  the  enemy's  strength  is  unknown,  it  is  better  to 
make  tentative  attacks  that  will  force  him-  to  disclose 


144  MODERN  CAVALRY 

himself  and  to  hold  the  bulk  of  troops  in  hand  until 
enough  information  is  gained  to  warrant  complete  action. 

Keep  a  careful  and  automatic  check  on  ammunition. 
The  best  laid  plans  can  be  defeated  by  the  eleventh  hour 
report  in  a  critical  situation  that  the  ammunition  is 
failing. 

If  the  hostile  cavalry  acts  in  conjunction  with  infantry, 
effort  should  be  made  to  isolate  it  and  destroy  it. 

The  commander  should  be  near  the  head  of  his  troops 
at  the  initiation  of  combat  and  then  should  be  exceedingly 
careful  that  he  makes  no  movement  of  himself  and  staff 
without  leaving  minute  directions  as  to  his  whereabouts. 
He  should  be  careful  to  visualize  the  engagement  as  a 
whole  and  not  become  engrossed  in  any  small  part,  an 
exceedingly  easy  thing  to  do  in  a  cavalry  fight  with  its 
large  dispersion. 

It  is  exceedingly  important  that  all  subordinates  should 
understand  the  intention  of  the  commander,  in  order  to 
be  able  to  act  intelligently  during  the  many  changes  and 
unforeseen  incidents  of  a  cavalry  fight. 

If  the  command  is  accompanied  by  artillery,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  its  value  is  rendered  almost  negligible 
by  insufficiency  of  information.  This  is  true  in  all  com- 
bat but  especially  true  in  a  cavalry  engagement  with  its 
rapid  movement  of  friend  and  foe  and  the  mobility  of 
the  targets  furnished. 

In  the  cavalry  rencontre  there  is  no  excuse  for  a  sur- 
prise meeting.  If  there  should  be  one  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  great  danger  in  surprise  is  the  hesitation 
and  loss  of  time  caused  thereby.  To  obviate  this  a  leader 
should  always  have  a  rough  plan  mapped  out  for  every 
contingency ;  he  must  never  approach,  for  instance,  a 
new  locality  without  planning  out  beforehand  what  he  is 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  145 

to  do  on  occasion.  He  must  continually  observe,  and 
require  his  subordinates  to  observe,  good  cover  from 
observation  and  fire  for  his  led  horses.  He  must  warn 
all  subordinate  commanders  against  the  common  dispo- 
sition of  commanders  to  become  involved  in  combat  with- 
out sending  back  information.  Information,  first,  last 
and  all  the  time  is  essential  to  the  best  team  work. 

It  is  essential  that  a  cavalry  commander  be  always  near 
the  head  of  his  columns.  The  whole  principle  is  to  keep 
his  unit  under  cover  from  observation  and  fire  until  his 
plans  are  made  and  his  orders  issued  for  rapid  decisive 
action. 

Many  commanders  delay  until  they  have  information 
of  the  enemy  down  to  the  most  minute  details.  In  other 
words,  they  surrender  their  initiative  and  do  not  depend 
to  a  great  enough  extent  upon  the  compelling  effect  of 
their  own  measures.  This  is  the  defensive  attitude  of 
mind  as  opposed  to  the  offensive  type.  Let  the  other 
fellow  worry.  Daring  and  initiative  are  the  well  springs 
of  great  success.  Inactivity  is  the  direct  cause  of  the 
losses  of  many  campaigns  and  battles. 

The  cavalry  commander  must  keep  all  elements  of  his 
command  in  mind  or  have  subordinates  specially  detailed 
to  that  end.  At  the  Battle  of  Worth,  in  1870,  the  4th 
Cavalry  Division  (German)  was  forgotten  after  being 
told  to  await  orders.  Their  strength  was  thereby  lost  to 
their  side  throughout  the  engagement.  It  is  best  not  to 
tie  cavalry  down  with  such  orders.  The  cavalry  com- 
mander must  never  let  absence  of  orders  be  an  excuse 
for  inaction.  Every  leader  who  has  cavalry  assigned  to 
him  must  understand  that  it  is  too  expensive  an  arm  to 
do  nothing. 

Dispersion  of  cavalry,  owing  to  its  mobility,  is  not  the 


146  MODERN  CAVALRY 

serious  fault  that  it  is  in  the  infantry.  Too  great  a  dis- 
persion was  corrected  by  the  initiative  of  the  squadron 
leaders  of  Rederns'  Brigade,  August  15,  1870,  when  they 
marched  to  the  sound  of  the  guns  and  quickly  brought 
reinforcements  of  15  squadrons  to  the  scene  of  the  en- 
counter, thereby  themselves  correcting  the  fault  of  the 
divisional  commander  who  had  dispersed  them  too  much. 

An  excellent  example  of  cavalry  combat  was  the  fight 
at  Haelen,  August  12,  1914.  German  forces  consisting 
of  six  regiments  (4th  and  2nd  Cavalry  Divisions),  7th 
and  9th  Jaeger  Battalions,  three  batteries  of  artillery, 
4,000  sabres,  2,000  infantry  and  18  guns  all  told,  tried  to 
force  the  passage  of  the  Gette  River  near  Haelen.  This 
was  defended  by  Belgian  forces  consisting  of  Lancers, 
Guides,  Cavalry,  Artillery  and  Cyclists  numbering  2,400 
sabres,  450  cyclists  and  12  guns.  The  battle  was  dis- 
mounted on  both  sides  with  the  exception  of  a  charge 
made  by  the  2nd  Cuirassiers,  9th  Uhlans,  I7th  and  i8th 
Dragoons  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division,  which  was  repulsed 
by  the  fire  of  the  Belgians.  The  fight  was  being  decided 
in  favor  of  the  Germans  when  a  Belgian  infantry  force, 
composed  of  four  weak  battalions,  entered  the  fight  and 
turned  the  scale.  The  Germans  were  repulsed  with  a 
loss  of  3,000  dead  and  wounded,  their  advance  batteries 
and  a  standard. 

An  excellent  illustration  of  mounted  and  dismounted 
attack  occurred  on  April  3Oth,  1918,  when  the  3rd  Aus- 
tralian Light  Horse  Brigade  was  held  up  near  Es  Salt  by 
fire  from  enemy  works,  These  were  stormed  by  the  9th 
and  loth  Regiments,  dismounted,  while  the  8th  Regiment 
galloped  along  the  road  and  forced  its  way  into  the  town 
in  spite  of  strong  resistance.  The  enemy  fled,  pursued 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  147 

by  one  troops  which  captured  300  prisoners,  29  machine 
guns  and  large  quantities  of  material. 

Another  example  of  a  purely  cavalry  fight  occurred 
during  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  on  September  7th.  The 
2nd  Cavalry  Brigade  was  acting  as  left  flank  guard  to 
the  Cavalry  Division,  with  the  9th  Lancers  as  advance 
guard  to  the  Brigade.  On  reaching  Fretoy,  the  village  of 
Moucel  was  found  occupied  by  a  patrol  of  the  Germans. 
It  was  taken  at  a  gallop  by  the  leading  troop  (about  one 
of  our  platoons)  followed  by  one  machine  gun.  A  troop 
and  a  half  moved  up  on  the  left  of  the  village.  Shortly 
afterward  two  squadrons  of  the  First  Garde  Dragoner 
Regiment  charged  the  village  and  drove  out  the  troop 
of  the  Qth  Lancers  after  a  little  street  fighting.  A  third 
Dragoon  squadron  (German)  came  up  to  the  village  from 
the  north,  in  support.  The  troop  and  a  half  of  the 
Lancers  charged  in  perfect  order  the  left  half  of  the 
squadron  and  pierced  it  with  loss,  both  sides  facing  the 
charge,  the  Germans  at  a  fifteen-mile  rate  and  the 
Lancers  at  full  speed.  Swinging  around  after  the  charge, 
the  9th  Lancers  gained  the  village  and  rallied  on  the 
north  side  of  it.  At  the  same  time  the  i8th  Hussars, 
who  had  been  sent  up  in  support,  drove  off  the  Germans 
by  fire  from  the  wood  on  the  left  of  the  village.  British 
losses :  i  officer,  2  men  killed,  2  officers  and  5  men 
wounded.  The  German  losses  are  reported  as  being  very 
heavy. 

It  must  be  reiterated  that  the  cavalryman,  even  in  the 
fire  fight,  should  not  lose  sight  of  that  most  important 
thing,  his  mobility.  He  is  a  poor  cavalryman  indeed  who 
dismounts  his  whole  force  and  sits  down  to  overcome  the 
enemy  by  a  purely  frontal  attack.  By  the  detachment  of 


148  MODERN  CAVALRY 

two  or  more  mounted  bodies  he  can  feint  an  attack  on  one 
of  the  enemy's  flanks  or  rear  and  drive  home  a  real  attack 
on  another  flank  or  the  rear.  It  will,  in  many  cases,  be 
advisable  to  consider  the  frontal  action  purely  a  holding 
attack.  The  frontal  attack  compared  to  the  flank  attack 
is  likened  to  the  difference  between  a  weight  held  in  the 
hand  and  the  same  weight  at  the  end  of  a  horizontal 
stick. 

In  the  attack  of  localities  it  is  necessary  to  keep  out 
both  a  mounted  and  dismounted  reserve,  the  former  for 
the  offensive  and  the  defense  of  led  horses,  reconnoiter- 
ing,  etc.,  the  latter  to  press  home  the  dismounted  attack. 

The  passage  through  a  defile  or  a  heavily  wooded  road 
should  never  be  undertaken  without  throwing  forward  a 
few  troops  to  hold  the  far  side  by  fire  and  prevent  an 
attack  on  the  necessarily  closely  formed  bodies  as  they 
emerge. 

In  minor  operations  the  fact  must  not  be  lost  sight  of 
that  speed  on  horseback  is  .not  the  only  advantage  in 
cavalry  mobility.  A  cavalryman  should  be  faster  on  foot 
for  two  reasons,  first  that  he  is  not  encumbered  with  the 
weight  that  a  foot  soldier  carries,  secondly  that  his  leg 
muscles  are  fit  for  extended  effort  after  he  has  traveled 
many  miles  on  horseback.  Advantage  can  be  taken  of 
this  in  minor  tactical  operations  to  outflank  opposing 
bodies.  In  the  recontre  a  swift  dismounting  and  rapid 
occupation  of  a  strategic  point  will  win  against  superior 
numbers  time  and  time  again.  The  essence  of  cavalry 
work  is  speed  and  this  should  be  remembered  in  dis- 
mounted operations  as  well  as  mounted. 

To  secure  the  fullest  effect  from  surprise,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  act  swiftly  and  resolutely  with  no  hesitation  in 
advance  or  withdrawal.  The  work  of  Jeb  Stuart  in  the 


VARIED  REQUIREMENTS  149 

Civil  War  is  one  of  the  finest  examples  of  combined  fire, 
shock  and  surprise  action. 

Another  interesting  example  of  the  cavalry  fight  is 
offered  by  the  5th  Cavalry  Brigade  (Chetwode)  when 
covering  the  rear  and  right  flank  of  the  First  Corps  in  its 
retreat.  On  August  28th  the  pursuing  German  horse- 
men came  into  touch  with  it  near  Cerizy.  At  about  five 
in  the  evening  three  squadrons  of  the  enemy  advanced 
upon  one  squadron  of  the  Scots  Greys  which  had  the 
support  of  J  Battery  Royal  Horse  Artillery.  The  Ger- 
mans were  fired  upon,  dismounted  and  attempted  to  ad- 
vance. The  fire  was  so  heavy  that  they  could  make  no 
progress  and  their  led  horses  were  stampeded.  They 
retired,  still  on  foot,  and  were  followed  up  by  a  squadron 
of  the  1 2th  Lancers  on  their  flank.  The  remainder  of 
the  1 2th  Lancers,  supported  by  the  Greys,  rode  into  the 
enemy,  killing  or  wounding  nearly  all  of  them  with  the 
sword  and  lance.  A  section  of  guns  had  meanwhile  been 
firing  over  the  heads  of  the  party  into  a  supporting  body 
of  enemy  cavalry,  who  retired,  leaving  many  dead  and 
wounded  behind  them.  The  British  lost  only  43  killed 
and  wounded.  The  enthusiastic  cavalrymen  rode  back 
between  the  guns  of  the  horse  battery  exchanging  cheers 
with  the  gunners  and  waving x  their  blood-stained 
weapons. 

In  war,  generally,  and  in  the  cavalry  combat,  particu- 
larly, indomitable  energy  is  the  secret  of  success.  Plans 
once  undertaken  should  be  pushed  through  in  spite  of  all 
obstacles.  Success  in  war  is  after  all  largely  a  matter 
of  character,  both  upon  the  part  of  the  nation  as  a  whole 
and  upon  the  part  of  the  leaders.  The  distinction  should 
be  made  between  indomitable  will  and  stubbornness.  The 

1  The  British  Campaign  in  France  and  Flanders,  Doyle,  page  121. 


ISO  MODERN  CAVALRY 

stubborn  leader  is  very  liable  to  act  upon  preconceived 
opinions  which  arise  very  easily  in  war.  A  preconceived 
opinion  is  a  thing  to  be  avoided  as  it  leads  inevitably  to  a 
biased  interpretation  of  reports,  as  the  leader  sees  only 
those  reports  that  confirm  him  in  his  mistaken  theory  and 
disregards  the  others.  This  will  lead  to  faulty  and  dan- 
gerous dispositions.  The  mind  must  be  kept  open  until 
there  are  enough  data  to  form  an  opinion,  after  which 
the  plan  should  be  formed  and  pushed  through  in  spite 
of  all  difficulties, 


CHAPTER  XI 

RECONNAISSANCE AIR   SERVICE   AND    CAVALRY 

In  line  with  a  great  many  hasty  judgments,  the  aero- 
plane has  been  slated  to  supplant  cavalry  in  the  field  of 
reconnaissance.  This  has  even  been  believed  by  cavalry 
officers  themselves.  One  of  the  first  effects  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  any  new  type  of  fighting  machine  or  of  any 
new  method  of  warfare,  is  the  claim  made  by  its  partisans 
and  taken  up  immediately  by  journalistic  laymen,  that 
the  innovation  will  supplant  all  previous  measures  any- 
where remotely  allied  to  its  functions.  This  was  true  of 
the  tank,  of  the  submarine  and  especially  true  of  the 
aeroplane. 

The  aeroplane  was  to  be  the  cavalry  of  the  future.  It 
was  not  only  to  perform  all  the  reconnaissance  functions 
of  cavalry  but  was  to  perform  its  combat  functions  as  well 
and  perform  them  better.  These  imaginings  have  of 
course  been  tested  by  reality  and  as  a  result  the  aeroplane 
has  been  assigned  to  its  proper  place  in  the  tactical  scheme 
of  things. 

There  still  remains,  however,  a  lingering  impression 
that  trie  aeroplane  has  supplanted  the  cavalry  in  that  very 
important  sphere  of  duty,  reconnaissance.  This  impres- 
sion is  very  strong  in  the  mind  of  the  laymen  and  also 
in  the  mind  of  that  type  of  officer  who  is  willing  to  accept 
any  dictum  except  study  and  analysis. 

151 


152  MODERN  CAVALRY 

A  careful  analysis  of  the  capabilities  and  limitations  of 
the  aeroplane  leads  to  some  rather  illuminating  conclu- 
sions. The  first  conclusion  is  that  it  would  be  extremely 
unwise  to  relegate  cavalry  to  the  limbo  of  forgotten 
things  in  view  of  the  many  manifest  limitations  inherent 
in  air  reconnaissance. 

These  limitations  are  so  important  that  they  make  entire 
dependence  upon  the  air  service  for  reconnaissance  a 
dangerous  experiment.  The  following  are  some  of  the 
factors  that  militate  against  successful  air  reconnaissance 
or  that  will  militate  against  it  in  future  wars. 

(a)  Hostile  control  of  the  air. 

(b)  Unfavorable  weather  conditions. 

(c)  Present  and  future  possibilities  of  anti-air  craft 
defense. 

(d)  Present  and  future  possibilities  in  concealment  and 
camouflage  for  troops. 

(e)  Night  operations. 

(/)   Inability  of  the  aeroplane  to  take  prisoners,  exam- 
ine dead  and  wounded,  judge  of  enemy  morale,  etc. 
(g)   Lack  of  continuity  of  observation. 

(a)  The  danger  of  an  army  depending  entirely  upon  air 
reconnaissance  can  be  clearly  brought  home  by  simply 
considering  the  possibilities  attendant  upon  the  loss  of 
air  control  by  our  own  side.  This  happened  on  the 
Western  front  several  times.  Its  results  were  not  so 
marked  owing  to  the  stationary  character  of  the  fighting. 
It  happened  upon  the  Eastern  front  with  disastrous  re- 
sults to  the  loser.  It  happened  on  the  Palestine  front. 
This  is  an  excellent  example  as  the  losing  side  not  only 
lost  the  control  of  the  air  t»ut  were  woefully  deficient  in 
cavalry  to  repair  the  loss. 


AIR  SERVICE  AND  CAVALRY  153 


Before  the  great  attack  of  September  i8th  and 
1918,  on  the  Turkish  lines  north  of  Gaza  the  Turkish  air 
force  was  almost  hors  de  combat  owing  to  the  supremacy 
of  the  British.  On  the  I5th  their  reconnaissance  reported, 
''Some  regrouping  of  cavalry  units  in  progress  behind 
the  enemy's  left  flank  apparently,  otherwise  nothing  to 
report."  At  this  time  three  cavalry  divisions,  five  infan- 
try divisions  and  a  major  portion  of  the  heavy  artillery 
of  the  force,  were  concentrated  behind  the  left  flank  and 
between  Ramleh  and  the  front  line  of  the  coastal  sector. 
There  were  301  guns  concentrated  instead  of  the  70  that 
were  normally  there.  The  unobserved  massing  of  these 
forces  led  to  the  successful  attack  and  overwhelming 
defeat  of  the  Turkish  VII  and  VIII  Armies. 

The  state  of  the  Turco-German  air  forces  can  be  gath- 
ered from  the  following  extract  from  their  captured  rec- 
ords: "From  August  25th,  1918,  to  August  3ist,  1918,  in 
consequence  of  lively  hostile  flying  activity,  no  recon- 
naissance could  be  carried  out."  For  a  period  of  seven 
days,  at  a  most  important  time,  the  Turkish  air  force  was 
unable  to  function.  Many  such  periods  occurred  in  this 
campaign  in  spite  of  the  excellence  of  the  German  airmen 
and  their  machines.  The  Turks  had  no  cavalry  in  num- 
bers or  quality  to  make  up  for  this  failure  in  their  air 
forces.  They  were  blinded,  they  lost  tactical  freedom 
and  the  initiative  passed  from  them. 

The  above  example  is  cited  to  show  what  happens  to 
an  army  that  places  its  full  dependence  upon  aerial  re- 
connaissance to  the  exclusion  of  cavalry  reconnaissance. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  another  serious  danger  that 
results  from  a  total  dependence  upon  the  air  service  is 
the  fact  that  even  a  great  and  efficient  air  service  may  be 
rendered  useless  shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  war  by  the 


154  MODERN  CAVALRY 

appearance  of  some  new  invention  or  improvement 
adopted  by  the  enemy.  It  might  take  weeks  and  months 
to  develop  a  corresponding  strength  on  our  own  side.  In 
a  war  of  movement  we  would  be  blinded  through  this 
period.  If,  in  a  war  of  the  future,  it  takes  us  as  long  to 
put  an  air  force  into  the  field  as  it  did  in  the  last  war, 
it  behooves  us  to  have  a  force  for  this  purpose  that  will 
be  ready  to  move  out  at  once  and  function  immediately 
— a  force  of  cavalry. 

(b)  Unfavorable    weather    conditions,,  especially    the 
ones  that  affect  visibility,  would  render  an  air  force  use- 
less at  certain  periods.     This  happened  in  many  cases  in 
the  World  War.     A  notable  example,  on  the  Palestine 
front,  occurred  in  the  period  of  three  days  after  Decem- 
ber 7th,  during  the  progress  of  the  converging  movement 
upon  Jerusalem.    Heavy  rains  and  mists  prevented  the  air 
force  from  observing.     The  British  carried  on  with  their 
cavalry — the  Turks,  without  cavalry,  were  helpless. 

(c)  Present   and   future   possibilities   of   anti-aircraft 
defense.     This  is  another  form  of  the  old  controversy, 
"shells  versus  armor."     The  development  of  anti-aircraft 
guns  at  present  is  advanced  enough  to  warrant  that  any 
force  sufficiently  supplied  with  them  and  trained  in  their 
use,  can  keep  the  aeroplanes  so  high  in  the  air  that  the 
information  gained  by  them  is  almost  negligible.     During 
the  later  stages  of  the  Palestine  campaign  the  British  anti- 
aircraft defense  had  so  improved  as  to  achieve  just  this 
purpose.     It  is  not  believed  that  the  possibilities  of  the 
anti-aircraft  gun  have  been  nearly  exploited  as  yet.  Their 
efficiency  is  of  proved  worth  now.     The  next  war  will 
see  even  greater  effects  produced  by  them.     It  is  only  a 
question  of  time  until  most  branches  will  be  armed  with 
them  and  trained  in  their  use. 


AIR  SERVICE  AND  CAVALRY  155 

(d)  Concealment   and    camouflage    for    troops.     The 
value  of  aeroplane  reconnaissance  is  nullified  to  a  certain 
extent  today  and  will  be  rendered  of  less  value  in  the 
future  owing  to  the  present  knowledge  and  future  possi- 
bilities   of    the   art   of    camouflage   and   concealment   of 
troops.     Troops  trained  in  this  and  practicing  its  princi- 
ples will  be  able  to  render  much  more  difficult  the  work 
of  the  air  reconnaissance.     The  combination  of  a  high 
degree  of  camouflage  and  concealment  with  an  efficient 
service  of  anti-aircraft  guns  has  already  been  put  into 
operation  with  successful  results.    There  are  large  possi- 
bilities for  the  future  improvement  of  this  phase. 

(e)  Movements  of  troops  at  night  will  go  practically 
undetected  by 'the  air  reconnaissance.    Granted  that  aero- 
planes can  fly  at  night,  what  is  the  good  of  flying  if  they 
can  see  nothing?     Cavalry  can  perform  this  duty — re- 
stricted naturally  to  security  reconnaissance — it  can  hold 
ground  and  prevent  the  movements  of  the  enemy  or  give 
warning  of  his  approach.     It  can  seize  commanding  points 
of  observation  and  establish  effective  screens. 

(/)  Inability  of  the  aeroplane  to  take  prisoners,  etc. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  Intelligence  officer,  the  aero- 
plane only  brings  back  a  small  part  of  the  needed  infor- 
mation. It  cannot  supply  the  important  information 
gained  from  prisoners,  it  cannot  take  prisoners,  it  can- 
not identify  enemy  units  and  in  many  cases  cannot  even 
identify  enemy  branches  of  the  service.  It  cannot  give 
information  leading  to  deductions  as  to  the  state  of  enemy 
morale.  It  cannot  examine  enemy  dead  and  wounded, 
capture  documents,  search  telegraph  offices  and  examine 
post  offices,  civilians,  etc.  In  other  words,  it  cannot 
supply  all  the  thousand  and  one  small  bits  of  information 
needed  to  provide  the  army  command  with  working 


156  MODERN  CAVALRY 

knowledge  of  the  enemy.  This  role  will  be  of  paramount 
importance  to  the  army  in  a  war  of  movement  as  it  has 
been  in  the  position  warfare  on  the  Western  front.  It 
could  be  carried  out  there  by  dismounted  troops.  In  any 
war  of  movement  it  must  be  carried  out  by  mounted 
troops. 

(g)  Lack  of  continuity  of  observation.  The  aeroplane 
cannot  hold  a  force  long  enough  under  observation  in 
many  cases  to  determine  its  intentions.  Its  reports  must 
of  necessity  be  based  upon  exceedingly  fleeting  glimpses, 
insufficient  in  most  cases  to  warrant  any  tactical  action. 

In  addition  to  all  the  above  mentioned  points  the  aero- 
plane cannot  hold  ground.  Its  offensive  power  is  not 
great  enough  to  exercise  any  decisive  effect  upon  the 
course  of  battle.  On  water  the  problem  of  naval  con- 
struction is  to  balance  the  three  factors  of  speed,  armor 
and  guns.  One  cannot  be  increased  without  correspond- 
ing loss  in  the  others.  The  same  problem  applies  to  the 
aeroplane.  The  desire  for  speed  in  the  aeroplane  has  led 
to  the  sacrificing  of  its  offensive  power.  The  sum  total 
of  the  results  of  all  the  improvements  in  the  air  service 
during  the  world  war  was  to  add  equations  to  each  side 
which  balanced  and  neutralized  each  other.  The  war 
went  merrily  on  on  the  ground  while  the  opposing  air 
fleets  fought  for  mastery. 

Dramatic  battles  in  the  air  were  very  spectacular  but 
the  professional  soldier  wishes  to  know  what  tactical 
results  were  gained  by  these  battles.  It  was  predicted 
that  the  air  service  was  to  end  surprise  as  a  factor  in 
war.  On  the  contrary  the  World  War  was  replete  with 
examples  of  surprises  on  a  vast  scale.  To  mention  a  few 
of  the  greatest,  there  was  the  German  offensive  against 
the  Russians  in  the  spring  of  1915,  the  German  offensive 


AIR  SERVICE  AND  CAVALRY  157 

against  Verdun  in  February,  1916,  the  withdrawal  of 
Hindenburg  to  the  new  line  of  defense  in  the  spring  of 
1917,  the  Austro-German  offensive  against  the  Italians 
in  October,  1917,  and  the  German  offensive  on  the  West- 
ern front  in  March,  1918. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  prove  that  dependence  upon 
the  air  service  as  the  sole  reconnoitering  force  is  depend- 
ence dangerously  placed.  The  air  service  has  too  many 
disadvantages  to  be  the  sole  dependence  for  the  service 
of  security  and  reconnaissance.  The  problem  now  is  to 
assign  the  aefoplane  to  its  proper  place  in  the  tactical 
scheme  of  things.  In  the  field  of  reconnaissance  that 
place  is  in  close  cooperation  with  cavalry.  The  study  of 
means  for  closer  cooperation  should  be  undertaken  with 
a  view  to  utilizing  the  many  manifest  advantages  of  the 
flying  service.  Studied  properly,  as  an  auxiliary  to  cav- 
alry in  this  field,  there  is  room  for  limitless  possibilities 
for  the  mutual  improvement  of  both  services. 

One  of  these  possibilities  is  a  fuller  exploitation -of  the 
mobility  of  cavalry.  A  higher  degree  of  development  of 
the  air  service  will  inevitably  tend  to  render  more  unusual 
the  factor  of  strategical  surprise.  Major  dispositions  of 
the  troops  on  each  side  will  be  known  to  the  opposing 
side.  The  only  possibility  of  success  in  many  cases  will 
be  the  possibility  of  moving  troops  to  a  selected  point  of 
attack  at  greater  speed  than  the  enemy  can  move  troops 
to  repel  them.  This  will  render  increasingly  important 
the  role  of  cavalry.  It  will  find  its  fullest  development 
in  this  type  of  operation  in  working  with  its  air  forces. 
The  determination  of  points  of  attack  and  the  picking  of 
routes  as  well  as  the  strategical  security  will  be  the 
function  of  the  air  forces. 

It  is  in  the  field  of  strategical  security  that  the  air  force 


158  MODERN  CAVALRY 

can  aid  cavalry  to  a  material  extent.  The  limitations  of 
the  air  service  make  it  of  doubtful  value  in  the  field  of 
tactical  reconnaissance.  In  the  realm  of  strategic  recon- 
naissance it  will  hold  full  sway.  Its  work  will  take  an 
enormous  burden  from  the  cavalry.  The  air  service  will 
find  its  role  in  sketching  the  broad  outlines  of  the  picture. 
The  cavalry  must  fill  in  the  details.  The  handing  over 
of  strategical  reconnaissance  will  result  in  much  saving 
of  horseflesh  to  the  cavalry.  It  will  save  it  much  disper- 
sion. It  will  allow  it  to  keep  its  strength  more  or  less 
intact  for  battle  purposes  and  will  allow  it  to  concentrate 
more  thoroughly  in  the  field  of  tactical  reconnaissance. 

Nevertheless  we  must  not  blindly  turn  over  all  the 
duties  of  strategical  reconnaissance  to  the  air  force.  The 
possibility  of  the  defeat  of  the  air  force  must  not  be  lost 
sight  of.  It  is  a  fragile  arm.  Being  a  mechanical  inno- 
vation it  is  subject  to  the  possibility  inherent  in  all  me- 
chanical innovations  in  war — the  possibility  of  being 
neutralized  or  effaced  by  new  and  superior  mechanical 
innovations.  For  this  reason  the  cavalry  officer  must 
study  and  understand  the  requirements  of  strategical 
reconnaissance  so  as  to  be  prepared  to  take  over  such 
duties  if  called  upon. 

Many  lessons  have  been  learned  in  the  World  War  as 
to  the  tactical  cooperation  of  the  air  service  with  immobile 
forces.  The  subject  that  now  requires  study  is  the  sub- 
ject of  cooperation  of  aeroplanes  with  highly  mobile 
forces.  One  phase  alone  of  this  study  needs  attention, 
the  question  of  means  of  communication  between  the 
aeroplane  and  the  rapidly  moving  cavalry  troops  on  the 
ground.  This  subject  presents  problems  for  solution  that 
were  not  solved  satisfactorily  in  the  World  War. 

In  line  with  the  above,  arguments  it  is  interesting  to 


AIR  SERVICE  AND  CAVALRY  159 

note  the  opinion  of  the  great  cavalryman  developed  by 
this  war — Field  Marshal  Allenby.  He  has  this  to  say  in 
his  article  in  the  American  Cavalry  Journal  of  January, 
1921,  "In  the  task  of  strategical  reconnaissance,  cavalry 
has  in  a  great  measure  been  displaced  by  the  recent  de- 
velopment of  the  Air  Service.  Distant  reconnaissance  is 
carried  out  infinitely  more  expeditiously  and  more  effi- 
ciently by  aircraft  than  by  horsemen.  This  effects  econ- 
omy in  horse  power  and  in  man  power  and  the  cavalry 
is  thereby  saved  for  its  ever  important  duties  of  tactical 
reconnaissance  and  battle. 

"Tactical  reconnaissance,  including  the  keeping  of 
touch  and  the  filling  of  gaps  in  the  long  front  of  the 
present  day  battlefields,  is  still  the  business  of  the  horse- 
man. 

"The  battle  value  of  cavalry  increases  with  the  breadth 
of  vision  bestowed  by  aircraft.  The  Air  Service,  by  en- 
larging the  horizon,  renders  possible  such  bold  strokes  by 
masses  of  horsemen  as  were  seen  in  Mesopotamia,  Pales- 
tine and  Syria." 


CHAPTER  XII 

CAVALRY  RECONNAISSANCE,  PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS 

To  secure  the  best  results  in  cavalry  reconnaissance  the 
army  commander  must  know  and  must  state  to  the  cav- 
alry what  information  is  desired.  The  broad  order  to 
discover  the  position  and  intentions  of  the  enemy  is  all 
very  well,  but  that  is  the  cavalry  duty  in  any  case.  What 
must  be  done  if  the  best  results  are  to  be  obtained,  is  to 
state  exactly  what  information  is  desired ;  whether  the 
enemy  is  at  a  certain  place;  whether  certain  bridges  are 
or  are  not  destroyed ;  whether  the  enemy  is  advancing 
upon  certain  roads;  whether  given  towns  are  occupied; 
how  far  the  flanks  of  the  army  extend,  etc.  Such  clear 
and  definite  orders  will  bring  in  clear  and  definite  reports. 

In  all  tactical  operations  it  is  not  only  necessary  to 
seek  information  but  it  is  necessary  to  know  what  infor- 
mation to  seek.  Napoleon's  superior  information  was 
mostly  due  to  the  fact  that  he  sent  his  cavalry  on  a 
definite  mission  to  secure  definite' information.  As  far 
as  the  higher  command  is  concerned,  it  is  simply  a  ques- 
tion of  having  a  plan  of  action  mapped  out  and  of  seek- 
ing the  special  information  that  will  aid  or  hinder  this 
plan.  It  implies  a  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war.  Without 
a  foundation  of  the  principles  of  war  the  officer  seeking 
information  is  working  in  the  dark  and  at  haphazard. 
He  is  unable  to  assess  correctly  the  value  of  the  infor- 

160 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  161 

niation  that  he  does  find.  With  a  knowledge  of  war  he 
is  enabled  to  narrow  the  field  of  endeavor  and  to  concen- 
trate upon  the  probabilities  of  the  situation. 

The  mobility  of  the  cavalry  enables  it  to  anticipate 
events.  The  intelligence  that  the  cavalry  brings  is  direct 
evidence  of  the  position  and  intentions  of  the  enemy. 
The  intelligence  brought  by  cavalry  has  this  advantage 
over  the  intelligence  gained  from  other  sources ;  that  it 
is  information  more  valuable  from  a  military  viewpoint 
owing  to  the  fact  that  it  is  information  gathered  by 
trained  observers. 

In  addition  to  securing  the  information  there  is  the 
necessity  of  transmitting  it.  One  of  the  great  faults  in 
reconnaissance  work  in  1870  was  the  fact  that  officers 
were  sent  out  on  long  missions  involving  in  some  cases 
rides  of  60  and  70  miles  without  any  proper  arrange- 
ments being  made  for  the  transmission  to  headquarters  of 
the  information  they  obtained.  Information,  no  matter 
of  what  import,  is  valueless  unless  it  reaches  the  higher 
command. 

To  further  the  transmission  of  information  it  is  of 
great  importance  that  lines  of  intelligence  be  established. 
This  is  accomplished  by  means  of  motorcycle  dispatch 
bearers,  motor  cars,  light  wireless  sets,  buzzers,  pigeons, 
mounted  orderlies  or  relay  posts  and  telephones.  It  is 
hoped  that  wireless  telephoning  will  soon  reach  a  state 
where  it  can  be  an  effective  aid  to  military  operations. 
The  first  point  is  to  secure  the  information,  the  second 
point  is  to  place  that  information  where  it  can  be  utilized. 

Reconnaissance  zones  must  be  allotted  by  the  chief  of 
the  reconnaissance  body.  These  zones  must  be  care- 
fully defined.  For  obvious  reasons  an  important  road 
should  not  be  used  to  limit  one  boundary  of  a  reconnais- 


1 62  MODERN  CAVALRY 

sance  zone.  In  the  case  of  the  change  of  the  direction 
of  the  enemy  or  the  shifting  of  the  zone  of  maneuver, 
new  allotment  of  reconnaissance  zones  must  be  made 
quickly.  This  is  best  done  by  recalling  the  forces  already 
out  simultaneously  with  the  sending  forward  of  new  units 
on  the  new  sectors. 

It  is  necessary,  in  seeking  knowledge  of  the  enemy,  to 
touch  him  at  a  number  of  points,  as  one  piece  of  informa- 
tion is  valuable  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  supported  by  other 
pieces  of  information.  Reports  from  a  multitude  of  dif- 
ferent sources  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  army  intelli- 
gence authorities  before  a  full  appreciation  of  the  situa- 
tion can  be  distilled  and  made  the  basis  for  action. 

The  service  of  reconnaissance  must  be  carried  out  in 
an  offensive  sense.  To  secure  the  advantages  of  superior 
information  it  is  necessary  to  move  on  a  broad  front  with 
strong  supports.  The  enemy  must  be  pushed  back  re- 
lentlessly with  rifle,  machine  gun,  and  artillery  fire  power, 
and  with  the  combination  of  mounted  and  dismounted 
attack,  until  his  formed  bodies  are  encountered.  THis 
will  necessitate  the  overthrowing  and  the  driving  from 
the  field  of  his  cavalry. 

One  duty  that  will  fall  particularly  to  cavalry  will  be 
that  of  making  prisoners.  This  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant means  of  gaining  information.  Every  effort 
should  be  made  to  capture  prisoners.  They  must  be  sent 
back  to  examining  posts  that  will  be  established  by  intel- 
ligence authorities  in  the  rear.  • 

Owing  to  the  importance  of  information  gained  from 
prisoners  our  own  men  must  be  particularly  warned  of 
the  damage  they  may  commit  to  their  own  side  by  giving 
any  information  if  captured.  They  must  be  told  that 
they  will  be  cleverly  cross:examined ;  they  may  be  put 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  163 

in  confinement  with  pretended  friends  who  will  pump 
them;  they  may  be  subjected  to  listening  devices  in  their 
prisons ;  threats  or  promises  may  be  made  them.  They 
must  be  warned  of  all  these  and  of  the  traitorous  action 
they  would  commit  if  they  supplied  the  enemy  with  any 
information,  no  matter  how  unimportant  it  might  seem. 

The  soldier  must  have  explained  to  him  the  work  of 
the  intelligence  section  of  an  army  staff,  how  they  gather 
in  a  multitude  of  seemingly  trivial  and  unimportant 
pieces  of  information  from  which  they  construct  impor- 
tant facts.  For  this  reason  he  must  not  divulge  any  in- 
formation no  matter  how  trivial  it  may  seem  to  him.  It 
may  be  the  keystone  to  an  incomplete  arch  of  knowledge 
already  in  enemy  possession. 

There  are  three  types  of  reconnaissance — protective, 
contact  and  independent.  Protective  reconnaissance  en- 
sures the  absence  of  the  enemy  and  the  safety  of  the  com- 
mand and  takes  the  form  of  outposts,  patrols  for  limited 
range  work,  flank  and  rear  guards,  and  in  some  cases, 
advance  guards. 

Contact  reconnaissance  is  employed  by  larger  bodies 
who  are  prepared  to  fight  for  information  if  necessary. 
This  takes  the  form  of  reconnaissance  in  force,  large 
cavalry  bodies  with  reconnaissance  missions  and  in  some 
cases  advance  guards. 

Independent  reconnaissance  takes  the  form  of  patrols 
and  scouting  bodies  who  have  wide  discretion  granted 
them,  who  range  very  far  and  who  are  required  to  secure 
information  without  fighting  if  possible. 

March  outposts — the  units  who  protect  the  marching 
body  when  it  halts  temporarily  come  under  the  heading 
of  protective  reconnaissance. 

Distances  in  protective  reconnaissance  should  be  sufii- 


164  MODERN  CAVALRY 

cient  to  allow  the  commander  of  the  main  body  to  make 
his  dispositions  in  case  of  alarm. 

The  independent  cavalry  of  an  army  is  the  chief  recon- 
noitering  force.  Its  mission  is  to  find  the  enemy  and 
keep  the  army  commander  informed.  To  achieve  its 
reconnoitering  mission  it  must  fight  a  way  through  the 
enemy  screen  and  identify  formed  bodies. 

It  is  necessary  clearly  to  define  the  mission  of  any  de- 
tached body — i.  e.,  whether  the  leader  is  engaged  in  a 
reconnaissance  in  which  he  may  find  opportunity  to 
damage  the  enemy  or  whether  he  is  engaged  in  a  tactical 
operation  in  the  course  of  which  he  may  pick  up  infor- 
mation. 

The  boldness  of  patrols  works  to  deceive  the  enemy. 
The  same  effect  is  gained  also  by  the  use  of  exaggerated 
numbers.  It  is  often  advisable  to  use  a  cavalry  force  as 
a  screen  for  demonstration  purposes  while  the  main  at- 
tack is  developed  elsewhere.  Ashby,  the  leader  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson's  cavalry  force,  was  very  skillful  in  this  use 
of  the  cavalry  and  succeeded  in  keeping  the  enemy  in 
doubt  as  to  whether  his  force  was  strongly  supported 
or  not. 

The  attitude  of  inhabitants  has  a  strong  influence  upon 
reconnaissance  duties.  In  hostile  countries  much  larger 
patrols  with  much  stronger  supports  must  be  used  than 
is  possible  amongst  a  friendly  population. 

Outpost  patrols  in  front  of  the  lines  are  not  very  good, 
not  only  owing  to  the  fact  that  they  are  often  mistaken 
for  the  enemy  and  useless  alarms  occasioned  thereby, 
but  because  of  the  fact  that  they  tend  to  lessen  the  vigi- 
lance of  the  outpost  lines  who  place  an  exaggerated  value 
on  the  security  afforded  by  them.  Patrols  on  the  flanks  of 
the  force  are  not  open  to  the  same  objections. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  165 

The  whole  idea  of  advance  guard  reconnaissance  must 
be  based  upon  the  necessity  of  securing  tactical  informa- 
tion. Information  and  security  are  synonymous  terms. 
The  value  of  the  advance  guard  depends  greatly  upon  the 
quality  of  the  reconnaissance  work,  even  to  a  greater 
extent  than  upon  its  fighting  power.  Information  that 
can  lead  a  commander  to  a  correct  decision  as  to  when 
to  attack  and  where,  is  of  untold  value. 

The  advance  guard  duties,  especially  in  the  cavalry, 
should  be  carried  out  in  an  offensive  spirit.  A  "normal" 
advance  guard  formation  is  about  as  ridiculous  as  a 
"normal  attack."  The  wedge-shaped  formation  usually 
adopted  as  the  last  word  in  advance  guard  formations  is 
purely  a  defensive  formation.  The  offensive  advance 
guard  should  have  observing  parties  well  forward  on  its 
flanks  and  move  on  a  broad  front.  This  acts  also  as  a 
screen. 

The  principle  of  keeping  one's  intenlions  from  the 
knowledge  of  the  enemy  is  violated  by  the  use  of  the 
wedge-shaped  formation ;  any  intelligent  military  observer 
knows  immediately  that  this  is  an  advance  guard  forma- 
tion, and  that  the  main  body  is  close  behind.  Further- 
more, upon  the  rencontre  it  is  necessary  to  observe  the 
enemy's  main  body  as  quickly  as  possible.  There  can  be  • 
no  doubt  as  to  the  superior  ease  of  observation  from  the 
patrols  on  the  flanks  of  the  line  formation  as  compared 
to  the  same  observation  attempted  from  the  wedge  shaped 
formation. 

The  commander  of  a  smaller  cavalry  detachment  such 
as  a  contact  squadron,  a  large  patrol,  troop  or  other  body 
would  do  well  to  keep  the  direction  of  the  scouting  in 
his  own  hands.  With  a  fixed  formation,  the  security  of 
the  column  is  left  to  the  individual  intelligence  and  energy 


166  MODERN   CAVALRY 

of  one  or  more  troopers  on  the  flanks.  They  are  very 
prone  to  disregard  strong  points  that  might  possibly  shel- 
ter an  enemy.  A  better  plan  is  to  send  out  successive 
units  to  search  designated  points  and  then  return  to  the 
column.  This  can  be  done  without  slowing  up  the  march 
by  sending  these  units  far  enough  in  advance,  watching 
for  their  signals  and  then  sending  out  the  next  trooper 
or  troopers  before  the  return  of  the  original  ones.  It 
might  be  called  "patrolling  by  successive  loops. " 

The  reconnaissance  on  the  part  of  a  retreating  force 
must  extend  well  to  the  flanks  and  well  forward,  as  the 
enemy  invariably  will  attempt  to  pass  the  rear  guard  and 
hit  the  flank  of  the  main  body. 

The  cavalry  screen  is  employed  to  conceal  tactical  or 
strategical  movements  from  enemy  observation.  It  is  not, 
as  it  is  often  described,  a  "cloud"  of  cavalry.  It  is  the 
advance  on  a  broad  front  of  a  line  of  strong  groups,  each 
covering  its  sector  by  patrols.  Basically  it  consists  of  a 
line  of  groups  in  observation  and  a  line  of  supporting 
groups,  with  also  a  line  of  reserves.  Good  communica- 
tion laterally  and  in  depth  is  essential. 

An  advance  guard,  considered  offensively,  should  not 
rest  content  with  simple  protection  of  the  main  body. 
This  is  only  the  securing  of  negative  results.  In  war 
you  must  strike  the  enemy  and  deliver  your  blows  on  his 
formed  bodies.  Therefore  the  purely  negative  idea  of 
simple  protection  of  the  main  body  must  be  supplemented 
by  reconnaissance  measures  of  sufficient  value  to  insure 
prompt  enough  information  to  permit  the  attnck  being 
launched  quickly  and  effectually.  This  information  must 
be  of  such  nature  as  to  permit  your  own  commanding  offi- 
cer to  reap  full  advantage  of  the  element  of  surprise  and 
to  take  swift  and  resolute  action  against  the  enemy. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  167 

The  principles  of  effective  screening  and  reconnaissance 
are  a  broad  front,  strong  supports  and  concerted  action. 
There  is  nothing  incompatible  in  the  necessity  of  ex- 
tension on  a  broad  front  and  the  tactical  necessity  of 
combined  and  concerted  action.  This  is  only  the  ap- 
plication of  one  of  the  principles  of  war,  the  principle 
of  the  economy  of  forces.  Effective  reconnaissance  re- 
quires width  of  front  while  successful  tactical  action 
requires  depth  of  formation.  The  happy  combination  of 
these  two  is  the  indication  of  a  skillful  leader. 

The  value  of  negative  information  must  be  impressed 
upon  all  subordinates.  It  is  just  as  important  for  higher 
command  to  know  where  the  enemy  is  not  in  many  cases 
as  it  is  to  know  where  he  is.  It  is  also  a  check  on  the 
presence  and  activities  of  the  reconnoitering  detachments 
and  assures  the  commander  that  all  fronts  are  being 
covered. 

In  sending  out  patrols  with  two  missions  to  perform, 
instruct  the  leader  as  to  the  more  important. 

The  highest  type  of  reconnaissance  is  that  where  the 
leader  is  told  what  is  wanted  and  left  to  choose  his  own 
means.  Wellington  in  the  Peninsular  campaign  was  par- 
ticularly noted  for  the  excellence  of  his  service  of  infor- 
mation. This  was  his  guiding  principle. 

Do  not,  when  approaching  a  retreating  enemy,  do  so 
directly  from  the  rear  where  he  has  a  rear  guard  but 
strike  in  on  a  flank  where  he  does  not  expect  you. 

When  a  large  force  is  despatched  on  a  contact  mission 
the  enemy  must  concentrate  his  screening  bodies  to  meet 
it.  Instructions  must  be  given  to  all  our  own  troops  in 
other  sectors  to  increase  their  activity  in  order  to  take 
advantage  of  the  corresponding  weakening  of  the  enemy 
forces  in  their  front. 


168  MODERN  CAVALRY 

In  combined  operations  with  large  bodies  the  recon- 
naissance should  be  kept  in  the  hands  of  higher  com- 
mand to  avoid  duplication  of  effort.  Failure  to  do  this 
was  one  of  the  faults  committed  by  the  German  Army  in 
their  advance  on  the  Moselle  in  1870. 

The  Scout: 

The  basis  of  all  cavalry  reconnaissance  work  is  the 
cavalry  trooper.  In  the  final  analysis  the  army  having 
the  most  intelligent  and  best  instructed  troopers  will 
produce  the  highest  degree  of  results  in  reconnaissance. 
The  cavalry  soldier  must  be  trained  carefully  in  his 
duties.  He  must  learn  first  of  all  that  the  measure  of 
the  value  of  a  scout  is  not  the  number  of  moving-picture 
hair-breadth  adventures  that  he  undergoes  but  the  amount 
of  information  that  he  brings  back.  He  must  be  grounded 
in  military  knowledge  to  such  an  extent  as  to  insure  that 
his  reports  will  be  intelligent  and  of  sufficient  value.  He 
must  be  instructed  in  the  military  vocabulary  in  the  rec- 
ognition and  designation  of  the  landscape  and  must  be 
taught  the  essentials  of  tactics.  His  intelligence,  initia- 
tive and  self-reliance  must  be  fostered. 

He  must  be  taught  the  elements  of  concealment  and 
instructed  that  they  are  simply  an  application  of  common 
sense.  Every  opportunity  must  be  used  by  his  officers 
while  at  drill  and  on  the  march  to  teach  him  essential 
points  in  scouting. 

He  must  be  taught  the  following  and  shown  by  prac- 
tical example: 

The  avoidance  of  crest  lines,  summits,  open  ground. 
Quiescence  when  stationary,  caution  when  moving. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  169 

Knowledge  of  backgrounds. 
Concealment ;  value  of  shadow  and  sunlight. 
"Freezing"  (Motion  meaning  life  to  most  observers). 
To  observe  on  foot  and  realize  that  the  horse  makes 

too  many  motions  for  safety. 

To  advance  by  successive  bounds ;  to  make  use  of  a 
good  post  of  observation  before  moving  on  to  the 
next  one. 

The  value  of  silence,  especially  in  wooded  country. 
Memory  for  landmarks. 
Looking  over  the  back  trail  for  a  possible  return  in 

a  hurry. 

For  night  operations,  sense  of  direction,  the  stars, 
running  water,  judgment  of  time  and  space,  wind 
direction,  slopes,  hills,  roads,  fences,  danger  of 
smoking,  avoidance  of  crests  (so  as  not  to  loom 
up  against  star  or  moonlight).  The  value  of 
transverse  lines  across  the  direction  of  route  to 
check  up  on  map. 

Training  to  seize  value  of  cover,  shadow,  broken  sun- 
light, small  hillocks,  depressions,  tufts  of  grass. 

The  value  of  blurring  the  outline  (the  feather  bonnet 
of  the  Indian  and  the  habit  of  the  Zulu  in  slowly  raising 
a  small  bush  over  a  hill  crest  before  raising  his  head  to 
look  through  it). 

The  danger  of  disturbing  flocks  of  animals,  and  the 
value  of  watching  the  actions  of  flocks  of  animals,  wild 
birds,  etc. 

The  value  of  patience. 

The  avoidance  of  an  appearance  of  apprehension  when 
discovered.  The  enemy  would  rather  capture  than  kill. 
A  sudden  sign  of  alarm  or  ill-considered  attempt  to 


170  MODERN  CAVALRY 

escape  might  precipitate  a  volley  where  an  unconcerned 
and  unsuspicious  attitude  might  lead  to  an  opportunity 
for  escape  a  moment  or  two  later. 

To  change  direction  when  out  of  sight  and  being  pur- 
sued. 

Never  to  appear  where  normally  expected.  Point  of 
emergence  from  a  wood  for  example  should  never  be 
normal  exit. 

Avoid  use  of  firearms  where  possible. 

To  remember  that  most  discoveries  are  made  at  the 
halt.  That  scouting  work  resolves  itself  into  picking  one 
good  observation  post  after  another  and  properly  ex- 
ploiting the  possibilities  of  each  and  a  quick  and  incon- 
spicuous movement  from  one  to  the  other. 

To  use  field  glasses  always  and  whenever  opportunity 
offers. 

To  look  at  things  from  the  enemy's  viewpoint.  As  the 
old  sea  captain  in  one  of  Kipling's  stories  said,  to  explain 
his  success  in  always  locating  the  schools  of  cod  fish,  he 
"thought  like  a  cod." 

Observation  of  tracks  in  mud  and  dust  and  study  of 
the  effects  of  wind  and  sun  upon  them.  Remember  when 
following  a  dim  trail  to  look  several  yards  ahead  rather 
than  directly  on  the  ground  at  your  feet. 

Study  the  enemy,  his  usual  strength  of  patrols,  out- 
posts, the  speed  and  condition  of  his  horses,  his  skill, 
initiative,  courage,  etc. 

Always  consider  possible  line  of  retreat.  Never  return 
by  the  same  route  if  possible.  Remember  that  snares 
are  always  set  in  runs. 

Always  have  a  rough  plan  of  operations  ready  for  any 
emergency.  The  danger  of  surprise  is  the  delay  caused 
by  hesitation, 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  171 

Never  enter  an  enclosure  without  looking  for  an  alter- 
native exit  or  a  "back  door." 

In  leaving  the  horse  leave  him  in  a  position  for  a  quick 
get  away.  If  surprised  by  horsemen  while  on  foot  move 
towards  wooded  or  broken  ground  where  it  is  difficult  for 
horsemen  to  follow. 

Always  carry  the  rifle.  A  shot  or  two  will  dampen  the 
enthusiasm  of  a  pursuer,  and  make  him  think  that  your 
boldness  portends  support  near  at  hand. 

Train  constantly  in  military  fundamentals  of  knowl- 
edge ;  a  civilian  scout  might  be  clever  but  his  information 
would  be  useless  from  a  military  standpoint  because  of 
his  ignorance  of  the  size  of  units,  branches  of  service, 
etc. 

Learn  the  peculiarities  of  the  enemy's  footgear,  his 
shoeing  of  horses,  his  artillery  wagon  and  motor  trans- 
portation tracks.  Be  able  to  tell  whether  a  large  or 
small  force  has  been  on  the  ground. 

An  observation  of  enemy's  tracks  may  lead  to  the 
avoidance  of  an  ambush. 

Study  dust  clouds  and  learn  the  different  forms  made 
by  different  arms  of  the  service. 

Have  a  unit  of  estimation  for  troops  and  for  distances. 

Watch  for  smoke  and  fire. 

Observe  and  report  on  enemy's  system  of  protection 
and  its  efficiency. 

Learn  to  get  second  hand  information  from  inhabitants, 
prisoners,  deserters,  etc.,  and  to  judge  of  its  value  from 
the  intelligence  or  disinterestedness  of  the  person.  Con- 
sider hostile  inhabitants  as  enemy  spies  and  avoid  where 
possible. 

Collect  all  documents,  letters,  note-books,  scraps  of 
paper  and  turn  them  in  even  if  you  cannot  read  them. 


172  MODERN  CAVALRY 

Turn  in  buttons,  articles  of  equipment,  etc.,  for  examina- 
tion by  the  intelligence  officers. 

Remember  that  a  live  enemy  in  the  form  of  a  prisoner 
is  valuable  to  the  intelligence  authorities  in  the  rear. 

Do  not  neglect  to  report  anything  unusual  that  you 
have  seen.  Remember  that  your  reports  may  be  amongst 
thousands  that  are  sifted  and  gone  over,  weighed  and 
compared,  by  trained  intelligence  personnel  and  a  thing 
that  to  you  may  seem  trivial  may  be  of  undreamed  of 
importance  when  added  to  other  facts. 

Maps  should  be  understood  and  the  scout  should  be 
able  to  draw  rough  sketches. 

Finally,  get  your  information  as  quickly  as  possible  to 
your  immediate  superior. 

The  Patrol: 

A  patrol  leader  is  valuable  according  to  the  degree  of 
tactical  and  strategic  knowledge  that  he  possesses.  For 
this  reason  our  younger  officers,  on  whom  so  much  of 
the  actual  patrolling  work  will  fall,  should  be  well 
grounded  in  the  tactics  of  their  own  and  other  arms  and 
should  possess  a  knowledge  of  the  elements  of  strategy. 
This  applies  to  non-commissioned  cavalry  officer  as  well. 

Before  starting  on  his  mission  the  patrol  leader  must 
cross-examine  himself  and  examine  his  command.  He 
must  assure  himself  that  his  men  and  horses  are  fit, 
inspect  ammunition,  food,  clothing,  shoeing,  see  that  field 
glasses  are  in  working  shape  and  must  instruct  his  com- 
mand in  their  duties  and  their  mission.  He  must  know 
clearly  what  information  is  required,  what  direction  he  is 
to  take,  whether  negative  information  is  desired,  where 
and  how  he  will  transmit  information  to  the  rear. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  173 

There  are  a  few  general  things  that  a  patrol  leader 
should  keep  in  mind.  He  must  never  appear  when  or 
where  normally  expected.  He  must  look  on  the  situation 
from  the  enemy's  viewpoint  in  order  to  gain  an  insight 
into  the  enemy's  probable  course  of  action.  He  must 
never  get  into  a  situation  with  no  means  of  exit.  He 
must  remember  that  the  more  decisive  the  direction  in 
which  one  moves  the  greater  is  the  probability  of  encoun- 
tering the  enemy.  In  hostile  country  he  must  conduct 
himself  as  though  surrounded  by  legions  of  spies.  If 
pursued,  he  must  remember  that  there  is  no  pursuit  so 
enthusiastic  as  that  of  defenselessness.  He  must  keep  a 
sting  in  his  tail,  remembering  that  a  well-placed  rifle  shot 
or  two  will  considerably  dampen  the  ardor  of  pursuit. 

When  in  doubt  he  must  take  the  offensive.  An  illus- 
tration of  this  was  the  action  of  a  Prussian  lieutenant, 
von  Papen,  who,  with  his  patrol  of  15  men,  in  1870  was 
pursued  by  a  French  party  of  some  30  men.  He  found 
himself  confronted  by  a  stream.  Three  of  his  horses 
refused  to  jump.  To  avoid  having  them  captured  he 
turned,  recrossed  the  stream  and  charged  the  French 
party,  taking  them  by  surprise  and  driving  them  off  with 
loss.  The  report  of  this  event,  brought  back  to  the 
French  General,  Ladmirault,  caused  him  to  deploy  his 
whole  corps  the  next  day,  imagining  that  such  boldness 
could  only  mean  the  presence  of  large  enemy  bodies  in 
his  vicinity. 

To  have  the  enemy  arrive  on  the  scene  simultaneously 
with  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  him  is  a  situation  that 
very  often  arises.  It  is  an  indication  of  poor  perform- 
ance of  reconnaissance  duties.  . 

When  reporting  his  information,  the  sending  officer 
must  remember  that  it  is  as  difficult  to  draft  a  good 


174  MODERN  CAVALRY 

report  as  it  is  a  good  order.  Clearness  and  brevity  make 
the  soul  of  a  report.  It  must  always  be  examined  by  the 
sending  officer  in  a  detached  way  in  order  to  visualize  the 
information  from  the  receiving  officer's  viewpoint. 

Every  document  of  any  possible  value  must  be 
examined  and  sent  in.  This  applies  to  newspapers, 
notebooks,  and  practically  any  piece  of  paper  containing 
any  writing  in  the  enemy  language.  Von  Kluck,  in  his 
march  through  Belgium  with  the  First  Army,  gained  much 
valuable  information  of  the  movements  of  the  English 
army  through  scraps  of  letters  and  notebooks  and  parts 
of  orders  picked  up  on  the  roads  and  fields  and  from 
dead  and  wounded  men  and  prisoners. 

The  principle  of  successful  patrolling  is  to  survey 
ground  thoroughly  before  moving  over  it,  using  the  field 
glasses  to  cover  it  carefully.  Remember  in  using  field 
glasses  to  divide  the  area  to  be  observed  into  some  sort 
of  sectors,  systematizing  the  work  and  leaving  no  place 
uncovered.  In  positions  in  observation  have  one  man  as 
observer,  dismounted,  with  the  rest  of  the  men  and  horses 
concealed. 

Before  starting  on  a  patrol  it  is  necessary  to  fix  on  a 
few  signals.  There  should  be  one,  for  instance,  for  the 
commander  to  assemble  his  patrol,  another  to  enable  the 
commander  to  call  in  a  flanker,  another  for  flanker  to  call 
the  commander  to  observe  anything  suspicious.  It  is 
necessary  to  have  the  patrol  formation  elastic.  For  this 
reason  a  formation  in  line  is  the  best.  In  addition  to  ease 
of  control  and  to  the  greater  extent  of  terrain  covered, 
this  formation  gives  the  commander  an  ability  to  swing  a 
flank  through  a  dangerous  place  without  risking  his  entire 
patrol.  This  will  also  frustrate  enemy  attempts  at 
ambush. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  175 

One  man  must  be  kept  so  far  in  rear  that  he  can 
make  a  "get  away"  in  case  of  surprise  and  capture. 
Remember  it  is  easier  to  capture  a  nian  by  waiting  for 
him  than  by  chasing  him.  This  necessitates  an  ability  to 
see  before  being  seen.  One  principle  of  all  reconnais- 
sance is  to  discover  the  enemy  before  the  enemy  discovers 
you. 

In  making  movements  remember  that  the  regular 
recurring  movement  most  quickly  catches  the  eye, 
especially  in  imperfect  light.  A  quick  movement  of  the 
whole  force  over  exposed  ground  may  be  unobserved. 
There  is  less  danger  in  swift  movement  than  in  slow,  as 
even  if  discovered  and  fired  upon  it  disturbs  the  enemy 
and  lessens  his  aim. 

In  reporting  upon  ground  it  is  necessary  to  study  it 
from  the  viewpoint  of  higher  command.  Remember  that 
a  sketch  or  map  tells  much  more  than  a  statement. 
Strive  for  useful  maps  and  sketches  instead  of  merely 
artistic  ones. 

Attempt  must  be  made  to  gain  information  from 
inhabitants.  In  hostile  countries  great  care  must  be  used 
in  this.  In  questioning  a  civilian,  consider  the  man's 
intelligence  and  status  in  life,  find  out  his  business  and 
what  his  viewpoint  or  his  special  knowledge  might  be. 
It  is  a  safe  plan  to  avoid  hostile  inhabitants,  considering 
them  as  part  of  the  enemy  forces.  In  sending  in  infor- 
mation, .  separate  what  you  have  heard  from  what  you 
have  actually  seen. 

Everything  unusual  must  be  reported,  no  matter  how 
irreletant  it  may  seem.  Small  articles  of  enemy  equip- 
ment must  be  sent  back  for  examination.  Information 
that  will  lead  to  the  determination  of  the  state  of  the 
enemy  morale  will  be  of  value.  The  finding  of  a  great 


176  MODERN  CAVALRY 

many  articles  of  equipment  is  one  means  of  judging  the 
state  of  enemy  discipline. 

Keep  constantly  the  object  and  the  mission  in  view. 
Attempts  to  capture  prisoners,  to  fight  enemy  patrols, 
and  to  capture  trophies  must  not  interfere  with  the  main 
object,  which  is  to  gain  information.  An  example  of  poor 
patrolling  work  is  furnished  by  a  Lieutenant  Ramin  of 
the  Prussian  cavalry.  On  August  8th,  1870,  he  reported 
the  location  of  an  abandoned  enemy  camp,  but  made  no 
mention  of  the  size  of  it  nor  of  the  direction  in  which 
the  enemy  left  it ;  he  pursued  a  hostile  patrol  a  long  dis- 
tance instead  of  a  sufficient  distance  to  determine  that 
there  were  no  formed  bodies  in  the  rear  of  it  and  com- 
pletely forgot  his  mission  in  this  pursuit. 

If  a  patrol  leader  finds  important  traces  of  the  enemy 
in  a  direction  different  from  that  to  which  assigned  he 
must  split  his  patrol. 

The  enemy  is  best  observed  while  on  the  march. 
Marches  are  usually  undertaken  in  the  morning.  The 
enemy  is  usually  in  camp  or  bivouac  in  the  evening  which 
makes  the  task  more  difficult.  For  this  reason  patrols 
must  start  early.  Patrol  leaders  should  make  their  plans 
in  the  evening  for  the  following  day  if  practicable.  They 
should  study  the  map  of  their  sector  until  they  have  it 
learned  by  heart. 

Remember  the  value  of  negative  information.  If  there 
is  certain  indication  that  the  enemy  is  not  in  a  sector  to 
which  the  patrol  is  assigned  the  leader  must  continue, 
sending  back  negative  reports  meanwhile  and  must  above 
all  not  encroach  upon  territory  assigned  to  another  patrol. 

Upon  the  rencontre,  or  surprise  meeting  with  an  enemy 
patrol,  take  the  immediate  offensive,  first  being  sure  that 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  177 

the  patrol  is  not  the  point,  or  advance  party,  of  a  larger 
body.  Arrange  an  ambush  if  possible.  This  is  another 
advantage  of  seeing  the  enemy  before  being  seen.  Every 
success  of  this  nature  increases  the  moral  superiority  of 
your  own  men.  If  it  is  impossible  to  care  for  prisoners 
they  can  be  rendered  harmless  by  being  deprived  of 
horses,  arms  and  shoes. 

In  forward  movements  the  patrol  leader  must  call  the 
attention  of  men  to  road  forkings,  lookout  positions, 
and  in  general,  have  the  men  study  the  back  trail.  This 
will  facilitate  the  progress  of  messengers  returning  with 
reports.  It  is  best  to  acquaint  men  with  the  contents  of 
any  written  messages  they  carry  so  that,  when  in  danger 
of  capture,  they  can  destroy  them  and  still  report  if  they 
succeed  in  escaping. 

Do  not  send  single  horsemen  long  distances  in  hostile 
country.  In  case  of  important  information  send  a  re- 
porting patrol  of  2  or  3  men.  The  strength  of  a  patrol 
for  this  reason  should  be  based  on  the  number  of  mes- 
sages it  is  expected  to  send. 

Reconnaissance  has  not  attained  its  objective  until  the 
main  bodjes  of  the  enemy  have  been  located  and  reported 
upon.  These  reports  must  be  complete.  To  state  that 
a  "party"  of  the  enemy  was  observed  is  a  waste  of  time, 
paper  and  horse  flesh.  What  is  wanted  is  a  report  on 
the  numbers  of  the  party,  their  branch  of  the  service, 
their  tactical  significance  and  any  other  points  that  can 
be  of  value. 

In  hostile  countries  it  will  be  necessary  to  move  with 
stronger  patrols.  Instruct  your  men  that,  when  pur- 
sued, they  should  never  return  directly  to  the  hiding 
place  of  the  patrol,  thereby  disclosing  it  to  the  enemy. 


178  MODERN  CAVALRY 

If  your  patrol  is  pursued  never  lead  the  enemy  directly 
back  to  the  support.  The  wisest  plan  is  to  disperse  and 
re-form  at  some  point  previously  designated. 

In  advancing  a  man  to  investigate  a  dangerous  point 
cover  his  approach  with  the  rifles  of  the  rest  of  the  patrol. 
It  is  hard  to  hit  a  mounted  man  moving  rapidly  but  it 
would  be  especially  difficult  if  the  enemy  himself  is  being 
fired  upon.  In  approaching  hills  or  elevations  in  which 
the  enemy's  presence  is  suspected  remember  there  is  usu- 
ally "dead  ground"  at  the  base  of  the  hill.  This  is  the 
place  to  change  both  gait  and  direction.  If  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  in  concealment  is  suspected  but  he  refuses 
to  disclose  himself,  one  method  is  to  return  nonchalantly 
in  the  direction  from  whence  you  have  come  and  when 
out  of  sight  dismount,  creep  back  and  observe  with  glasses. 
This  will  very  often  result  in  finding  the  enemies'  heads 
bobbed  up. 

The  patrol  commander  should  have  rank  and  experi- 
ence sufficient  to  make  his  reports  of  some  value.  He 
must  state  all  information  in  any  way  bearing  upon  the 
strength,  arm  of  service,  intentions  and  dispositions  of 
the  enemy.  To  deduce  these  things  he  must  be  familiar 
with  military  practice  and  procedure.  The  more  knowl- 
edge that  he  has  of  the  art  of  war  the  more  valuable 
will  he  be  as  a  reconnoitering  agent. 

If  he  is  in  hostile  country  and  does  not  speak  the  lan- 
guage he  must  have  an  interpreter  with  him.  One  ad- 
vantage of  our  army  is  the  ease  with  which  it  is  possible 
to  locate  an  interpreter  amongst  the  enlisted  personnel. 

It  may  be  advisable  to  send  out  an  escort,  part  way, 
with  a  patrol,  to  establish  a  sort  of  advanced  base  or  mes- 
sage center.  This  escort  may  leave  relays  or  communica- 
tion posts  behind  it. 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  179 

Patrols  sent  out  with  a  protective  mission  to  accom- 
plish must  fight.  Purely  information  patrols  must  avoid 
combat  unless  it  is  necessary  in  carrying  out  their  mis- 
sion. Young  and  active  patrol  leaders  too  frequently  are 
spoiling  for  a  fight  to  the  extent  of  forgetting  that  the 
fight  is  only  a  means  to  the  end  and  that  their  mission 
is  to  gather  information. 

An  electric  flashlight  is  an  indispensable  portion  of  a 
patrol  leader's  equipment,  to  enable  him  to  read  and  write 
messages  at  night,  to  examine  maps,  etc. 

The  patrol  leader  must  start  out  with  the  most  complete 
grasp  possible  of  the  general  and  special  situation  to  per- 
mit him  to  act  intelligently. 

The  patrol  leader  should  see  for  himself  whenever  pos- 
sible. This  applies  to  the  cavalry  officer  in  any  situation. 

Night  Operations: 

The  patrol  at  night  should  work  dismounted.  The 
men  should  be  well  closed  up  so  as  to  be  able  instantly 
to  conform  to  the  movements  of  the  leading  man.  It 
is  desirable  to  have  oral  communication  between  all  parts 
of  the  patrol.  Signals  must  be  fixed  upon  in  advance.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  sound  is  more  audible  in  the 
silence  of  the  night  than  in  the  day  time. 

It  is  important  not  to  lose  contact  with  the  enemy  at 
night.  On  the  night  of  August  6- 7th,  1870,  von  Bredow's 
Brigade  lost  all  touch  with  the  V  French  Corps  which 
slipped  away  through  the  mountains  and  formed  a  junc- 
tion with  MacMahon's  Army.  All  touch  with  the  enemy 
on  this  flank  was  lost  for  days. 

The  service  and  practice  of  night  patrolling  is  a  very 
important  subject  of  training  for  cavalry  in  peace  time. 


180  MODERN  CAVALRY 

For  finding  the  way  across  country  at  night  study  the 
map  beforehand  and  figure  out  the  directions  of  rivers 
or  streams,  the  slope  of  the  ground  and  its  direction;* 
roads,  fences,  etc.,  are  all  helpful  in  keeping  the  direction 
or  in  checking  up  on  it. 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  give  the  horses  all  the 
rest  possible  at  night.  A  horse  is  useless  or  nearly  so 
for  night  patrolling.  Select  a  resting  place  for  the  patrol 
where  the  avenues  of  approach  can  be  guarded.  Horses 
must  be  unsaddled  and  the  unit  guarded  against  surprise. 
It  may  be  necessary  to  retire  with  the  bulk  of  the  patrol 
leaving  one  or  two  men  in  observation,  dismounted.  Their 
horses  can  be  tended  by  the  remainder  of  the  patrol  and 
brought  up  by  them  in  the  morning.  The  patrol  must 
not  retire  so  far  as  to  necessitate  a  long  march  to  recover 
the  lost  ground.  In  friendly  countries  stay  in  the  larger 
villages,  in  hostile  countries  avoid  villages. 

The  Transmission  of  Information: 

Every  means  must  be  used  to  get  information  back 
where  it  can  be  used.  Telegraph  and  telephone  lines, 
buzzer,  aeroplane-dropped  messages,  motor  cycles,  pig- 
eons, mounted  messengers,  automobiles,  wireless  and  all 
other  means  that  can  be  found  should  be  utilized. 

It  should  only  be  necessary  to  get  the  information  back 
to  the  advanced  troops.  It  must  be  cared  for  by  their 
intelligence  personnel  and  forwarded. 

Information  intended  both  for  other  troops  and  for 
higher  authority  must  be  noted  as  having  been  sent  to 
other  troops,  "copies  to.  C.O.'s  ist  and  2nd  Squadrons." 
This  will  avoid  having  higher  command  receive  several 
messages  of  the  same  import  which  might  exaggerate  the 


PATROLS  AND  SCOUTS  181 

importance  of  the  original  information.  Keep  a  record 
of  all  information  sent. 

Patrol  leaders  and  messengers  must  transmit  all  in- 
formation to  neighboring  units  and  to  all  officers  met, 
telling  them  to  whom  they  are  transmitting  the  informa- 
tion. 

The  ordinary  channels  of  information  are  from  sub- 
ordinate to  superior.  If  there  is  a  certainty  of  a  more 
rapid  transmission  than  this,  use  it,  notifying  all  inter- 
mediate commanders  of  the  information.  Give  informa- 
tion ro  the  first  fresh  troops  met  "for  transmission." 
The  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  receiving  it  im- 
mediately becomes  responsible  for  its  proper  transmis- 
sion. The  task  of  the  messenger  is  not  finished  until  he 
has  checked  its  final  arrival. 

Urgent  information  should  be  sent  immediately  to 
higher  command.  This  should  not  be  done  unless  ab- 
solutely necessary  and  then  should  be  followed  by  trans- 
mitting it  through  the  customary  channels. 

Reports  must  be  carefully  made,  separating  opinions 
from  facts.  They  should  be  condensed  and  brief  to 
facilitate  their  transmission  by  wire  or  wireless.  The 
number  of  the  report  should  in  all  cases  be  noted  thereon 
as  well  as  the  place,  date  and  time,  and  name  or  designa- 
tion of  the  sending  detachment. 

It  is  important  that  the  statements  of  inhabitants  are 
not  sent  back  as  facts.  The  information  coming  from 
untrained  observers  should  be  accepted  with  caution. 

In  sending  important  information  when  there  is  no  other 
means  than  mounted  messengers  send  it  by  several  men, 
preferably  taking  different  routes. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY 

British  Cavalry: 

The  British  cavalry  operating  in  Palestine  consisted  of 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  forces  and  of  British  Yeo- 
manry. The  Australian  and  New  Zealand  forces  were, 
properly  speaking,  at  the  commencement  of  the  opera- 
tions, mounted  infantry.  They  were  armed  with  the  rifle 
and  bayonet.  The  Australian  Light  Horse  Division  was 
afterwards  armed  with  the  sword  and  instructed  in  its 
use.  The  tendency  of  these  Colonial  troops  was  to  de- 
velop more  into  cavalry  as  time  went  on. 

The  British  Yeomanry  was  armed  and  equipped  like 
the  British  regular  cavalry.  The  Yeomanry  corresponds 
somewhat  to  our  National  Guard. 

The  British  b'rigades  consisted  generally  of  three  regi- 
ments, of  three  squadrons  each ;  the  squadron  was  divided 
into  four  troops  of  some  twenty-four  men  each.  This 
makes  a  British  squadron  slightly  larger  than  one  of  our 
troops,  their  regiment  slightly  larger  than  one  of  our 
four-troop  squadrons  with  corresponding  differences  up 
to  and  including  the  division. 

Mounted  Attack  Formations 

At  the  beginning  of  operations  the  Colonial  troops 
charged  with  the  rifle  on  the  back  and  the  bayonet  held 

182 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         183 

in  the  hand  on  several  occasions.  As  noted  above  a 
large  proportion  of  them  were  later  armed  with  the 
sword.  This  was  by  their  own  unanimous  request.  The 
Colonial  troops  had  the  single  rank  formation. 

The  Yeomanry  troops  attacked  with  the  sword.  They 
had  the  double  rank  formation.  The  mounted  attack 
was  usually  made  with  two  squadrons  of  the  regiment 
in  the  first  line  and  the  third  squadron  in  the  second 
line.  The  same  formation  was  adopted  in  the  brigade, 
the  attack  being  made  with  two  regiments  in  the  first 
and  one  in  the  second  line. 

Dismounted  Attack  Formations 

The  attack,  dismounted,  was  made  by  the  squadron 
in  four  lines.  With  the  Australians  and  New  Zealanders 
each  line  consisted  of  one  troop,  with  the  troop  leader 
and  an  automatic  weapon  in  the  center  of  each  line. 
In  the  Yeomanry  the  attack  was  also  made  in  four  lines 
but  the  troops  had  extension  in  depth,  the  first  and  sec- 
ond troops  taking  the  right  and  left  halves  respectively 
of  the  first  and  second  lines,  with  the  third  and  fourth 
troops  taking  the  right  and  left  halves  respectively  of  the 
third  and  fourth  lines.  In  both  cases,  the  squadron  com- 
mander took  his  place  in  the  third  or  fourth  line. 

Each  troop  had  from  18  to  20  men  in  line.  There 
was  very  little  signalling  after  the  action  started,  the 
main  dependence  being  placed  on  the  cooperation  of  all 
leaders  in  the  carrying  out  of  the  instructions  received 
before  the  commencement  of  the  action. 

The  advance  by  rushes  was  not  considered  of  any 
value.  The  advance  was  made  at  a  walk,  moving  rapidly 
on  the  objective,  the  men  neither  halting  nor  lying  down 
unless  forced  to  do  so  by  excessive  losses.  They  closed 


184  MODERN  CAVALRY 

tip  on  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet.  (All  mounted  troops 
in  the  Palestine  campaign  were  armed  with  the  bayonet.) 

The  majority  of  the  attacks  were  made  after  good  prep- 
aration by  rifle,  machine  gun  and  artillery  fire.  At- 
tacks were  organized  in  depth  with  as  few  men  as  pos- 
sible attacking  directly. 

Great  stress  was  laid  upon  personal  reconnaissance 
before  entering  the  attack.  The  brigade  commander,  with 
his  three  regimental  and  his  machine  gun  and  artillery 
commanders,  would  make  a  careful  reconnaissance.  The 
troops  were  kept  under  cover  until  all  plans  had  been 
made  and  orders  issued.  The  second  in  command  of 
the  brigade  brought  the  troops  forward  on  the  comple- 
tion of  this  preliminary  survey.  The  success  of  the 
operations  was,  as  a  whole,  due  to  the  care  with  which 
this  preliminary  reconnaisance  was  made.  This  was 
followed  by  care  in  the  issuing  of  orders  and  instruc- 
tions to  the  subordinate  commanders. 

Led  horses  were  cared  for  in  a  manner  very  similar 
to  ours.  They  were  seldom  immobilized,  however, 
(coupled  or  circled),  owing  to  the  danger  from  aerial 
bombing  or  machine  gun  attacks. 

The  Proposed  British  Cavalry  Division 

The  trend  of  thought  in  British  cavalry  circles  can  be 
seen  from  the  recommendations  of  a  recent  board  of 
general  officers  convened  by  the  British  War  Office  to 
make  recommendations  for  the  future  organization  of 
the  cavalry  division. 

These  recommendations  specifically  left  out  of  consid- 
eration any  possibilities  of  trench  warfare.  It  was  stated 
that  special  equipment  for  this  possibility  was  considered 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         185 

wasteful,  believing  that  any  need  for  this  type  of  equip- 
ment could  be  met  by  higher  authority  at  the  time  the 
need  arose. 

They  recommended  that  mixed  brigades  be  done  away 
with  and  that  the  cavalry  brigade  contain  nothing  but 
cavalry,  the  auxiliaries  being  kept  under  control  of  the 
division.  It  was  noted  that  the  highest  degree  of  co- 
operation was  necessary  between  the  cavalry  and  these 
auxiliaries  but  that  this  cooperation  could  best  be  se- 
cured directly  under  the  division  commander.  Special 
needs  or  detached  service  on  the  part  of  any  of  the 
brigades  or  regiments  could  be  met  by  the  assignment 
of  the  necessary  auxiliaries  when  the  occasion  arose. 

It  was  recommended  that  the  division  of  three  brigades 
be  adopted  because  four  brigades  would  be  unwieldy 
and  two  would  not  be  convenient  tactically.  For  similar 
reasons  the  brigade  should  be  composed  of  three  regi- 
ments. 

The  Cavalry  Regiment 

The  underlying  idea  in  the  organization  and  strength 
of  the  regiment  is  the  idea  of  having  a  unit  that  can 
easily  be  controlled  by  one  man,  the  regimental  com- 
mander. It  was  recommended  that  it  consist  of  three 
large  squadrons,  each  of  five  troops,  one  of  which  would 
be  a  Hotchkiss  Gun  Troop.  This  would  distribute  the 
Hotchkiss  guns  in  the  most  satisfactory  manner  and 
would  still  leave  the  other  portions  free  and  available 
for  mounted  or  dismounted  work. 

The  personnel  allotted  to  regimental  headquarters 
should  be  organized  as  a  squadron. 

The  number  of  Hotchkiss  guns  allotted  to  the  regiment 


186  MODERN  CAVALRY 

should  be  14,  at  the  rate  of  2  per  headquarters  squadron 
and  4  per  fighting  squadron. 

A  troop  (righting)  would  consist  of  24  rank  and  file. 
The  regimental  total  would  then  be  570  of  all  ranks  in 
round  numbers.  Personnel  required  for  signalling  should 
form  an  integral  part  of  the  regiment.  Stores  required 
for  demolitions  should  not  be  part  of  the  equipment  of 
the  regiment  as  this  work  should  be  left  to  the  engineers. 
The  discarding  of  the  horse  bandolier  for  the  carrying 
of  extra  ammunition  was  recommended. 

Artillery  with  the  Cavalry  Division 

The  main  consideration  is  to  have  guns  that  can  keep 
pace  with  the  cavalry.  The  British  i8-pounder  is  con- 
sidered too  heavy  for  this  purpose;  the  I3~pounder, 
or  even  a  lighter  gun,  is  considered  more  suitable. 

It  is  necessary  to  add  a  proportion  of  howitzers,  this 
to  overcome  the  opposition  of  enemy  detachments  in 
places  where  they  cannot  be  reached  by  the  flat  trajec- 
toried  field  guns.  The  artillery  for  the  division  should 
consist  of  a  headquarters,  three  6-gun  13-pounder  bat- 
teries, and  one  6-gun  4.5  in.  howitzer  battery  together 
with  an  ammunition  column. 

The  ammunition  column  should  be  so  organized  as  to 
provide  three  light  sections  carrying  13  pdr.  ammunition 
and  a  proportion  of  small  arms  ammunition.  A  howitzer 
section  and  a  heavy  section  of  G.  S.  wagons  also  carry- 
ing 13  pdr.  ammunition  are  also  assigned.  Batteries 
with  a  suitable  proportion  of  the  ammunition  column 
could  be  attached  to  brigades  when  needed.  Each  bat- 
tery should  be  equipped  with  two  Hotchkiss  guns.  A 
light  car  should  be  added  for  the  artillery  commander 
of  the  division. 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         187 

Machine  Guns  with  the  Cavalry  Division 

While  it  is  necessary  to  have  the  closest  connection  with 
the  machine  guns  and  the  cavalry  it  is  felt  that  this  is 
best  attained  by  keeping  the  former  under  the  direction 
of  the  division,  detaching  them  when  occasion  requires 
with  detached  units.  They  should  be  organized  into  three 
self-contained  squadrons,  capable  of  being  attached  each 
to  a  brigade  when  necessary. 

Each  squadron  should  have  twelve  guns,  which  is 
considered  the  largest  number  that  can  be  efficiently 
handled  by  one  commander.  Each  squadron  should  be 
organized  into  three  troops  of  four  guns  each.  Each 
troop  would  be  divided  into  two  subsections. 

In  the  event  that  machine  guns  capable  of  firing  armor 
piercing  bullets  are  adopted,  it  is  recommended  that  they 
be  attached  to  the  cavalry  division  in  suitable  numbers. 
These  should  be  attached  to  the  machine  guns  of  the 
squadron  and  included  in  the  allotment. 

Motor  machine  guns  and  armored  car  units  should  not 
be  included  in  the  cavalry  division  but  should  be  attached 
to  it  when  necessary, 

The  French  Cavalry: 

Organisation 

The  French  cavalry  platoon  consists  of  three  squads 
which  are  each  composed  of  ten  men  and  a  corporal. 
It  is  commanded  by  a  first  or  second  lieutenant,  who 
has  two  non-commissioned  or  sous-ofliciers  called  marechal 
des  logis. 

The  squadron  is  composed  of  four  platoons  and  is 
commanded  by  a  captain.  Its  strength  is  actually  about 
no  men. 


188  MODERN  CAVALRY 

The  regiment  consists  of  four  squadrons,  a  machine 
gun  section  of  four  guns,  and  a  supply  section,  both 
commanded  by  officers.  The  regiment  is  commanded  by 
a  colonel.  The  major  of  cavalry  commands  one  or  more 
squadrons.  His  position  corresponds  somewhat  to  that 
of  our  lieutenant-colonel.  The  cavalry  brigade  consists 
of  two  regiments,  commanded  by  a  brigadier  general. 
The  regimental  officers  have  all  been  through  the  ranks 
for  at  least  a  year's  service  and  then  have  all  been  grad- 
uated from  the  Cavalry  School  at  Saumur. 

The  Non-Commissioned  Officer 

The  French  non-commissioned  officers  are  much  more 
thoroughly  trained  and  have  more  responsibility  and  au- 
thority than  ours. 

To  qualify  for  the  position  of  corporal  (Brigadier) 
the  soldier  must  have  served  at  least  four  months  with 
the  squadron.  He  is  examined  in  both  theoretical  and 
practical  subjects  by  his  officers.  These  subjects  consist 
of  tests  in  horsemanship,  use  of  arms,  both  mounted  and 
dismounted,  and  an  oral  test  in  cavalry  drill  regulations. 
To  be  a  sergeant  of  cavalry  (marechal  des  logis)  the 
corporal  must  have  served  at  least  six  months  in  his 
rank.  The  examination  is  along  the  same  lines  as  the 
examination  for  corporal  but  is  more  advanced. 

After  two  years'  service  as  marechal  des  logis  he  may 
make  application  for  written  examination  for  entrance  to 
the  Cavalry  School  at  Saumur.  These  examinations  are 
very  difficult,  including  both  theoretical  and  practical 
subjects.  Assistance  to  men  wishing  to  prepare  for  this 
is  furnished  by  the  officers  who  conduct  classes  in  the 
regiment.  If  successful  in  this  examination  the  sergeant 
attends  the  school  for  one  year.  While  there  he  holds  the 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         189 

rank  of  aspirant.  Upon  successful  completion  of  this 
course  the  aspirant  is  commissioned  as  a  second  lieutenant 
and  assigned  to  a  regiment.  If  unsuccessful  he  is  re- 
turned to  the  regiment  from  which  appointed,  with  the 
rank  of  marechal  des  logis. 

Automatic  Rifles 

There  are  six  automatic  rifles  (the  Chauchat)  carried 
in  each  squadron.  Two  of  these  are  carried  in  the  first 
and  fourth  platoons,  respectively,  and  one  each  in  the 
second  and  third.  The  gun  crew  consists  of  a  corporal 
and  three  privates,  one  as  loader,  one  as  carrier,  and  one 
to  lead  the  gun  horse.  The  corporal  fires  the  gun.  All 
automatic  rifle  instruction  in  the  regiment  is  carried  on 
under  the  supervision  of  one  officer.  The  average  rate 
of  fire  developed  is  said  not  to  be  more  than  from  20 
to  30  shots  a  minute  per  gun  owing  to  the  frequent 
stoppages. 

Some  Tactical  Principles  of  the  French  Cavalry 

The  tactical  principles  that  guide  the  French  cavalry 
are  substantially  those  of  the  Regufations  of  May,  1918. 
They  state  that  rapidity,  mobility  and  capacity  for 
maneuver  are  the  first  requisites  for  cavalry  as  long  as 
there  exists  opportunity  for  march  and  maneuver. 
Cavalry  must  fight.  These  fights  will,  in  the  majority  of 
cases,  take  place  on  foot.  Cavalry  tactics,  therefore,  must 
conform  to  the  modern  development  of  fire  power.  The 
cavalry  must  be  able  to  fight  on  foot  unaided,  except  for 
the  artillery. 

The  mounted  fight,  however,  must  not  be  lost  sight  of. 
Training  must  be  had  in  preparation  for  this.  Opportuni- 
ties for  the  mounted  fight  will  occur  when  operating 


190  MODERN  CAVALRY 

against  cavalry,  in  making  or  receiving  a  charge,  against 
shaken  or  surprised  infantry  in  open  warfare,  against 
artillery  in  column  of  route,  and  against  the  flanks  and 
rear  of  artillery. 

Cavalry  is  an  arm  easy  to  expend  and  difficult  to  re- 
place. It  must  not,  therefore,  be  sacrificed  under  circum- 
stances that  do  not  allow  the  use  of  its  special  charac- 
teristics. 

Cavalry  dismounted  formations  must  conform  to  their 
equivalents  in  the  infantry;  the  cavalry  regiment  for 
example,  when  dismounted,  should  correspond  to  and 
have  equal  strength  with  two  infantry  companies. 

The  mobility  of  cavalry  must  be  taken  advantage  of 
even  when  in  the  dismounted  fight,  and  attempts  must 
be  made  upon  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear.  When  the 
enemy  stands  firm  he  must  be  held  by  fire  while  the 
mounted  portion  of  the  command  advances  against  him. 
The  cavalry  command  is  divided  into  three  parts — ist 
the  dismounted  portion,  2nd  the  led  horses  and  combat 
equipment,  3rd  the  mounted  reserve  which  can  be  as 
large  as  one-fourth  of  the  whole. 

The  mounted  reserve  protects  the  flanks.  It  takes 
fullest  advantage  of  success  by  throwing  elements  into 
the  fire  fight  against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy. 
It  pursues  the  retreating  enemy  and  protects  the  mount- 
ing of  the  dismounted  men.  It  is  charged  also  with 
maintaining  communication  with  the  neighboring  units. 

The  corps  and  divisional  cavalry  ensures  success  in 
the  offensive  battle,  the  army  cavalry  exploits  success.  In 
the  defense  the  cavalry  can  limit  and  localize  the  effect 
of  the  enemy's  breaking  through  any  portion  of  the  line. 

Cavalry  must  make  charges  against  the  retreating  in- 
fantry and  artillery.  It  must  rapidly  enlarge  points  of 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         191 

irruption  by  the  leading  forward  of  fire  units  and  the 
use  of  the  automatic  weapons  against  the  flanks  of  the 
unbroken  portion  of  the  enemy  forces. 

The  general  rule  for  the  frontal  attack  of  dismounted 
cavalry  units,  is,  that  they  shall  attack  in  conjunction  with 
army  units  carrying  many  machine  guns.  These  troops 
must  turn  against  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear.  In  de- 
fense the  dismounted  cavalry  units  must  protect  the  ad- 
vance of  reserves  and  must  hold  important  points  on  the 
line  of  a  possible  retreat. 

The  army  cavalry  has  to  undertake  the  duties  of  ex- 
ploiting success,  magnifying  the  effect  of  surprises  and 
the  protection  of  the  movements  of  the  army.  Rapidity, 
mobility  and  its  holding  power  give  the  army  cavalry 
opportunity  to  solve  tasks  which  it  is  impossible  for 
the  infantry  division  to  solve  with  the  same  speed  and 
the  corps  or  divisional  cavalry  with  the  same  power. 
These  tasks  are  the  threatening  of  the  enemy's  rear,  at- 
tacks against  those  portions  of  the  enemy's  line  which 
stand  firm,  reconnaissance  and  attack  against  advancing 
reinforcements  and  against  rear-guard  positions,  preven- 
tion of  the  enemy's  attempts  to  face  again  to  the  front, 
the  holding  of  positions  until  the  appearance  of  the  in- 
fantry, the  accomplishment  of  important  demolitions  and 
the  capture  or  destruction  of  the  enemy's  provision  and 
ammunition  supplies. 

It  will  be  necessary  to  assign  with  the  cavalry  such 
auxiliaries  as  aeroplanes,  light  tanks,  artillery,  infantry 
and  labor  units  as  well  as  enhanced  communication 
facilities. 

Cavalry  is  warned  again  and  again  not  to  become  in- 
volved in  extensive  frontal  attacks.  It  must  use  its 
mobility  in  turning  against  the  enemy's  flanks  or  rear 


192  MODERN   CAVALRY 

with  fire,  at  the  same  time  keeping  the  march  or  attack 
direction.  It  is  above  all  necessary  to  keep  higher  leader- 
ship fully  informed  at  all  times. 

Belgian  Cavalry: 

The  Provisional  Instructions  of  May,  1920,  for  the 
Belgian  cavalry  prescribed  that  tactics  for  small  groups  of 
cavalry  should  be  based  upon  the  cooperation  of  small 
combat  groups.  It  provides  that  each  combat  group 
should  consist  of  an  automatic  gunner,  with  his  weapon, 
ammunition  bearers  and  riflemen. 

The  combat  group,  which  is  a  section  (half  a  platoon) 
is,  according  to  the  regulations,  an  element  in  either  at- 
tack or  defense.  In  the  defense,  the  automatic  rifle  is 
used  in  cross-fire ;  it  serves  to  defend  the  neighboring 
groups  echeloned  near  it,  the  defense  of  the  group  itself 
being  in  the  hands  of  its  riflemen.  These  groups,  whether 
in  attack  or  defense,  are  echeloned.  All  idea  of  dis- 
mounted attack  in  line  of  skirmishers  is  abolished. 

Organisation 

The  section,  which  is  the  combat  group,  consists  at  war 
strength  of  u  men.  The  platoon,  which  consists  of  two 
sections,  has  been  adjudged  too  vulnerable  and  too  cum- 
bersome for  maneuver  under  ordinary  conditions  of 
combat.  The  1 1  men  are  divided  into  i  non-commissioned 
officer,  3  ammunition  bearers,  I  horseholder,  and  6  rifle- 
men. The  latter  are,  in  addition,  all  armed  with  hand 
grenades. 

The  platoon  consists  of  32  men  at  war  strength.  Of 
these  22  compose  the  two  sections  or  combat  groups. 
The  remaining  men  are  i  non-commissioned  officer,  horse- 
holders,  a  trumpeter,  horseshoer,  etc.  The  trumpeter  is 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         193 

at  the  disposal  of  the  platoon  commander.  Horseholders 
are  always  Nos.  3  in  sets  of  fours.  The  mounted  forma- 
tion is  so  arranged  that  they  shall  always  be  either  super- 
numeraries or  specialists  such  as  horseshoers,  farriers, 
saddlers,  etc.  They  are  not  armed  with  the  rifle. 

The  regiment  on  a  war  footing  consists  of  two  groups, 
each  consisting  of  two  squadrons  and  a  machine  gun 
squadron.  The  brigade  on  a  war  footing  consists  of 
two  regiments  and  an  extra  machine  gun  squadron. 

The  horse  artillery  group,  of  which  there  is  but  one 
in  the  Belgian  army  at  present,  consists  of  three  batteries 
of  four  guns  each  armed  with  the  75  mm.  T.  R.  Krupp. 

The  Belgian  cavalry  is  armed  with  three  types  of 
automatic  weapons  and  machine  guns,  the  Chauchat  for 
the  automatic  rifle,  the  Hotchkiss,  a  light  machine  gun, 
and  the  Colt,  which  is  the  armament  of  the  machine  gun 
squadrons  proper.  The  first  two  are  the  weapons  of 
the  combat  groups. 

Some  Tactical  Principles  of  the  Belgian  Cavalry 

It  is  held  that  the  platoon  mounted  cannot  approach 
nearer  to  the  enemy  than  2,000  meters.  Platoons,  dis- 
mounted, advance  in  combat  groups  of  two  echelons  at 
distances  of  50  meters  and  intervals  of  40  meters.  They 
are  preceded  by  patrols  at  distances  of  from  100  to  200 
meters.  This  formation  is  said  to  be  based  upon  war 
experience  which  showed  the  necessity  for  attacks  in 
depth.  The  advance  of  the  reserve  waves  is  made  in  or- 
dinary line  of  platoon  columns,  single  file,  echeloned  at 
100  meters  distance  and  50  meters  interval. 

Great  stress  is  laid  upon  the  necessity  of  carefully  in- 
structing officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  especially 
the  latter,  in  the  mechanism  of  the  combat  group  work, 


194  MODERN  CAVALRY 

and  the  necessity  of  forgetting  the  old  line  of  skirmishers. 

The  cavalry  attack,  dismounted,  must  always  be  made 
in  two  echelons.  In  compliance  with  this,  the  squadron 
may  be  made  to  attack  with  two  platoons  grouped, 
forming  the  .first  two  echelons,  a  third  platoon  forming 
the  third  echelon  and  the  fourth  platoon,  according  to 
circumstances,  acting  as  either  the  mounted  reserve,  a 
reinforcement  for  the  firing  line,  as  liaison  agents  or 
simply  as  horseholders.  When  the  regiment  operates  as 
a  whole,  the  reserve  echelon  becomes  the  regimental  re- 
serve which  would  consist  of  an  entire  squadron.  This 
is  to  avoid  a  series  of  small  local  reserve  units  too  widely 
scattered  to  be  effective. 

Freedom  of  maneuver  and  the  maximum  of  mobility 
are  the  governing  rules  for  cavalry  operations.  The 
disposition  to  resort  to  dismounted  action  too  soon  must 
be  guarded  against.  This  would  operate  to  sacrifice  the 
very  essence  of  cavalry  as  cavalry,  reducing  it  to  the 
role  of  a  mere  mounted  infantry.  The  advance,  mounted, 
should  be  made  as  far  forward  as  is  possible  and  the 
dismounted  attack  only  undertaken  when  further  mounted 
maneuver  becomes  impossible. 

Horse  Artillery  and  Cavalry 

The  cardinal  rule  for  the  guns  with  cavalry  is  to  fire 
on  sight.  The  cavalry  action  should  be  started  with  artil- 
lery and  this  fire  should  not  cease.  The  great  fault  is  not 
to  employ  artillery  enough.  Horse  artillery  should  be 
prepared  to  take  up  positions  more  rapidly  than  field 
artillery  and  the  artillery  commander  should  be  given  a 
free  hand  in  his  choice  of  positions  for  his  guns.  In  these 
days  of  long  range  guns,  the  position  of  the  batteries  is 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY          195 

of  no  interest  to  the  cavalry  commander  as  long  as  the 
artillery  can  carry  out  the  mission  assigned  to  them. 

German  Cavalry: 

There  are  no  official  German  dictums  upon  cavalry 
available  as  yet  but  the  trend  of  thought  in  German 
military  circles  can  be  judged  from  the  many  publica- 
tions upon  the  subject  printed  since  the  war.  Balk, 
especially,  has  written  an  exhaustive  essay  upon  the  sub- 
ject, which  essay  has  been  translated  and  is  condensed 
into  some  of  the  following  notes.1 

The  German  General  Staff  concluded,  as  a  result  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  and  the  patent  inferiority  dis- 
played by  the  cavalry  on  both  sides,  that  only  a  first  class, 
highly  trained  cavalry  would  be  of  any  value  in  modern 
war. 

In  line  with  this,  the  German  cavalry  was  supplied 
with  good  mounts  and  armament.  The  mounts  are 
criticized  by  Balk  as  not  being  of  sufficient  hardiness  to 
stand  the  rigors  of  campaigning  without  shelter.  The 
armament  was  also  criticized  by  him,  the  tubular  steel 
lance  and  carbine  being  considered  excellent  but  the  am- 
munition supply  (45  rounds  per  man)  being  considered 
insufficient.  The  thrusting  sabre,  carried  on  the  saddle, 
he  does  not  consider  of  any  proved  value  as  compared 
to  the  lance.  (It  has  since  been  discarded  in  the  new 
German  Army  and  the  lance  retained  as  the  "arme 
blanche".) 

As  a  result  of  the  world  war,  charges  by  regiment 

1  "Entwickelung  der  Taktik  im  Weltkrieg,"  Balk,  Chapter  X, 
pages  240-258  inclusive. 


196  MODERN  CAVALRY 

and  brigade  are  still  considered  possible  but  the  charge 
by  division  is  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  Germans  felt 
that  their  armament  with  the  lance  gave  them  decided 
superiority  over  the  Allied  cavalry  and  feel  that  their 
cavalry  had  the  superior  morale  throughout.  They  com- 
plain of  a  too  rapid  deterioration  of  horseflesh  and  of  the 
sacrificing  of  cavalry  units  by  ill-advised  mounted  at- 
tacks. It  is  also  stated  that  there  were  many  opportunities 
for  the  mounted  attack  which  were  not  taken  advantage 
of. 

The  use  of  cavalry  in  the  battle  field  is  considered  to 
be  more  difficult  than  it  has  been  in  the  past  but  they 
concluded  that  as  long  as  the  human  factor  is  what  it  is, 
there  are  still  many  opportunities  to  use  cavalry  mounted 
in  battle. 

"There  are  many  charges  against  artillery  which  have 
a  strong  probability  of  success,  for  instance  mounted  at- 
tacks against  batteries  on  the  march,  surprise  attacks 
against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  firing  batteries,  against  the 
front  of  masked  batteries,  and  against  artillery  unsup- 
ported by  infantry.  It  can  often  be  extremely  important 
to  silence  a  battery  if  only  for  a  few  minutes.  Ammuni- 
tion columns  are  extremely  vulnerable  to  mounted  attack." 

Shaken  and  surprised  infantry  are  considered  vulner- 
able to  the  cavalry  attack.  "Weapons  be  they  ever  so 
powerful  are  only  so  in  the  hands  of  men." 

It  is  held  that  the  cavalry  of  today  must  be  able  to 
fight  mounted  as  well  as  dismounted  and  that  cavalry 
must  not  be  degraded  to  the  role  of  mere  mounted  in- 
fantry. Many  examples  are  cited  of  the  decisive  effect 
of  even  the  appearance  of  cavalry  in  the  world  war, 
especially  on  the  Eastern  Front. 

It  is  concluded  that  the  charge  is  not  the  sum  of  all 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         197 

cavalry  tactics.  Dismounted  action  is  the  most  important 
phase  of  cavalry  duty.  In  dismounted  work,  cavalry 
must  be  independent  of  other  arms  and  work  without 
assistance.  The  increased  assignment  of  fire  weapons  to, 
cavalry  has  raised  the  value  of  that  branch.  Cavalry 
must  rapidly  drive  forward  its  strong  fire  power  against 
the  enemy's  flanks,  and  other  weak  points. 

Enterprises  against  the  enemy's  line  of  communications 
are  of  much  more  value  than  formerly,  owing  to  the  in- 
creased dependence  placed  by  an  army  on  its  provisions 
and  munitions  from  the  rear. 

Army  tasks  require  a  stronger  cavalry.  Divisional 
cavalry  can  be  weakened  or  replaced  by  cyclists.  The 
army  cavalry  reconnoiters  in  combination  with  air-craft, 
covers  the  movements  of  the  army  and  insures  the  com- 
munications between  separate  parts.  On  the  encounter 
of  the  armies,  cavalry  must  make  itself  useful  against  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  against  important  railway 
centers,  must  block  the  enemy's  rear  guard  and  must 
prevent  the  arrival  of  enemy  reinforcements. 

Air  reconnaissance  completes  cavalry  reconnaissance 
when  not  made  impossible  by  hazy,  or  unfavorable 
weather.  It  also  gives  the  general  direction  to  cavalry 
reconnaissance.  The  principles  already  developed  in 
peace  time  by  study  of  previous  wars  on  all  types  of 
reconnaissance,  near,  distant  and  battle,  have  been  proved 
sound.  The  Germans  admit,  however,  that  they  used 
patrols  of  inferior  strength  and  that  they  were  too  con- 
fident when  operating  against  the  Russian  cavalry. 

It  is  stated  that  the  armament  with  the  lance  gave  their 
patrols  great  superiority.  It  is  recommended  that  wire- 
less units  be  attached  to  the  reconnoitering  squadron. 
Patrols  should  always  be  well  supported  by  these  squad- 


198  MODERN  CAVALRY 

rons.  The  contact  squadron  must  have  good  fighting 
power  in  order  to  break  through  enemy  resistance. 

Many  examples  are  cited  of  successful  screening  move- 
ments and  this  type  of  cavalry  work  is  considered  of  in- 
creased value. 

Cavalry  is  considered  of  great  value  as  a  decisive  in- 
tervening force  in  battle  with  fire  power.  It  can  come 
in  swiftly  with  all  parts  intact  and  its  effect  will  be 
decisive. 

The  fire  power  of  cavalry  must  be  increased  by  the 
assignment  of  a  larger  proportion  of  automatics.  This, 
not  only  to  make  up  for  the  loss  in  horseflesh  (it  is  stated 
that  in  Courland  in  1916  the  squadrons  of  the  6th  Cavalry 
Division  could  only  put  from  twenty  to  thirty  carbines 
per  squadron  on  the  firing  line  owing  to  losses  in  horse- 
flesh), but  to  make  up  for  the  men  absent  with  the  led 
horses.  Every  cavalryman  must  be  more  than  an  average 
good  rifleman. 

The  Germans  recommend  the  assignment  of  Jaeger 
battalions  to  the  cavalry  division  to  augment  its  power. 
They  recommend  that  men  dismounted  for  any  cause  be 
supplied  with  bicycles  and  thus  enabled  to  follow  the 
command  as  a  cyclist  detachment.  They  state  that  this 
was  successfully  done  in  the  Italian  army. 

It  is  stated  that  the  absence  of  howitzers  and  of  long 
range  field  guns  with  the  cavalry  was  very  often  felt. 
They  recommend  that  not  too  many  calibres  be  carried 
with  the  cavalry  division  as  it  tends  to  confusion  in  am- 
munition supply  and  is  too  cumbersome. 

For  the  cavalry  division  they  recommend  the  attach- 
ment of  one  company  of  mounted  engineers  supplied, 
amongst  other  things,  with  demolition  materials.  As  al- 
ready remarked,  it  is  considered  indispensable  to  have  the 


NOTES  ON  FOREIGN  CAVALRY         199 

reconnoitering  squadrons  equipped  with  light  wireless  sets, 
but  the  regiments,  brigades  and  divisions  should  have 
the  heavier  sets.  There  should  be  a  signal  detachment  in 
each  regiment  to  handle  this. 

The  Germans  unite  on  the  efficacy  of  cyclist  units  at- 
tached to  the  cavalry.  They  state  that  these  were  not 
of  such  great  value  on  the  Russian  as  they  were  on  the 
Western  front.  They  unite  on  the  necessity  of  increased 
artillery  with  the  cavalry  and  increased  cooperation  of 
the  two  arms. 


In  studying  the  French,  Belgian  and  German  cavalries, 
the  fact  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  they  look  upon  a 
warfare  of  position  as  the  most  probable  form  for  the 
next  war  in  which  they  are  likely  to  be  engaged.  This, 
of  course,  is  based  upon  the  geographical  and  political 
situation  in  each  case.  For  this  reason  the  British  cavalry 
is  a  more  valuable  study  for  us  than  the  others  mentioned. 
It  is  taking  into  consideration  the  necessity  of  all  types  of 
warfare  on  widely  separated  places  on  the  earth's  surface. 
It  also  considers  the  warfare  of  position  as  the  exception 
rather  than  the  rule, 


INDEX 


Abu  Shushesh,  30 

administration,  63 

advance  guard,  120;  resisting 
power  of,  121 ;  as  holding 
force,  120,  121 

advantages,  cavalry  over  in- 
fantry, 108,  109 

aeroplanes,  75 ;  lack  of  con- 
tinuity of  observation,  152, 
156;  limitations,  152,  157; 
inability  to  hold  ground, 
156;  weather  conditions 
affecting,  152,  154;  see 
"air  service"  also 

Agesilaus,  27 

air-control,  danger  of  loss  of, 
152,  153 

air  forces,  Turkish,  153; 
Turco-German,  153 

air  service  and  cavalry,  151 
to  159 

air  service  and  cavalry,  coop- 
eration, 76,  157,  158 

Aisne,  Battle  of  the,  140 

Alexander  the  Great,  106 

Allenby,  Field  Marshal,  3,  8, 
75,  105,  123,  125,  126,  128, 

139,  159 

Alvensleben,  Colonel  von,  132 
American  Civil  War,  7 
American  theory  as  to  cavalry, 

8 
Am  Kohleh,  138 


Amman,  134 

ammunition,  carrying  of,  no; 
check  on,  144;  column, 
British  cavalry  division, 
186;  supply,  116,  198 

anti-aircraft  defense,  87;  pos- 
sibilities of,  152,  154 

Anzac  Mounted  Division,  139 

armament,  cavalry,  British, 
182 

armament,     cavalry,     German, 

195 

arme  blanche,  94 

Armored  Car  Battery  at  El 
Afule,  122 

armored  cars,  see  "cars,  ar- 
mored" 

army,  British,  60,  125,  126 

army,  national  characteristics 
expressed  by,  32 

army,  Russian,  135 

Armies,  Turkish  4th,  7th  and 
8th,  28,  29,  153 

art  of  war,  6 

artillery,  75;  attack  against, 
99,  100,  196;  in  pursuit, 
131,  132;  mounted  attack 
with,  98;  with  British  cav- 
alry division,  186 

artillery  horse,  aids  cavalry 
mobility,  79;  Belgian,  193, 
194,  195 ;  cooperation  with, 
76,  77,  78;  equipment,  81 ; 


201 


202 


INDEX 


in  rear  guard  and  pursuit, 

82 

Ashby,  164 
aspirant,  189 
assembly    in    case   of    reverse, 

143 

attack,  frontal,  115,  116; 
cavalry  object,  94;  dis- 
mounted, 196,  197;  mount- 
ed against  artillery,  196; 
mounted  against  infantry, 
196;  mounted,  German 
opinion  of,  195,  196; 
mounted,  importance  of, 
89;  mounted,  entitled  to 
support,  91 ;  mounted, 
needs  support  of  artillery, 
80;  mounted,  moral  ef- 
fect, 89,  90,  94,  95,  TOO; 
mounted,  risk  involved, 
99;  mounted,  against  cav- 
alry, 98;  mounted,  factors 
in,  97;  mounted,  training 
for,  96;  mounted,  size  of 
units  involved,  99,  100; 
mounted  in  World  War, 
101  to  105 ;  mounted,  see 
"charge"  also ;  formations, 
dismounted  British,  183, 
184;  formations,  mounted 
British,  183 

Australian  Light  Horse,  138; 
Third  Brigade,  102,  146; 
Fourth  Brigade,  102 ; 
Fourth  and  Twelfth  Regi- 
ments, 101,  139 

Australian    Mounted    Division, 

139 
Australian    and    New    Zealand 

Forces,  armament  of,  182; 

as  mounted  infantry,   189 
Australian    and    New   Zealand 


Mounted      Division,      128, 
129 

Austro-German  offensive 
against  Italians  in  1917, 

*57. 

automatic  weapons,  107,  in; 
Belgian  cavalry,  193 ; 
French  cavalry,  189 ;  Ger- 
man cavalry,  198;  carry- 
ing of,  no,  in;  see  ''ma- 
chine guns"  also 

auxiliaries,  neutralize  each 
other,  75 

Balkan  War,  134 
Balck,  139,  195 
Barbwire,  75 
Battle,  three  phases  of,  3 
decided  by  men,  6,  7 
efficiency,  16 

Bayonet,  cavalry  need  for,  116 
Beersheba,  102,  138,  139 
Belgium,  forces  at  Halen,  146 
German     advance     through, 

141,  174 

Bernhardi,    General  von,   54 
Bernstorff,  129 
Bicycles,  to  replace  lost  horses, 

109,  198 
Bliicher,  133 
Bobocul,  105 
Boer  War,  7,  79,  80 
Boers,  90 
Bredow,  yon,  179 
Briggs,  First  Cavalry  Brigade, 

140 

brigade,  cavalry,  Belgian,   193 
brigades,  cavalry,  British,  185 
brigades,  cavalry,  French,  188 
brigadier,  French  corporal,  188 
British      army,      see      "Army, 

British" 


INDEX 


203 


British    cavalry,    7;    see    also 

"Cavalry,  British" 
Buzzer,  signalling,  86 

Camouflage,  against  air  obser- 
vation, 152,  155 

Cars,     armored,     75,     76,    83; 
armored,  with  anti-aircraft 
guns,  84 
equipment,  84 
in  advance  and  rear  guards, 

83 

in  Palestine,  83 

organization,  84 

tactical  use  of,  85 

with  advance  guard,  122 
Characteristics,  national  Amer- 
ican, 33 

Cavalry,   advance   and   retreat, 
108 

advertising,  12 

aids  to,  6 

American,     lacks     advantage 
practice  in  war,  15 

arm  of  decision,  13 

as    combatant    branch,    i,   8, 

75 

as  escort  for  artillery,  82 
as  offensive  troops  in  battle, 

Association,   12 
Belgian,  192  to  195 
Belgian,  armament,  192 
Belgian,  combat  groups,  192 
Belgian,     organization,     192, 

193 
Belgian,     tactical    principles, 

193,  194 
British,  7,  72,  81,  90,  95,  121, 

126,  182  to  187 
British,  armament,  182 
British,  organization  of,  182 


Cavalry,   civilian  notion  of,  9, 

10 
Colonial,      mounted      attack' 

formation,  182,  183 
Combat  policy  for,  15 
Combat  training  for,   116 
deceiving  enemy,  142 
dismounted,    attack    against, 

99 

dismounting      in      face      of 

enemy,  91 
doctrine,  15 
drill  regulations,  German, 

79 
education  of  officers  to  value 

of,  13 

European,  81 
flanking  movements,  108 
French,  72,  81,  128,   134,  187 

to  192 
French,      organization,      187, 

188 
French,     tactical     principles, 

189  to  192 
German,  9,  81,  126,  129,  132, 

133,  134,  195  to  199 
German,  armament,  195 
improvement  of,  6 
in    battle,    German    opinion 

of,  196 

in  combat,  142  to  150 
in  1914,  10 
in  defense,  115 
independent,  164 
insures    freedom    of    action, 

in  World  War,  61 

Japanese,    at    Sandepu,    115; 

142;  before  Mukden,  135 
Journal,  12,  75,  105 
less       numerically,       greater 

strategically,  13 


2O4 


INDEX 


Cavalry,  main  role  of,  75 

man,  definition  of,  52 

opponents  of,  75 

Prussian,  128 

Russian,  9,  105,  134,  197 

School,  French,  188 

Serbian,  134 

standards  of  training,  15 

supplanted       in       strategical 
reconnaissance,  13 

temporary  eclipse,  13 

theatres  of  war,  10 

training  policy,  15 

Turkish,  153 

value    in    tactical    reconnais- 
sance, 13 

vulnerability   to   air    attacks, 

84 

Cerizy,  126,  149 
Character,   success  in  war  de- 
pends upon,  159 
Charge,   cavalry,  95 ;   see  "At- 
tack,  mounted" ;   also  fac- 
tors in,  96 

new  value  of,  97 
Charle-sur-Marne,    123 
Charles  XII,  91 
Cherfils,  13 
Chetwode,  149 
Civil  War,  American,  81,  134, 

139,  149 

Civilian  ideas,  cavalry  work, 
9,  10 

Clauswitz,  von,  65 

"coddling"  men,  40 

Colonial  dismounted  attack 
formations,  183,  184 

Colonial  mounted  attack  for- 
mations, 182,  183 

Column,  ammunition,  British 
cavalry  division,  186 

Column,  veterinary,  mobile,  73 


Combat,  mounted ;  see  "Attack, 
mounted"  and  "Charge" 

Combat,  cavalry  in,  142  to  150 

Combat,    cavalry   training    for, 
116 

Commander,  patrol,  178 

Commander,     position     during 
combat,  144 

Commendation,  28 

Communication,      air      service 
and  mobile  troops,  158 

Competition,  28;  spirit  of,  27 

Concealment,     effect     on     air 
service  of,  152,  155 

Conde,  91 

confidence,  lack  of,  61 

cooperation,    necessity    of,    be- 
tween branches,  60 

control  of  the  air,  hostile,  152 
to  154 

Corps,  Cavalry,  Fromel,  141 

Cossacks,  135 
corporals,  responsibility,  18 

Cromwell,  96 

Cronje,  130 

crowd,  psychology  of,  40 

crowd  mind,  45 

Cuirassiers,  2nd  German,  146 

cyclist  units,  199 


Damascus,   102 
Darius,  107 
De  Brack,  96 

Dedeagatch,  Battle  of,  134 
defile,  passage  through,  148 
de  Lisle,  125,  140 
Desert  Mounted  Corps,  128 
disadvantages,  cavalry,  109 
disciplinary  drills,  34 
discipline,  necessity  of  Ameri- 
can type  of,  33 


INDEX 


205 


discipline,  of  intelligence,  33 
of  habit,  34;  danger  of  too 

much  of,  34 
real.  41 

dismounted  attack,  197;  also 
see  "attack,  dismounted" 

dispersion,    cavalry,    145,    146 

divisions,  infantry,  75 
cavalry,  75 

cavalry,  basic  duty  of,  75 
cavalry,   marching   speed   of, 

77 

cavalry,  assignment  of  aux- 
iliaries to,  77 

cavalry,  advantages  over  in- 
fantry division,  136 

cavalry,      British      proposed, 
184,  185 

cavalry,      German      Second, 

Sixth  and  Eighth,  139 
documents,  patrol  must  gather, 

174 

Doyle,  Conan,  140 

dragoon  principle,  7 

Dragoons,  I3th  German,  at 
Mars-la-Tour,  98 

Dragoons,  i6th  German,  at 
Mars-la-Tour,  99 

Dragoons,  24th  Guard  Regi- 
ment, German,  105 

Dragoons,  I7th  and  i8th  Ger- 
man, 146 

Dragoons,  First  Guard  Regi- 
ment, German,  147 

Dragoons,  Fourth  Guard,  Brit- 
ish, at  Solesmes,  135 

dress,  effect  of,  47 

drill,  danger  of  excessive,  33 

drill,  mounted,  need  of  analyz- 
ing value  of,  37 

Drill  Regulations,  Cavalry, 
German,  137 


Eastern  front,  cavalry  on,  9 
Efficiency  records,   officers,  62, 

63 

Eighth  Australian  Light  Horse 

Regiment,  146 
Eighth  Turkish  Army,  128 
Eighteenth     Cavalry     Brigade, 

German,  104 
El  Afule,  122 
El  Burj,  138 
El  Mughar  Ridge,  102 
enemy,    best   time   to   observe, 

176 

enthusiasm,  lieutenant's,  devel- 
opment of,  19 

Esdraelon,  Plain  of,   103,  131 
esprit  de  corps,  44 
Es  Salt,  146 
Es  Sir,  126 
example,  effect  of,  45 


fatigue  duty,  interference  with 

training,  29 
field  glasses,  use  in  patrolling, 

174 
Fifteenth      Cavalry      Brigade, 

103 
Fifteenth       Cavalry       Brigade 

(Imperial  Service),  104 
Fifth  Cavalry  Brigade,  British, 

126,  149 
Fifth  Cavalry  Division,  British, 

charge  of,  95 

Fifth    Cavalry    Division,    Ger- 
man, 141 
Fifth    Division,    British,    1914, 

125 

fire  action,  114 
fire  action,  cavalry,  29,  107 
fire    action,    cavalry,    mounted, 


2O6 


INDEX 


fire  power,  augmentation  of 
cavalry,  no 

fire  power,  cavalry,  need  of, 
SO* 

fire,  volume  of,  109 

firing  problems,  faults  in,  117, 
118 

First  Army,  German,  127,  130, 
141,  174 

First  Corps,  British,  123,  140, 
149 

First  Cavalry  Brigade,  British, 
140 

First  Cavalry  Corps,  German, 
141 

Fontaine  Fauvel,  123 

Forbach,  Battle  of,  132 

forces,  economy  of,  167 

formations,  patrol,  174 

Fourth  Cavalry  Division,  Brit- 
ish, 130;  at  Lejjun,  103 

Fourth  Cavalry  Division,  Ger- 
man, 104,  141,  146 

Fourth  Turkish  Army,  129 

foxhunting,  50 

Franco-Prussian  War,  98, 
142 

Frederick  the  Great,  35,  91 

French,  Field  Marshal,  3,  4, 
11,  54,  126,  129,  130,  139 

Fretoy,  combat  at,  105,  147 

Froeschwiller,  Battle  of,  128 

Frommel,  141 

gallopers,  86 

Gaza,  153 

General  Staff,  German,  195 

German  Cavalry  Drill  Regula- 
tions, 79 

German  Cavalry;  see  "Cavalry, 
German" 

Germans,  86,  95,  121,  126 


Germans,  seize  bicycles  to  aid 

cavalry,  109 

Gettysburg,  Battle  of,  135 
Goltz,  von  der,  137 
Gough,  125,  126 
Grenfell,  83,  125 
ground,  reporting  on,  175 
groups,    combat,    Belgian    cav- 
alry, 192 
guard   duty,    interference   with 

training,  29 
Guards,    Brigade    of,    British, 

140 
Guards,       Cavalry       Division, 

German,  141 
Guards,  First  and  Second  Life, 

British,  138 
Guards,   Royal  Horse,  British, 

138 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  91 


Haelen,  combat  of,  146 

Haifa,   103,   104 

Haig,  Field  Marshal,  3,  4,  140 

Hampshire  Battery,  104 

headquarters,  regimental,  Brit- 
ish, 185 

Hejaz,  134 

heliograph,  86 

Hindenburg,  withdrawal  of,  in 
1917,.  157  . 

hobbies,  individual,  16 

Hood,  134 

horse  artillery;  see  "artillery, 
horse" 

horse,  as  weapon,  78 

horse,  breeding,  12 

Horse,  Jacobs,  104 

horse,  led;   see  "led  horses" 

horse,  cause  of  losses  in  cam- 
paign, 7,  73 


INDEX 


207 


horse  bowmen,  Parthian,  92 

horse,  soldier's  responsibility 
for,  67 

horse,  stimulation  of  soldier's 
interest  in,  67 

horse  training,  degree  of,  67 
scope  of,  66 
training  for  war,  66 

horses,  German,  cavalry,   195 

horses,  losses  in  German  cav- 
alry, 198 

horses,  care  of,  in  night  opera- 
tions, 180 

horsemanship,  practical  value 
of,  49;  effect  on  physi- 
cal well  being,  50 

Hotchkiss  guns,  185 

howitzers,  with  British  cav- 
alry division,  186;  with 
German  cavalry  division, 
198 

Huj,  103 

Hussars,  I5th  British,  140 

Hussars,      i8th     British,      125, 

147 

Hussars,  I5th  and  i6th  Ger- 
man, 104 

Hussars,  9th  Regiment  Ger- 
man, 104,  105 

Hussars,  loth  German,  at 
Mars-la-Tour,  99 

Hussars,  First  German  Life 
Guard,  101 

Hussars,  Royal  Bucks,  102 


imagination,  need  of,  55 
infantry,  mounted,  91,  93 
initiative,   abuse   of   term,    18; 
its  relation  to  training,  18; 
should  spring  from  knowl- 
edge, 51 


inhabitants,  attitude  of,  164; 
information  from,  175 

information,  145 ;  negative, 
167,  176;  transmission  of, 
180,  181 ;  valueless  unless 
transmitted,  161 

instruction,  practical,  64 

interest,  effect  on  memory,  35 ', 
especial  value  in  cavalry 
training,  35 ;  means  of 
producing  in  cavalry,  36; 
value  of,  35 

interpreter,  with  patrol,  178 

Irish  Horse,  The,  140 

Italian  Army,  bicycles  in, 
198 

Jacobs  Horse,  104 
Jaegar,  121,  126,  129,  198;  bat- 
talions, 7th  and  9th,  146 
Jackson,  Stonewall,  32,  164 
Jaffa,   138 
Japanese   Cavalry  at   Sandepu, 

H5 

J  Battery  Royal  Horse  Artil- 
lery, 149 

Jerusalem,  154 

Jordan,  128,  130 

Judea,  129 

Kaukab,  101 

Kauwukah,   138 

Kluck,   General  von,  4,   5,   86, 

126,  130,  134,  174 
Kumanovo,  Battle  of,  134 

Ladmirault,  General,  173 
lance,  German,  195,  196 
lance,  the,  197 
Lancers,  I2th,  149 
Lancers,  i8th,  103 
Lancers,  2nd,  at  Lejjun,  103 


208 


INDEX 


Lancers,     Jodhpur     Regiment, 

103 
Lancers,      Mysore      Regiment, 

104 

Lancers,  29th,  104 
Lancers,    20th,    at    El    Afule, 

122 

Lancers,  9th,  83,  125,  147 
Langlois,  60,  78 
leaders,  importance  in  cavalry 

of,  52 

leaders,  necessity  of,  14 
leaders,  qualities  necessary,  14 
leadership,    definition    of,    57; 

test  of,  20 
led  horses,   109,   112,   113,   116, 

117,    118;    attack    of,    99; 

British     handling     of,     in 

Palestine,    184;    cover   for, 

T      "45 

Lejjun,  103 

lieutenant,  responsibility,  18 

Lille,  105 

localities,  attack  of,  148 

loyalty,      cultivation      of,     40; 

necessity  for,  39 
Ludendorff,  General  von,  4,  6 
Lys  River,  4 

MacMahon,  128,  179 

machine  guns,  British  cavalry 
division,  187;  in  mounted 
attack,  98;  machine  guns, 
75;  also  see  "automatic 
weapons" 

Makt    Abu    Naj,    104 

Makt  Fathallah,  104 

major,  opportunities  for  con> 
mand,  24 

major,  cavalry,  French,  188 

maps,  175,  180 

Manchuria,  135 


march  outposts,  163 

marechal  des  logis,  188 

Marne,  Battle  of  the,  5,  123, 
126,  131,  139,  147 

Mars-la-Tour,  Battle  of,  98 

Marwitz,  von,  5,  127,  130,  141 

Megiddo,  130 

melee,  the,  98 

memory,  effect  of  interest  on 
soldiers',  35 

Mesopotamia,  9,  159 

messages,  coded,  86 

messengers,  177 

Mexican  border,  10,  61 

Militdr  lYochenblatt,  g 

mission,  patrol,  176 

mission,  reconnoitering,  neces- 
sary to  define,  164 

Mischenko,  135 

mobile  reserve,  108,  136 

mobility,  loss  of,  76,  impor- 
tance of,  106,  147,  148; 
taking  advantage  of,  113, 
114 

Modder,  130 

Moltke,  von,  54 

Mons,  Battle  of,  5,  125 

morale,  effect  of,  31 ;  German, 
31 ;  in  peace,  necessity  for, 
31 ;  constituents  of,  31 ; 
enemy,  inability  of  aero- 
plane to  judge  of,  151,  154 

motor  cycles,  with  advance 
guard,  122;  with  cavalry, 

85 

Mount  Carmel,  103,  104 

mounted  attack ;  see  "attack, 
mounted,"  and  "charge" 

mounted  infantry;  see  "infan- 
try, mounted" 

mounted  reserve,  115;  see  also 
"mobile  reserve" 


INDEX 


209 


movements,  visibility  of,   175 
Mukden,    Battle    of,    129,    135, 

142 
Murat,  73 

Nansouty,  73 

Napoleon,  31,  108,  120,  160 

Nazareth,  103 

newspaper,  report  of  cavalry 
operations,  9,  10 

night  operations,  and  aircraft, 
IS2^  1SS I  reconnaissance, 
179,  180 

Ninth  Australian  Light  Horse 
Brigade,  146 

Ninth  Cavalry  Division,  Ger- 
man, 141 

non-commissioned  officers;  see 
also  "officers,  non-commis- 
sioned";  French,  188,  189; 
importance  of,  18;  coop- 
eration with,  importance 
of,  46;  British,  57;  selec- 
tion of,  20;  responsibility, 
20;  as  trainers  of  indi- 
viduals, 20 

Northern  Corps,  N  i  e  m  a  n 
Army,  German,  139 

Novikov,  Russian  Cavalry  Di- 
vision of,  142 

obedience,  57;  reasons  for 
failure  in,  58 

offensive,  value  of,  88,  95 ; 
German,  March,  1918,  6 

officers,  cavalry,  definition  of, 
52;  as  group  leaders,  20; 
cavalry,  American,  88 ; 
combat,  development  of 
responsibility,  18;  efficiency 
records  of,  62;  see  also 
efficiency  records,  officers; 


junior,  training  of,  26; 
junior,  training  for  higher 
command,  27;  keeping  fit, 
51 ;  keeping  mentally  fit, 
51 ;  necessity  of  tactical 
training  for,  51,  53;  must 
know  individual  soldier, 
42;  need  of  specialization, 
57;  National  Guard  and 
Reserve,  12;  Reserve, 
training  of,  26;  tactical 
training  tests  in,  53;  re- 
sponsibility towards  men 
of,  42;  gating  of,  based  on 
unit,  64 

officers,  non-commissioned,  im- 
portance of,  19;  selection 
of,  20;  as  trainers  of  indi- 
viduals, 20;  training  of, 
26;  duties  not  to  be 
usurped,  56 ;  increasing 
prestige  of,  20;  see  also 
"non-commissioned  offi- 
cers" 

open  warfare,  value  of,  9 
Orchies,  105 

organization,  principles  of,  56 
outer  lines,  advantage  of,  99 
Oyama,  Field  Marshal,  129 


Palestine,  9,  80,  90,  97,  101,  122, 
126,  128,  129,  130,  133,  138, 
139,  152,  154,  159,  182 

paper  chases,  50 

Papen,  von,  129 

Parker,  General,  89 

patrol  leader,  action  before 
start  of,  172,  178,  179; 
pointers  for,  173  to  179; 
knowledge  required,  172, 
178 


2IO 


INDEX 


patrolling,  by  successive  loops, 
165,  166 

patrols,  outpost,  164;  strength 
of,  177;  when  to  fight,  179 

Pelet-Narbonne,  von,  135 

Peninsular  Campaign,  98 

Pershing,  General,  4,  5 

perspective,  necessity  of 
proper,  30 

physical  training,  46 

pigeons,  86 

pistol,  as  an  American  weapon, 
92,  93;  as  a  shock  weapon, 
93;  and  sabre,  compared, 
92,  101 

platoon,  cavalry,  Belgian,  192, 
193;  cavalry,  French,  187 

policy,  combat  for  cavalry,  15; 
training,  for  cavalry,  15 

polo,  50 

position  warfare,  199;  impor- 
tance in  future  wars,  2 

prisoners,  aid  to  information 
of,  162,  163;  inability  of 
aeroplane  to  take,  152, 
155 ;  rendering  harmless, 
177 

private,  developing  sense  of 
responsibility  in,  27;  sol- 
dier, means  of  advance- 
ment, 20 

problems,  firing  for  cavalry, 
117 

Provisional  Cavalry  Squadron, 
American  Forces  in  Ger- 
many, no 

psychology,  37 

punishing  power,  misuse  of,  40 

pursuit,  127  to  133 ;  by  fire, 
132;  danger  of  reckless, 
132;  magnifying  number^ 
in,  132 


raids,  133  to  135 

railroads,  133 

rallying,  96 

Ramleh,   130,   153 

rating  cards,  for  individual 
training,  23 

rear-guards,  124  to  126 

reconnaissence,  151  to  181 ;  ad- 
vance guard,  165,  166; 
avoiding  duplication  in, 
168;  air,  197;  independent, 
163 ;  contact,  163 ;  prelim- 
inary to  charge,  98; 
protective,  163;  protective, 
distances  in,  163,  164;  of 
retreating  force,  166 ; 
strategical,  sphere  of  air 
service,  157,  158;  tactical, 
sphere  of  cavalry,  157,  158 

recruits,    system    of    receiving, 

25 

Rederns  Brigade,  1870,  146 
regiment,  cavalry,  Belgian, 
193 ;  cavalry,  American, 
not  tactical  entity,  16; 
cavalry,  British,  185,  186; 
cavalry,  French,  188;  cav- 
alry, American,  readiness 
for  war,  24,  25 ;  cavalry, 
American,  loss  of  officers 
and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, 26;  cavalry,  Ameri- 
can, training  scheme, 

25 

remounts,  system  or  receiving, 
30;  service,  Palestine  cam- 
paign, 73 

Rennenkampf,  135 

rencontre,  176 

reports,  173,  I74>  177,  181 ; 
newspaper,  of  cavalry  op- 
erations, 9,  10 


INDEX 


211 


reserve,  mobile;  see  also  "mo- 
bile reserve";  108 

reservists,  lack  of  trained,  in 
American  cavalry,  25 

resisting  power,  advance  guard, 
121 

riding,  cross  country,  50 

rifle,  influence  on  cavalry  tac- 
tics, 7 

Richthofen,  von,  141 

Rimington,  14,  19 

Royal  Horse  Artillery,  J  Bat- 
tery, 149 

Roye,  134 

Rumania,    105;    operations    in, 

9 

Rupert,  Prince,  96 
Russian  campaign,  Napoleon's, 

7.3 
Russian    cavalry,    9,    105,    134, 

197 

Russo-Japanese  War,  129,  150; 
cavalry  in,  195 

sabre,  advantage  of,  in  ren- 
contre, 95 ;  experience  of 
Australian  forces  with,  94; 
German  opinion  of,  195; 
improper  training  in,  93; 
need  of  better  American, 

94 

Sadowa,  Battle  of,  128 
Saloniki,  134 
Saumur,     French     Cavalry 

School  at,  188 
Sandepu,  Japanese  cavalry  at, 

142 

Saulchery,  143 
San  Quentin,  126,  134 
Scharnhorst,  16 
Schmid,  von,  General,  35 
Scots  Greys,  149 


scout,  qualities  necessary  to, 
168;  subjects  trained  in, 
168  to  172 

scouting,  night  operations,   169 

screen,  cavalry.  140,  141,  166, 
167 

season  habit,  in  American  cav- 
alry training,  25 

Second  Cavalry  Brigade,  Brit- 
ish, 125,  140,  147 

Second  Cavalry  Corps,  Ger- 
man, 141 

Second  Cavalry  Division,  Ger- 
man, 141,  146 

Second  Corps,  British,  1914, 
138,  139,  140 

Second  German  Army,  130,  141 

Second  Light  Horse  Brigade, 
126,  133,  134 

section,  Belgian  cavalry,  192; 
too  few  men  for,  29; 
leader,  importance  of,  29 

security,  114,  121 

self-respect,  41 

sergeant,  responsibility  of,  18 

Seventh  Army,  Turkish,  128, 
129 

Seventh    Brigade,    British,    in 

I9H,  139 

Seventh  Cavalry  Brigade,  Brit- 
ish, 138 

Seventh  Cavalry  Division, 
French,  179 

Seventh  Division,  British,  138 

Seventh  Mounted  Brigade, 
British,  139 

Seventy-fourth  Infantry  Di- 
vision, 138 

Shellal,  138 

Shenandoah  Valley,  91 

Sheridan,  91,  140 

Sherman,  135 


212 


INDEX 


Siberia,  10 

signals,  for  patrols,  174;  with 
advance  guard,  123 

signal  service,  85,  86 

soldier,  as  individual,  22;  cav- 
alry, requirements,  proper 
training  of,  21 ;  American, 
points  of  superiority,  36; 
practical  nature,  37;  stand- 
ards, 41 ;  lack  of  uni- 
formity in  training,  22; 
cavalry,  developing  self- 
reliance  of,  27;  see  also 
"private  soldier" 

Solesmes,  125 

Sordet,  139 

South  African  War,  130;  see 
"Boer  War"  also 

speed,  essential  in  training,  28, 

US 

sports,  mounted,  their  impor- 
tance, 49 

squad,  cavalry,  French,  187; 
too  few  men  for  training 
in,  29 

squad-leader,  119 

squadron,  the  importance  of 
the,  23;  cavalry,  British, 
185 ;  cavalry,  French, 
187 

squadron  commander,  as  ad- 
viser, 19 

standardization  of  training,  17, 
18 

standards,  training  for  cav- 
alry, 15 

Stuart,  "Jeb,"  135,  148 

stubbornness,  danger  of,  150 

study,  value  of,  54 

suggestion,  use  of,  44 

surprise,  fullest  effect  from, 
148 


surprises,  in  World  War,  in 
spite  of  air  service,  156, 
157 

sword;  see  "sabre" 

sympathy,  necessity  of,  43 

Syria,  9,  159 

tactics,  cavalry  with  horse  ar- 
tillery, 81 

tanks,  75,  86,  87 

tanks,  whippet,  67 

target,  furnished  by  dismount- 
ed man,  89 

target,  furnished  by  mounted 
man,  90 

Tarnakova,  Battle  of,  142 

teaching,  officer  must  have 
ability  in,  59 

teamwork,  application  to  train- 
ing of,  38 

Tenth  Australian  Light  Horse 
Regiment,  146 

tests  for  training,  16 

tests  of  officers,  62 

Third  Cavalry  Brigade,  Brit- 
ish, 125,  126 

Third  Division,  British,  at 
Solesmes,  125 

training,  standardization  of, 
17;  weekly  compared  to 
seasonal,  26 ;  individual, 
rating  cards  for,  23 ;  indi- 
vidual proficiency,  ^3 

trains,  143 

transportation,  modern  means, 
ii 

troop,  importance  of,  as  unit, 
23;  cavalry,  British,  186; 
disciplinary  standing  of, 
tests  for,  63 ;  duty,  increas- 
ing prestige  'of,  64 ;  train- 
ing, tests  for,  63 


INDEX 


213 


troop  commander,  19,  21 
trucks,  caterpillar^  77 
Turco-German  air  forces,  153 
Turenne,  91 
Turkish  Armies,  7th  and  8th, 

128,  153 
Turks,  103 

Uhlans,  95 

Uhlans,  Bavarian  Brigade  near 
La  Garde,  101 

Uhlans,  First  Guard  Regi- 
ment, 101 

Uhlans,  Third  Guard  Regi- 
ment, 101 

Uhlans,  Ninth  Regiment  at 
Haelen,  146 

value,  battle,  of  cavalry,  159 
Verdun,      surprise      attack 

against,  1916,  157 
Villers  Faucon,  95 
volunteer  system,  evils  of,  25 

Wadi  Jamus,  102 

War,  Civil,  American,  81,  134, 

139,  149 

war  efficiency,  main  object,  28 
war,  main  issue  for  army,  65 
War,    South    African,    60,    72, 

90,    130;    see    also    "Boer 

War" 
warfare,  position,  199 


warfare,     trench,     disregarded 

in     future     plans     British 

cavalry,  185 
Wellington,  98,  167 
Western   front,  cavalry  on,  9, 

129;   type  of   warfare  on, 

ii 

Wheeler,  134 
wireless  sets,  197,  199 
wireless  with  cavalry,  86 
Wood,      Field      Marshal      Sir 

Evelyn,  54 
work,    and    results,    difference 

between,  58 

work,  mechanical,  evils  of,  59 
Worth,  Battle  of,  145 

Xenophon,  27 

Yeomanry,  British,  armament, 
182 ;      dismounted      attack 
formations,    183,    184;    or- 
ganization and  attack  for- 
mations, 182,  183 
Yeomanry  Division,  138 
Yeomanry,  Dorset,  102 
Yeomanry,   Middlesex,   104 
Yeomanry,     Warwick     and 

Worcester,  102,  103 
Ypres,  Battle  of,  5,  136,  138 

Zones,  reconnaissance,  161,  162 
Zulu,  92 


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